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In response to the emerging Cold War conflict, American policymakers adopted
cultural diplomacy as a permanent component of US foreign policy for the first time. In
an attempt to win the hearts and minds of the worlds’ people, American leaders utilized
international cultural outreach, through methods such as exchanges of students, teachers,
and scientists, traveling exhibitions, radio and television broadcasts, publications, and
tourism, among others. In recent decades, many historians have begun to explore the
significance of these efforts. However, none of these works have examined the
experience of those individuals who actually participated in the exchanges. This work
begins to fill that void by focusing on American academics who travelled to the Soviet
Union on educational exchange during the Cold War. By exploring their personal reports
and recollections of their time behind the Iron Curtain, this study illuminates how they
perceived their own nation, its values, and their own sense of national identity and
purpose. Ultimately, I argue that these Americans used the image of the inferior Soviet
“other” to cement a more unified national identity and affirm their feelings of American
exceptionalism. Still, though their belief in American superiority remained constant

throughout, their commitment to actively serve as America’s cultural representatives
abroad waxed and waned at different points in the Cold War. Namely, although at the
start of the program in 1958 exchangees enthusiastically assisted in spreading American
values abroad, when American public opinion shifted against the Vietnam War their
efforts immediately ceased. This shows specific examples of how conceptions of
American ideology changed in this period. For a time, these Americans, and probably
many others, abandoned a tenet that had long been central to American identity- the
belief that the United States had the duty to assert its ideology globally. It was not until
the last years of the Cold War, when American and Soviet leaders made significant
improvements in superpower relations, that these individuals felt confident enough to
serve again as cultural ambassadors. These fluctuations provide a case study of the direct
and personal effects of major political and foreign policy shifts on ordinary Americans.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1961, James H. Billington, an American professor of Russian history at
Harvard University, sat with three Soviet academics onboard a car traveling the TransSiberian Railway. Participating in an educational exchange of guest lecturers facilitated
by his institution and the University of Leningrad, Billington had in this instance one of
many opportunities to speak freely and directly with Soviet citizens. While partaking
generously from a bottle of the latest imported Cuban rum, the three men began
discussing their thoughts on the United States. They made sure to preface their opinions
on American society with their admiration for the professor personally. Billington
recalled: “‘We like YOU,’ the heaviest consumer of the Cuban beverage repeatedly
assured me, addressing me as ‘Ivan Ivanovich’ since ‘we can’t translate your name into
Russian, but want to accept you as one of us.’” While he did not seem to take terrible
offense to his newly given Russian name, Billington, however, did become concerned
about these educated and intelligent men’s perceptions of American life. He remembered
one of the men declaring, “It must be sad to live in an imperialist country.” Another
asked genuinely, “Why can’t Negroes publish works in their native language?”1
This Harvard professor was not alone in his concern about these misconceptions,
though, as American policy-makers also regretted these negative sentiments perpetuated
James H. Billington, “They Know So Much, Understand So Little,” New York Times, August 13, 1961,
SM7.
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by the Soviet government and its citizens. Through various methods of cultural
diplomacy, American politicians and strategists throughout the Cold War tried numerous
ways to part the Iron Curtain and relay positive information about life in the United
States through direct contacts with those living under Soviet rule. One particular
technique involved individuals like Billington who participated in academic exchange
programs with Eastern Europe.
Numerous historians have provided examinations of Cold War cultural exchange,
along with Soviet-American academic exchange in particular, and the purposes the
American government had in establishing these programs. However, no scholar has
conducted an analysis of the academics who actually participated in the exchanges, or
how they perceived the program, its role in the Cold War, and their own sense of national
identity and purpose. This project utilizes the words and recollections of those individuals
to fill that void. The organizations that operated US-Soviet educational exchange during
the Cold War required participants to write follow-up reports after their return to the
United States. These reports were intended to be kept relatively confidential; they were
not disseminated outside these agencies and their only purpose in addition to providing
feedback for exchange organizers was to be included anonymously in a handbook
containing advice for the following year’s participants. These reports were also generally
freeform. Though the agencies periodically suggested topics that exchangees might
include in their reports, the format, specific content, and length of these reports varied
from participant to participant. Therefore, these sources would appear to give an honest
view of how these Americans perceived their experience in the Soviet Union while on the
exchange program.
2

The first aim of this project is to provide an in-depth understanding of American
efforts at cultural diplomacy during the Cold War. As the US government got
increasingly involved in directing cultural exchange in this era, policymakers created
numerous new methods aimed at promoting direct interaction between the American and
Soviet people. This included exchanges of students, teachers, athletes, doctors, artists,
and scientists, traveling exhibitions, radio and television broadcasts, publications, and
tourism, among others.2 To fully understand how cultural exchange functioned during
this period, though, this work focuses on just one of those methods-- academic exchange- with the idea that such an emphasis can illuminate Cold War cultural exchange more
clearly and precisely, both from the perspective of exchange organizers and the
exchangees themselves.
The second, and more significant, objective of this research is to provide a lens
into Americans’ sense of national identity during the Cold War. By examining the
memories and recollections of Americans on academic exchange to the Soviet Union, I
seek to recount their conceptions of American values and how they evolved during a
period in which national ideology was particularly important. In describing the Soviet
Union, the reports of these individuals can offer great insight into how Americans
perceived not only their communist rival but also their own nation, its people, its
institutions, its mission, and its values.
It is important to note that the individuals examined here do not necessarily speak
for the entire American population nor do their views always correspond with other
groups of Americans. After all, this subset of Americans consisted of only educated
Robert F. Byrnes, Soviet-American Academic Exchanges, 1958-1975 (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1976), 42.
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individuals and those who had the economic means to obtain higher education. Most of
these individuals were white and a majority, especially in the first decade of the
exchange, were male. Still, though their viewpoint may not be completely representative,
they are certainly significant. First, their reports provide a direct look into the thoughts
and values of relatively “ordinary” Americans. While most historical examinations of the
Cold War and cultural diplomacy often focus only on policymakers and politicians and
their ideas and perceptions, this approach illuminates how the views of ordinary
individuals formed and evolved throughout this period. Second, these Americans’ ideas
are particularly important because most of them were very well-informed about the
Soviet Union, especially compared to the majority of their fellow Americans. Most
exchangees travelled to the Soviet Union to research a Russian or Soviet topic, the
majority of them spoke Russian, and many traveled to the region multiple times. These
exchangees viewed the Soviet Union from an academic perspective that encouraged them
to be objective and dispassionate. Therefore, the fact that ideas about American
exceptionalism and national identity appeared in their reports suggests the truly powerful
and pervasive nature of these ideas. That even these Americans, who approached the
Soviet Union from a scholarly perspective, saw it through the lens of popular American
Cold War values makes it very likely that many other Americans viewed the conflict and
their country in similar ways.
Tied closely with the previous objective, the third and final aim of this work is to
illustrate how national policy and shifts in America’s political landscape affected
individual citizens. The following chapters progress in three roughly decade-long periods
because each represents a distinct political era. The first, from 1958 to 1968, was not only
4

the first decade of the exchange program, but it was also an era when the American
commitment to containing communism was generally (though not wholly) unquestioned.
The second, from 1969 to 1979, was a period of flux in American Cold War values. With
growing doubts about the legitimacy of the Vietnam War, shocking government scandals,
and a swelling crisis of confidence among the American people, American Cold War
policy was under more scrutiny than ever before. However, this changed in the third
period from 1980 to 1991. President Ronald Reagan’s initial antagonistic rhetoric toward
the Soviet Union reasserted that the Cold War was primarily a battle of ideas, and his
subsequent negotiations with the Soviet leadership reestablished the possibility that
American values could be transplanted abroad, even within the communist bloc.
Examining the recollections, perceptions, and beliefs of American exchangees throughout
each of these periods can illuminate the exact impact of these political shifts on this
particular set of Americans.
The foundation of this project builds on several important theoretical concepts
developed by historians and other scholars, especially ideas about culture, national
identity and the construction of the “other,” and analyses of travel writing. As a work that
seeks to interpret the perceptions of individuals, the methods of cultural studies are
especially integral. The work of anthropologist Clifford Geertz is an important influence,
especially his ideas about the significance of culture. He claims that culture, at its most
basic level, is a context for the actions and behaviors of individuals. Therefore, in
gathering historical records, “what we call our data are really our own constructions of
other people’s constructions of what they and their compatriots are up to.” Taking that
into account, with this project I have attempted to take a deeper look at the accounts of
5

American exchangees, striving to unpack their sense of self and identity both by what
they said and what they did not say. Geertz claimed that mankind has a drive to “make
sense out of experience” by using symbolic activities, such as ideology, to create a
framework for understanding and comprehending the world.3 This project seeks to extract
that framework and get a precise picture of the values and ideals these Cold War
Americans held. Another central concept in this project, in addition to Geertz’s ideas
about culture, is Benedict Anderson’s notion of nationalism. In his monograph Imagined
Communities, Anderson argues that “all communities larger than primordial villages of
face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined.” Nations are imagined in the
sense that, even though most citizens of a nation will never meet one other, they form
constructed values and ideologies that connect them together and give them a sense of
unity.4 This work assumes that Anderson’s concept of nationalism is applicable to
twentieth-century Americans. Therefore, it seeks to extract, analyze, and show the
changes in notions of nationalism and national identity among Americans during the Cold
War era.
Several historians of the past few decades have deployed Geertz’s and Anderson’s
concepts to develop the field of cultural history, and this project also draws on the work
of those scholars. For instance, historian Michael H. Hunt in Ideology and US Foreign
Policy is clearly influenced by Geertz in his definition of ideology as “an interrelated set
of convictions or assumptions that reduces the complexities of a particular slice of reality
to easily comprehensible terms.” Though Americans have traditionally resisted the idea
Clifford Geertz, The Interpretations of Culture: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 9, 14,
140-141.
4
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism
(London: Verso, 1983), 6.
3
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that they were dogmatic or ideological, Hunt’s research shows that such a national
consciousness was present throughout American history.5 My work utilizes the
arguments of Geertz and Hunt, further illustrating that Americans did indeed have a
strong, if sometimes unconscious, national ideology, especially during the Cold War.
Other historians have expanded upon this idea as well, such as John Fousek in his book
To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Roots of the Cold War. Fousek
seeks to understand popular perceptions of US foreign policy and underscores the
importance of examining public discourse and popular culture in order to reconstruct
American Cold War ideology. The Cold War consensus, he argues, was upheld by the
general public’s acceptance and perpetuation of America’s nationalist ideology. While
Fousek mainly focuses on discourses in the media and within African American and
labor union publications, I seek to expand on his model by using the accounts of
American academic exchangees.6
This project also draws heavily from research on national identity and the concept
of the “other.” The ideas of literary critic Edward Said, presented in his seminal work
Orientalism, are imbedded throughout this research. Said posited that nineteenth-century
Western imperial powers constructed the exotic, strange, and inferior image of the East in
order to solidify Westerners’ notion of their own superiority. In other words, the West
defined itself by its contrasting image of the “other,” namely the Orient.7 Through my
research, I have applied Said’s concept of the “other” to Americans living in the shadow
of the Cold War. During this turbulent time, the image of the Soviet Union as the primary
Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and US Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), xi, 13.
John Fousek, To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), ix, 2.
7
Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 12-26.
5
6
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enemy-other provided a stabilizing force for American national identity. Though
Americans debated and renegotiated their sense of self many times throughout this
period, the notion of their superiority to the Soviet other provided one of the few unifying
foundations for their national ideology.
Some historians have studied this “othering” phenomenon in relation to the Cold
War, such as Walter Hixson in The Myth of American Diplomacy. Hixson explores how
culture and ideology shaped American foreign policy throughout its history, and he
claims that the Soviet Union “merged into the long line of enemy-others dating back to
Indian conquest and critical to the reaffirmation of the mythically rooted imagined
community.”8 While Hixson’s work is broad in scope, drawing from secondary sources
on American history from the nation’s founding to the twenty-first century, I seek to
apply his ideas to a single group of exemplary Americans in order to understand if and
how it was exhibited by individuals. Another historian, David S. Foglesong, also utilized
Said’s framework in his book The American Mission and the “Evil Empire.” Foglesong
contends that, from the late nineteenth to the twenty-first century, organizations and
movements focused on “freeing” Russia strongly influenced how Americans perceived
themselves, “particularly by offering proof of American idealism and reassurance about
the special place of the United States in the world.”9 My research seeks to further test this
notion by putting it against those Americans who actually travelled to the Soviet Union.
Lastly, my research is also influenced by scholarly literature on travel writing.
Professor of literature Tim Youngs defines the term “travel writing” as “first-person
Walter L. Hixson, The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and US Foreign Policy (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 166.
9
David S. Foglesong, The American Mission and the “Evil Empire”: The Crusade for a “Free Russia”
Since 1881 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 6.
8
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prose accounts of travel that have been undertaken by the author-narrator.”10 In The
Cambridge Introduction to Travel Writing, Youngs underscores the important ways that
scholars of travel writing have utilized the ideas of Edward Said. Namely, Said’s analysis
shows that travel writings cannot be taken as pure factual accounts. Instead, travelers-and thus their writings-- are heavily influenced by the culture in which they originate,
which prohibits the traveler from objectively viewing the location he or she is visiting.
Therefore, according to Youngs, travel writing illuminates how people define themselves
and how they define others.11 Another literature scholar, Carl Thompson, agreed that
studying travel writing “can yield significant insights into the ideologies and practices
that sustain the current world order” and is a way to “reveal something of the culture
from which that writer emerged.” This is because of the process of constructing a travel
narrative, he argues. A traveler cannot simply record every single moment of his or her
trip abroad. Therefore, travelers must choose events they deem significant and translate
them into narratives. This introduces a “fictive dimension” into the travel text and thus
illuminates the writer more so than the subject being written about.12 Thus, my research
does not aim to provide a glimpse into Cold War Soviet society through the writings of
American exchange participants. Though many of these exchangees’ reports recount in
detail the workings and characteristics of life in the Soviet Union, my analysis proceeds
with the assumption that these accounts offer more valuable insight into the ideology and
ideals of their authors than they do into the environment being observed.

Tim Youngs, The Cambridge Introduction to Travel Writing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2013), 3.
11
Youngs, The Cambridge Introduction to Travel Writing, 1-9.
12
Carl Thompson, Travel Writing (New York: Routledge, 2011), 10, 27.
10
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With these foundational concepts in mind, this work argues that many Americans
during the Cold War used the image of the Soviet enemy-other to cement a more unified
national ideology and assert their feelings of American exceptionalism. Though
Americans faced new challenges to their national values at different points in the Cold
War, the accounts of American academic exchangees show that their internalization of
American superiority, coupled with their consistent critiques of Soviet society, provided a
constant method of reaffirming their sense of American identity and purpose. During the
first decade of the exchange program, from 1958 to 1968, Americans worried about the
spread of communism and the prospect of the Soviet Union surpassing the United States
in national strength and technology. Exchangees dealt with these fears by promoting
American exceptionalism and touting the belief that the Soviet people could easily be
convinced to emulate the American way, both in terms of its democratic values and its
consumer culture. The second decade of the exchange, from 1969 to 1979, was a time of
ideological crisis for many Americans. The growing opposition to the Vietnam War
forced Americans to confront the possibility that the containment of communism might
not be feasible or worth the cost in many areas of the world. Still, while most American
exchange participants of this decade abandoned their previous desire to spread American
values to the Soviet people, they held on to their notions of American exceptionalism
through their consistent criticisms of the inefficiencies and hardships of Soviet life. In the
third period, from 1980 to 1991, President Ronald Reagan “re-othered” the Soviet Union
with his aggressive rhetoric and shifted the purpose of the Cold War back to being a
battle of ideas. His subsequent “reversal,” in advocating for a better relationship with the
Soviet Union, convinced American exchange participants that it was worthwhile for them
10

to serve again as America’s cultural ambassadors. Such a change in national policy made
these Americans believe, like their president, that the Soviet Union was capable of major
reform. Thus American exchangees in the final years of the Cold War believed it was
their duty to instill superior American values into the Soviet people, in particular the
importance of free intellectual expression and critical thinking. These trends show that
the major political and foreign policy shifts of the Cold War had deep and personal
effects on individual Americans. In particular, the fluctuating health of US-Soviet
relations and changing public opinion about American international policy convinced
them of the feasibility or futility of their efforts to service as America’s cultural
representatives.
This research fits into the growing historiography within the field of American
foreign relations that focuses on culture and international cultural transfer. According to
diplomatic historians Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, the field’s turn toward
cultural history was the most significant development of the early twenty-first century.
They cite two main strands of analysis used by historians in this emerging realm of study:
those who study cultural exchange or “cultural transfer” between the US and other
nations and those who analyze how culture affects American foreign policy and the
worldview of American policymakers. Furthermore, Hogan and Paterson assert that this
trend also changed the types of sources diplomatic historians utilize. With the new
cultural turn, many began using archives of institutions such as the US Information
Agency or the Agency for International Development, while others even increasingly

11

look to non-governmental records.13 This trend is especially true for American historians
of the Cold War. As Robert Griffith outlines in this article “The Cultural Turn in Cold
War Studies,” before the 1990s there were very few works on Cold War culture and even
fewer that explained the Cold War as a cultural phenomenon. By the turn of the twentyfirst century, though, more and more historians, along with their peers in American
studies, anthropology, literature, and sociology, created a plethora of scholarship on
American Cold War culture and “how that culture shaped and was in turn shaped by the
Cold War.”14 Other scholars in the field, such as Scott Lucas and Walter Hixson, concur
that the study of the Cold War has much to gain from cultural insights. Lucas contends
that “there are signs that culture, which was integral to the quest for supremacy in the
Cold War, will finally receive due recognition.”15 In other words, as Hixson asserts,
diplomatic historians had begun to not only focus on American interactions abroad but
also “the narratives that produced consent behind foreign policy.”16
Similarly, this works seeks to add to the increasing body of scholarship on
American identity and ideology, especially in the context of the Cold War. In the broader
field of diplomatic history, many scholars of the last three decades have begun to explore
the centrality of ideology to American foreign policy. One of the first historians to take
this approach was Frank A. Ninkovich in his work The Diplomacy of Ideas: US Foreign
Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950. While he admitted that American leaders
consistently relegated cultural relations to a minor role in their international strategies,
Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 7-8.
14
Robert Griffith, “The Cultural Turn in Cold War Studies,” Reviews in American History 29 (2001): 150.
15
Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher, eds., Cultural and International History (New York:
Berghahn Books, 2003), 206.
16
Hixson, The Myth of American Diplomacy, 3.
13
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examining the methods and messages put forth by America’s cultural diplomacy can
illuminate broader notions of “national character” and “the larger cultural forces at
work.”17 A few years later, Michael H. Hunt expanded on this concept even further in
Ideology and US Foreign Policy. He contended that national ideology was central to
explaining American foreign policy throughout the nation’s history. Most notably,
American ideology has always centered around three notions in particular: the existence
of a racial hierarchy, a hostility toward and resistance of “un-American” leftist
revolutions, and the connection between national greatness and the desire to spread
American democracy abroad. Still, he asserted, leaders have constantly reshaped or
reassembled these notions throughout American history, and thus American ideology has
never been completely fixed or static.18 Finally, historian Walter L. Hixson reinforced
these earlier works in his book The Myth of American Diplomacy. He argued that
“national identity drives US foreign policy” and those notions, especially the idea that the
United States is destined to be a “beacon of liberty” and assert its power globally, is at the
heart of America’s aggressive foreign policy.19
Building on these works, other scholars have more recently examined the
influence of ideology specifically on America’s Cold War policy. American studies
professor Scott Lucas, in his book Freedom’s War, agreed with Hunt on the centrality of
ideology, asserting
The United States, just like the Soviet system with which it contended for so long,
has an “ideology.” It may not be as rigidly presented as MarxismFrank A. Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas: US Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 2-4.
18
Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and US Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 12-17,
171,172.
19
Hixson, The Myth of American Diplomacy, 1-2.
17

13

Leninism…however, it still serves to justify and, to some extent, to organize
political, economic, and cultural activity.20
Therefore, his central argument concluded that the Cold War was, at its heart, a clash of
ideologies, and in this clash, America’s guiding force was the idea that the United States
had the duty to spread freedom abroad. Furthermore, this ideology was not imposed on an
“unwilling or passive [American] public” but was instead willingly advocated by private
groups such as the National Committee for a Free Europe, the American Committee for
the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia, American Friends of Russian Freedom, and many
others.21 Additional studies, such as the aforementioned works by John Fousek, concur
with Lucas and further reinforce the importance of ideology and national identity in
driving American foreign policy. My research seeks to bolster those arguments and also
add a new consideration to this strain of diplomatic history. Ideology was not only
important in shaping how American policymakers interacted with the world or in
justifying US Cold War foreign policy. Notions of America’s values also helped
determine how ordinary Americans conceptualized the world and their nation’s place in
it. This project shows specifically how one segment of Americans interpreted and utilized
prevailing views of American ideology in their interaction with Soviet society at different
points throughout Cold War.
In addition to contributing to the growing scholarship on American ideology, this
research also fits into the recent push by diplomatic historians to consider the importance
of non-governmental actors in American foreign policy. Historian Akira Iriye describes
these as individuals or groups “outside of the formal state apparatus” who do not view
Scott Lucas, Freedom’s War: The American Crusade Against the Soviet Union (New York: New York
University Press, 1999), 1-2.
21
Lucas, Freedom’s War, 2.
20
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direct political activities as their primary objective. Iriye was one of the first diplomatic
historians to assert the importance of such people in his article “A Century of NGOs.”
American non-governmental organizations, all of which promoted international outreach
or cultural interchange, grew dramatically in the twentieth century, reaching over 1,500
by the 1980s. Therefore, he argued, the American government was not the only entity
shaping perception of the United States abroad, but instead these groups played a
significant role as well.22 Additional scholars have since taken this less governmentcentered approach to American foreign affairs. Historian Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht
applauded these efforts, noting that these new works were creating a more diverse field of
diplomatic history. Because of scholars’ growing attention to private actors, she
contended, international history had taken on “a profound pluralism,” including “a
growing awareness that the state is only one out of many principal agencies in the
international arena.”23 One of these scholars includes Justin Hart and his look at Cold
War public diplomacy in his recent work Empire of Ideas. He argues that American
policymakers’ incorporation of public diplomacy and cultural exchange into their larger
Cold War strategy meant that “ordinary people played the defining role in creating the
image of ‘America’ projected to the world.” While American leaders could do their best
to shape that image, it came down to individual Americans on the ground to decide how
exactly they wanted to present the United States to peoples abroad.24 My work agrees
with these scholars that, especially during the Cold War, individual Americans played a

Akira Iriye, “A Century of NGOs,” Diplomatic History 23 (Summer 1999): 421-435.
Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher, eds., Culture and International History (New York:
Berghahn Books, 2003), 5.
24
Justin Hart, Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of US Foreign
Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 10-12.
22
23

15

vital role in shaping the global perception of the United States. Still, in terms of those on
academic exchange to the Soviet Union, they appear to have had less power than Hart
conjectures. The Cold War consensus, explored at the end of the following chapter, and
American ideology more broadly was a powerful force in this era. The fact that American
exchangees reshaped their tactics and rhetoric in direct correlation with broader political
shifts show that they could only stray so far from those prevailing and pervasive notions
of American identity. Specifically, they consistently confirmed the idea of American
exceptionalism through their actions and behavior while abroad. So while this research
underscores the importance of these non-governmental actors, it also places them within
a larger Cold War context that they played a part in perpetuating.
This work will begin by outlining the development of American cultural
exchange. It will trace the first major instances of these international interactions in the
late nineteenth century and then follow the increasing involvement of the American
government in adopting these once-private sector methods. This second chapter will
culminate with the 1958 cultural exchange agreement between the United States and the
Soviet Union, which allowed for the first official US-Soviet academic exchanges to
begin. Subsequent chapters will trace the exchange through three periods, 1958-1968,
1969-1979, and 1980-1991, showing how political and cultural shifts and larger foreign
policy happenings of these eras changed both the health and size of the exchange
program and also affected how the American participants themselves perceived of the
program and their purposes abroad.
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PRESENTING A “FULL AND FAIR” IMAGE OF AMERICAN LIFE, 1900-1958
Though United States government-supported cultural exchange became a
relatively well accepted method of advancing American interests by the latter half of the
twentieth century, this was a fairly new phenomenon. Various private groups had
promoted cultural interchange in the pre-Cold War era, but the United States government
had mostly kept itself detached from these incursions into the cultural sphere, especially
during peacetime. As made apparent by the history of American cultural exchange
throughout the twentieth century, American leaders very begrudgingly took up the mantel
of cultural purveyors. The ideologically-charged Cold War necessitated a peacetime
exchange program, and American leaders finally established new government
organizations that sought to guide the message and means of these intellectual
transmissions, including those that specifically targeted the Soviet Union. Still, each postwar presidential administration encouraged private actors to help facilitate these
exchanges, including educational exchange, in order to avoid the negative connotation
many Americans associated with government propaganda. This chapter will serve as a
foundational background to subsequent chapters, providing a synthesis of historical
works that have explored how the United States government became involved in cultural
exchange and how such programs came to be extended to the Soviet Union after World
War II. It will also show that the vast majority of existing historical scholarship on
17

American cultural exchange only examines these efforts from the perspective of those
high officials, either in the private or public sphere, who organized them. While
historians have given thorough examinations of the motivations of these individuals,
almost no literature exists that examines the ideals, perceptions, and experiences of the
exchange participants who actually travelled abroad as representatives of America.
Subsequent chapters will use the experience US-Soviet academic exchangees to began
remedying this omission.
The earliest efforts to disseminate American values across the globe began in the
nineteenth century with the activities of several private groups. Missionaries in particular,
driven by a sense of American exceptionalism coupled with evangelical fervor, travelled
to Latin America, Africa, and Asia to promote uplift and “civilization” through spreading
Protestant Christianity. They especially focused on building schools and providing
education as a means not only to promote the Gospel, but also to foster American ideals
such as democracy and individualism. American missionaries even singled out promising
young locals to send back to the United States to receive a Western education. With such
training, missionaries postulated, these individuals could come back to their homelands
and become influential Christian leaders in their respective communities.25 Throughout
most of the nineteenth century, this was almost the entire scope of American student
exchange programs. This was partially because international scholars generally held
European universities in much higher esteem than American institutions. While many
Americans travelled abroad for higher education, very few students had an interest in
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studying in the United States. By the mid-nineteenth century, students from regions in
Asia, such as China and India, did begin to enroll in American colleges, but reciprocal
exchanges remained rare.26
Likewise, academic exchange between the United States and Russia, as well as
cultural exchange more broadly between the two nations, remained essentially
nonexistent in the nineteenth century. Unlike America’s missionary zeal for other foreign
regions, Americans were largely indifferent to the plight of Russians before the twentieth
century. Political leaders, diplomats, and the American people tended to view Russia as
backward, economically weak, and a seedbed of radical activity. Though a “free Russia”
movement did develop in the 1880s and 1890s, with American activists collaborating
with Russian revolutionaries to end tsarist oppression, no official or unofficial cultural
exchange programs between the two nations emerged in that period.27
The first years of the twentieth century would bring about an increase, however
gradual, in efforts aimed at American cultural transmission. As in previous years, these
endeavors generally stemmed from private initiatives and, increasingly in the early
1900s, from philanthropic foundations. Organizations such as the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, founded in 1910, and the Rockefeller Foundation, established in
1913, laid the groundwork for future large-scale cultural exchange programs, and
especially focused on promoting academic interchange. These efforts were spurred on, in
part, by economic incentives. Leaders of the Rockefeller Foundation, for instance,
believed that spreading education through exchange programs helped grow the middle
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class in the developing world and thus provided burgeoning markets receptive to
American business.28 However, as historians have recently uncovered, these major
philanthropic foundations were also driven by a desire to promote American foreign
policy interests, showing that even in this early period, the heart of cultural exchange was
in improving America’s image worldwide.29 John D. Rockefeller, Jr. believed that
international academic ties in particular would help create friendly relations between the
United States and other nations.30 The first president of the Carnegie Endowment, Elihu
Root, concurred, asserting the need to utilize cultural connections to assist in remedying
international conflict. In carrying out this objective, the Carnegie Endowment initiated
what would become the standard cultural programs of the Cold War period in the years
soon after its founding in 1910; these included the exchange of students and professors,
the exchange of publications and books, English language instruction abroad, and the
exchange of experts in various professional fields. These early initiatives focused mostly
on parts of Latin America and the Far East.31 Still, even though private efforts, especially
through philanthropic foundations, dominated the cultural diplomacy of the early
twentieth century, the American government soon made its first forays into what political
scientist Joseph Nye has termed “soft power” strategies.32
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The United States government first delved into cultural exchange programs by
promoting educational cooperation with China. In the aftermath of the Boxer Rebellion in
1900, the major Western powers, including the United States, forced huge indemnities on
the Chinese government. Secretary of State John Hay convinced President Theodore
Roosevelt in 1904 to repurpose those debts to fund a program allowing Chinese students
to study in the United States. Hay envisioned a dual foreign policy purpose, both
improving the image of the United States in China and spreading Western ideals through
the returning Chinese participants.33
Still, throughout the early twentieth century, American cultural relations with
Russia remained illusory in terms of large-scale or official exchanges. Though there were
some cultural transmissions between the United States and Russia, such as exchanges of
publications, music, and travelling entertainers, educational contact remained limited.
Furthermore, very few American universities offered Russian studies, which limited the
number of potential students available for exchange programs to Russia. In this period,
only two American institutions offered instruction in Russian history and merely three
universities allowed students to study Russian language and literature.34 The Bolshevik
Revolution in 1917 almost completely severed Russian-American cultural ties, and it
would be decades before those connections could be reestablished and expanded upon.
The experience of the Great War finally provided the impetus for the United
States government to create a large-scale cultural exchange and informational program,
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although American officials saw this mostly as a wartime expedient that would cease at
the end of the conflict. Realizing the importance of influencing public opinion as a
method to help win the war, within days of America’s entrance into the First World War
in the spring of 1917, President Woodrow Wilson issued an executive order to create a
new government division charged with leading America’s propaganda efforts. Wilson
chose journalist George Creel to head the new organization, called the Committee for
Public Information (CPI). The use of the word “information” represented a very
conscious decision, as both Wilson and Creel knew that the term “propaganda” implied
manipulation and deceit in most Americans’ minds.35 The CPI oversaw domestic
methods to increase support for the war among American citizens; more significantly, it
also worked to influence foreign perceptions of the United States through means of
cultural transmission, an unprecedented role for the American government. For instance,
the CPI disseminated American publications abroad, either by sending articles to foreign
presses, using planes to drop leaflets on European cities, or establishing libraries abroad
stocked with American books. In all, the CPI oversaw the distribution of a staggering 75
million American publications during the course of World War I. The CPI also sponsored
speaking tours, patriotic films, English-language schools, exhibitions, and radio
broadcasts all over Europe.36 Despite its effective outreach and Creel’s efforts to maintain
the CPI as an “informational” program, government-sponsored cultural projection
became mired in suspicion among both American politicians and the public. Therefore,
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by the summer of 1919, just a few months after fighting had ceased in Europe, Congress
dissolved the Committee for Public Information. It was almost two decades before the
American government would again consider venturing into the sphere of cultural
interchange, and it was only when a second world war seemed imminent that American
officials felt compelled to recreate and expand many of Creel’s programs.37
Throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s, private organizations again took the
initiative in promoting international cultural exchange. During this period, Secretary of
Commerce Herbert Hoover attempted to persuade Congress to sponsor scholarships for
international students to study in the United States, but Congress rejected his proposal.
This set the precedent for the next decade during which the American government played
no substantial part in promoting or organizing cultural or educational exchanges.38
Private organizations enthusiastically filled this vacuum, however, and these cultural
internationalist groups expanded at an unprecedented rate. For instance, both the
Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment broadened their previous efforts at
cultural outreach. Also, the Teachers College at Columbia University created an
international program in 1923 whereby its students could go abroad to Asia, Latin
America, the Middle East, and Africa to lead educational reform efforts in those regions.
These were just a few examples of this period’s expanded efforts, though; surveys
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conducted by the American Council on Education outlined that by 1925, more than 120
American organizations were engaged in international educational activities 39
One of the most significant academic exchange associations to emerge from the
inter-war period, which laid the groundwork for future cultural organizations, was the
Institute of International Education. Following World War I, organizers of the Carnegie
Endowment realized that their burgeoning academic exchange program was quickly
becoming too cumbersome to operate solely within the confines of their foundation. They
decided to establish a conjoined agency that would specifically oversee their educational
activities. Thus, with a startup grant of $30,000, Carnegie officials founded the Institute
of International Education (IIE) in 1919. The IIE was particularly instrumental because,
as historian Frank Ninkovich asserted, it was “the nation’s first body devoted exclusively
to the systematization of cultural relations.”40 Still, while the IIE became the largest
organization for the promotion of academic exchange, many other foundations and
agencies in the post-World War I era built upon its seminal efforts. By 1925, more than
120 American organizations actively promoted international educational activities.41
Underpinning this trend, universities in the United States began offering more courses on
the study of other nations and regions during this period, laying the curricular foundation
for the field of international relations and providing an impetus for study abroad
programs.42

Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 10; Bu, Making the World Like Us, 51,
115-116; Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order (Baltimore: John Hopkins University
Press, 1997), 51.
40
Arndt, The First Resort of Kings, 41; Bu, Making the World Like Us, 53; Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of
Ideas, 18-19.
41
Bu, Making the World Like Us, 51; Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 10.
42
Arndt, The First Resort of Kings, 40.
39

24

Despite the wide variety of these inter-war cultural organizations, they appeared
to be united in their core beliefs and aspirations. After the horrific experience of the First
World War, cultural internationalists stressed repeatedly the importance of cross-national
understanding. As contemporary political scientist Mary Follett wrote, “The oldfashioned hero went out to conquer his enemy; the modern hero goes out to disarm his
enemy through creating a mutual understanding.” These advocates concluded that
international cultural cooperation, and academic exchange in particular, was the means to
achieve peace. Not only would such efforts help avoid another global cataclysm, but they
would serve to spread American democratic values and promote a positive impression of
the United States all over the world.43
Regardless of many Americans’ apprehensions about the 1917 communist
revolution in Russia, this expansion of American cultural exchange programs even
extended to the newly-formed Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and interaction
between the United States and the Soviet Union extended across many segments of
society in the 1920s and early 1930s. Indeed, American and Soviet citizens maintained so
much contact with one another in the inter-war period that the level of cooperation they
reached was not matched again until the 1960s. Both “informal” cultural exchange- such
as relief programs, industrial and technological exchange, religious outreach, and
tourism- and more explicit cultural relations in realms such as entertainment, art, and
education served to bridge the boundary between East and West in this period.44
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In the inter-war period, American and Soviet citizens interacted directly through a
number of different programs and methods, and even when these connections did not fit
easily under the term “cultural exchange,” these personal interactions often promoted
understanding and good feelings between the two nations. One of the first large-scale
connections between the United States and Communist Russia was American relief
efforts during and after the Russian Civil War. A horrific famine overtook the region in
the early 1920s, and Herbert Hoover’s humanitarian organization, the American Relief
Administration (ARA), oversaw food distribution. Organizers of this aid program
recognized this undertaking as more than a mere benevolent mission, however. The ARA
organizers also utilized their work in Communist Russia as a means of cultural
projection, hoping that it would encourage goodwill towards the United States among the
Russian people and thus conceivably prompt them to overthrow Bolshevik rule.45 The
communist victory in the civil war and the subsequent establishment of the Soviet Union
did not bring an end to American-Soviet contacts, though. Evangelical missionaries,
particularly Methodists, Baptists, Pentecostals, and Adventists- travelled to Soviet Russia
in relatively large numbers during most of the 1920s. The Bolshevik regime tolerated
religious incursions into their country in this early period, allowing these America
missionaries personal and direct interaction with the Soviet people. This was due to the
fact that Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin believed that an important component of Soviet
success was learning from the American public education system. Therefore Soviet
officials welcomed many American missionaries, such as Methodist minister Julius F.
international understanding. Though cross-cultural goodwill was often a secondary goal of these programs,
achieving such was not the explicit or official purpose of these programs.
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Hecker, who promoted education in conjunction with their religious mission. Hecker
created a series of correspondence courses and teacher training programs in the USSR in
these first years after the communist revolution, helping to begin repairing an educational
system that had been disrupted by the First World War and the subsequent Russian Civil
War. However, by 1929 this openness began to be scaled back as the Bolshevik regime
began to view the burgeoning Protestant movement as a dangerous rival in their effort to
win over young Russians to the communist cause.46
Throughout this same period, academic exchanges unaffiliated with religious
institutions began to grow between the United States and the Soviet Union, though
historians have struggled to arrive at a precise number of exchangees because of a lack of
records on these activities. For instance, in 1921 the Rockefeller Foundation began to
fund young Soviet scientists who wished to study in American universities. Additionally,
the foundation granted $15,000 to Soviet scientific institutions in the 1920s to provide
them with adequate laboratory equipment and access to foreign medical publications.
Another proponent of these efforts was Stephen P. Duggan, a Columbia University
Professor and founder of the Institute for International Education. In 1925 Duggan
travelled to Moscow on an invitation from the Soviet government to initiate an academic
exchange program of both students and professors, and he finalized an agreement with
Soviet officials that six Soviet students would study in American universities in the
following months. Because historians have not found exact records of this interchange,
determining the volume of exchangees in this period is difficult. Historian J. D. Parks
uncovered records showing a visiting Soviet professor at Princeton in 1925, at least
46
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twelve Soviet students attending American universities on Rockefeller Foundation grants
in this period, and a group of sixty-four Soviet students enrolled in American engineering
schools in 1931, but quantification beyond that has so far proved impossible. Still, these
first contacts represented some of the first organized attempts to promote relatively largescale academic exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Other American influences and contacts came from tourists. Many curious
Americans sought out a first-hand experience of the Soviet Union in the inter-war period,
and many recounted that they were well-received by both the government and the people.
Although the flow of tourists was slow at first, with only 150 Americans visiting the
USSR in 1927, this number swelled to almost 10,000 by 1932.47 Another avenue of
American-Soviet contact in the inter-war period was through industrial and commercial
interaction. Beginning in the late 1920s, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin sought rapid
industrialization through the First Five Year Plan, and his regime appealed to many
American corporations for support. Industrial leaders from Ford, American Locomotive,
General Electric, and International Harvester, among others, sold products and provided
technological assistance to the Soviet Union, and they accrued large profits from these
exports. Despite the US government’s refusal to grant diplomatic recognition to the new
communist government, American industrialists had no qualms about conducting
commercial dealings with the USSR; as a result, trade revenue from Soviet contracts
almost tripled from 1921 to 1930, reaching the unprecedented level of $95 million
annually. These were not merely long-distance commercial transactions, though, as these
trade deals also prompted more personal interaction between the American and Soviet
47

Parks, Culture, Conflict, and Coexistence, 24-28.

28

people. American companies commissioned their experts to go to the Soviet Union and
provide instruction on how to use their machinery. In 1930 alone, a Soviet official
remarked that there were about 700 American engineers in the USSR who were helping
overhaul and industrialize the Soviet economy.48 In addition to these exchanges that
lacked explicit cultural overtures (even though they did tend to promote personal crossnational interaction), more organized and focused cultural exchange organizations
emerged in the same period that sought to construct mutual understanding between East
and West more overtly.
While the US government refused to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet
Union throughout the 1920s, making governmental cultural exchange agreements
impossible, new privately-organized American groups filled this void and helped
facilitate cultural interaction in the inter-war period. The Soviets, meanwhile, appeared to
show greater receptiveness to some forms of cultural exchange, establishing the AllUnion Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS) in 1925. Officially,
its purpose was to “promote knowledge and mutual understanding,” but a major
underlying impetus was to gain access to Western science and technology. A group of
American academics and social activists reciprocated in 1926 by forming the American
Society for Cultural Relations with Russia. The society elected William Smith, president
of Smith College, as its first president and John Dewey, influential educational reformer,
as vice president. Other leading reformers, such as Jane Addams, made up its more than
one thousand members. According to the organization, it sought:
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to bring together those who are interested in Russian life and culture; to promote
cultural intercourse between the two countries, and especially the interchange of
students, doctors, scholars, artists, scientists, and teachers; [and] to collect and
diffuse information in both countries on developments in science, education,
philosophy, art, literature, and social and economic life.
Underlying this reasoning was the desire to introduce the Soviets to American values.
Through negotiations between these two entities, exchanges in exhibits, professional
delegations, entertainers, students, and professors took place, although at a relatively
modest rate.49
However, by the 1930s these culture efforts would soon dissipate almost entirely.
Though diplomatic relations between Washington and Moscow reopened in 1933, with
President Franklin D. Roosevelt officially recognizing the Soviet Union, subsequent
years actually witnessed a vast decrease in cultural interchange between the two
countries. By the mid- to late-1930s, Stalin began tightening his government’s control of
all segments of Soviet life, including culture. As part of these efforts, the regime began
portraying foreigners in the Soviet Union as spies and saboteurs, and one result was that
by 1937 Soviet officials began turning away American tourists in large numbers.
Compounding this trend was the fact that American leaders did little to combat this
growing Soviet resistance to cultural interaction. By this point, cultural exchange with the
Soviet Union was not resisted by the State Department, but neither did they actively
promote it. Thus, due to Moscow’s resistance and Washington’s indifference, almost all
person-to-person contacts between the two nations ceased and would not resume for
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another thirty years.50 Still, even though the prospects for US-Soviet exchange seemed to
be quickly fading, the US government in the 1930s began dramatically altering its stance
on cultural affairs, taking on an unusually prominent role in organizing cultural programs
and using them to advance foreign policy objectives.
While US-Soviet exchanges stagnated in the late 1930s, the American
government began exploring other avenues for cultural projection, notably in Latin
America, and its efforts there would involve the government more directly than ever
before in peacetime cultural affairs. Specifically, in 1938 Franklin Roosevelt’s
administration created the Division of Cultural Relations within the State Department,
which directed official cultural and educational exchange programs. Global crises
provided the most pressing motivating factor for Roosevelt’s administration to embrace
cultural diplomacy, specifically the rise of fascism and the effective use of education, art,
and culture by the new totalitarian regimes. The decision was also influenced by the fact
that Britain and France had recently begun to venture into utilizing cultural diplomacy
and American officials wished to explore these avenues as well. Its establishment
constituted a revolutionary step, illustrating for the first time that cultural diplomacy
could be a major component of America’s foreign policy.51
The earliest efforts by the newly-created Division of Cultural Relations centered
on Latin America. As part of his Good Neighbor Policy, Roosevelt sought to use direct
exchanges to improve the United States’ relationship with Latin America and also
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counter German and Italian influence in the region.52 To initiate these exchange
agreements, leaders from the United States and many Latin American countries met at the
Buenos Aires Conference in 1936. Secretary of State Cordell Hull headed the American
delegation and one of his proposals was the “facilitation by government action of the
exchange of students and teachers.” That recommendation for academic exchange was
the only provision introduced by the American delegation that actually made it into the
final treaty. It required each of the twenty-one signatory countries to finance the
exchange of at least two graduate students per year, per country. This was a modest
effort, and in the subsequent seven years only about 1,200 Latin American students,
professors, and professionals came to the United States, and merely 225 American
students studied in Latin America. Still, the American government had now initiated
formal cultural exchange programs with the goal of improving foreign peoples’
perceptions of the United States. This humble beginning set the precedent for future
programs and served as a State Department testing ground for subsequent efforts all
around the world.53
The onset of World War II provided the impetus to transform the nascent cultural
exchange program in Latin America into one that attempted to attract hearts and minds
globally, and by the end of the conflict, cultural diplomacy was firmly embedded into
American foreign policy.54 Even before United States military intervention in the Second
World War, President Roosevelt began formulating a propaganda strategy by creating the
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Office of the Coordinator of Information by executive order in July 1941. Roosevelt
appointed Colonel William J. Donovan, a New York attorney and Medal of Honor
recipient for his service in World War I, as the head of the agency. While the
administration conceived the agency as an intelligence gathering organization, Donovan
received permission from Roosevelt to also devote a segment of the office to cultural and
informational activities. This branch came to be called the Foreign Information Service
(FIS), and one of its first efforts was immediately to begin a radio broadcast to Europe.
By February 1942, Donovan and his office had created one of the most enduring and
well-known informational programs to emerge from this period, the Voice of America
(VOA) radio broadcast. It transmitted American news all over the world and would
continue into (and even beyond) the Cold War era. The Voice of America conducted its
first broadcast in German, and it repeatedly included the assurance that: “The news may
be good or bad. We shall tell you the truth.”55 This sentiment foreshadowed the
propaganda technique that Cold War cultural tacticians would use in the years after the
war.
After Pearl Harbor, the Roosevelt administration saw a need to better organize
America’s various informational efforts and consolidate them under one umbrella
agency. As a result, the president created the Office of War Information (OWI) in June
1942 through Executive Order 9182. Roosevelt chose journalist Elmer Davis to direct
this new agency. Not only did the OWI oversee domestic propaganda measures to bolster
American citizens’ enthusiasm for the war, but it also established a presence overseas in
an attempt to create a favorable impression of the United States among foreign
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populations. Directing these efforts was the previously established Foreign Information
Service, which was renamed the US Information Service (USIS) and functioned as the
overseas branch of the OWI. The OWI was significant in getting the American
government involved in large-scale ideological operations again, and by the end of the
war these American cultural efforts had reached over forty countries.56
The Second World War also had a significant effect on US-Soviet cultural
relations in particular, as both ordinary citizens and government leaders on each side
acquired a heightened interest in one another during this period. This curiosity was a
logical extension of the wartime alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union,
as these strange bedfellows sought to understand one another better.57 As an antecedent to
cultural exchange, American universities began offering an increasing number of courses
on Russian language and history as they quickly realized their own acute ignorance of
their nation’s new-found ally. Before the onset of the war, only about ten American
universities taught the Russian language, but after the war that number had grown to over
140.58 Soviet citizens, too, became more interested in the West, and the United States in
particular, as a result of World War II. The experience of the war gave the Soviet people
a more significant view of the outside world than they had been exposed to in decades.
For example, as explored by political scientist Robert English, Lend-Lease aid from the
United States, in the form of such goods as “airplanes, automobiles, foodstuffs, and other
56
Amanda Wood Aucoin, “Deconstructing the American Way of Life: Soviet Responses to Cultural
Exchange and American Information Activity During the Khrushchev Years,” (PhD diss., University of
Arkansas, 2001), 30; Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 15; Wilson P. Dizard,
Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the US Information Agency (Boulder: Lynne Ripener Publishers,
2004), 34; Hart, Empire of Ideas, 80-83; Henderson, The United States Information Agency, 31-33.
57
Parks, Culture, Conflict, and Coexistence, 63.
58
Berman, “The Changing Nature of Soviet Cultural Exchange Policy,” 8-9; Robert F. Byrnes, SovietAmerican Academic Exchanges, 1958-1975 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), 20; Parks,
Culture, Conflict, and Coexistence, 71.

34

goods…conveyed impressions [of the United States] as a land of plenty.” In addition, the
Soviet government eased negative propaganda targeted at the United States during the
course of the US-Soviet alliance, and even permitted some positive sentiments to be
expressed toward the West. For instance, Stalin’s regime allowed the showing of some
American films during the war years.59
With a new-found appreciation for cultural diplomacy resulting from their forays
into Latin America, the State Department and American leaders sought to create similar
agreements with the Soviet Union during World War II in the hopes of opening Soviet
society to Western influence. In 1943, American Ambassador to the Soviet Union
William Harrison Standley proposed many ways to expand US-Soviet cultural contacts in
this period, and Soviet Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs S. A. Lozovsky and Foreign
Minister Vyacheslav Molotov proved receptive to most of his suggestions. These
proposals included an agreement that allowed twenty-one Soviet college students to study
at Columbia University for eight months. Another accord allowed for the English
translation of Russian social science and humanities works. Perhaps the most far-reaching
of the wartime cultural programs, though, was the publication of America Illustrated in
the Soviet Union. An operation overseen by the Office of War Information, America
Illustrated was a monthly magazine about life in the United States. After arduous
negotiations, Soviet officials agreed to its distribution, and although it had a circulation of
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only about 32,000 copies each month, evidence suggests that the periodical was very
popular and individual copies often passed hand-to-hand among many readers.60
Several additional American diplomats and politicians stressed that this wartime
situation presented a unique opportunity to use cultural relations, such as exchanges and
publications, to force an opening of Soviet society. Ambassador to the Soviet Union
Averell Harriman asserted in 1944 that, “Many of the problems of our relations with
Russia center around the relative isolation of the Russian public from the general currents
of the world thought and world feeling,” and so he argued that the United States should
push for collaboration between the American and Soviet people. Similarly, Secretary of
the American Embassy in Moscow, John Melby, contended that the United States could
use informational and cultural programs to exploit the sympathy for America that already
existed among the Soviet people. Then after a few years, these programs would “create a
strong enough feeling of internationalism among opinion-influencing groups in the Soviet
Union to… [cause] the small top policy group to take a more tolerant attitude toward
foreign groups.”61 It seems likely that Soviet officials were not oblivious to these
intensions though, and as the war was coming to an end, they repeatedly resisted
American efforts to expand cultural relations any further.62 American leaders continued
to utilize cultural programs as an instrument of foreign policy in other regions, but the
Soviet Union remained impermeable to such outreach for more than a decade after the
war. Regardless, these attempts show a continuity between the goals of cultural exchange
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during the war years and the aims of Cold War programs, both of which aspired to open
Soviet society to Western ideas and influences.
Though new president Harry S. Truman disbanded the Office of War Information
at the conclusion of World War II, this did not mean that the United States government
abandoned the use of soft power techniques after the war. The experience of the war and
the harnessing of mass communications in global propaganda efforts had expanded most
American diplomats’ conceptions of what constituted diplomacy. Now many within the
American leadership began viewing cultural efforts as a form of foreign policy. In 1944,
even before the war had come to a close, the State Department created the position of
Assistant Secretary of State for Public and Cultural Affairs and named Archibald
MacLeish, a Librarian of Congress and Pulitzer Prize-winning poet, to fill it. This new
office would continue to help direct American cultural efforts after the war. In addition,
following Truman’s executive order disbanding the OWI, all functions of the agency
were absorbed into the State Department, illustrating the perceived importance of postwar overseas cultural projection. Suddenly, the small exchange programs with Latin
American before World War II had mushroomed into a more comprehensive and global
operation that now had a permanent place in America’s foreign policy establishment.63 In
the following decades, cultural exchange programs would certainly struggle with such
problems as underfunding and critics’ doubts about their effectiveness; still, by 1945,
cultural diplomacy was thoroughly established as a legitimate method to advance
America’s national interests, even in peacetime. In the Cold War ideological struggle that
exploded in the post-World War II era, these methods became more expansive than ever.
63
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As the post-war world become enveloped by growing tensions between the
capitalist and communist powers, American leaders sought to broaden their means of
cultural diplomacy as a way to combat the perceived Soviet threat. Though there were
many vocal critics of such methods and though early Cold War cultural programs
struggled with disorganization, the efforts by the Truman administration in the late 1940s
and early 1950s laid the groundwork for future cultural efforts that were more extensive
and better coordinated. Much of the timidity that characterized initial post-war inquests
into the expansion of cultural programs was in reaction to critics, in both the public and
private sphere, who viewed propaganda as merely a wartime measure that was contrary to
American values in a time of peace. Therefore, proponents of these programs continued
to refer to them carefully as “informational” projects instead of “propaganda” in an
attempt to ward off discrediting attacks by opponents.64
Initial post-war cultural projects had two main objectives: to obstruct communist
influence by waging psychological warfare with the Soviet Union and to spread
capitalism and democracy by creating a positive perception of the United States abroad.
As Cold War historians have recently discovered, the goal of “liberation” in Eastern
Europe was not merely a hollow aspiration; instead, officials in the Truman
administration sincerely believed that waging psychological warfare constituted an
effective way to corrode communist influence. The leading architect of containment,
diplomat George F. Kennan, articulated this very idea, arguing that the United States had
to “compel” the Soviet regime to denounce its expansionist aims. This would be
accomplished, not through military force, but by winning over the Soviet people through
Robert E. Summers, America’s Weapons of Psychological Warfare (New York: Wilson, 1951), 12-13,
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cultural programs and launching a psychological assault on the Soviet government.65
Furthermore, Truman and many in his administration realized that this could be
accomplished through methods such as academic exchange. As the president contended
in a speech in April 1950, in order to combat “false” and “crude” communist propaganda,
the United States had to “encourage many more people from other countries to visit us
here...We should find more opportunities for foreign students to study in our schools and
universities.”66 As a parallel goal to countering communist propaganda and scaling back
its influence, American policymakers further desired to instill a positive image of the
United States in foreign minds. Again, Kennan contended that the United States
government should strive to counter the “negative impressions about this country that
mark so much of world opinion.”67 Similarly, Assistant Secretary of State for Public
Affairs William Benton stressed the salience of using cultural programs to present a “full
and fair picture” of the American way of life to peoples abroad.68 These sentiments
would help inspire Truman’s 1950 “Campaign of Truth,” a program aimed at countering
Soviet propaganda not solely with harsh anti-communist rhetoric but instead by focusing
on the many benefits of American capitalism and democracy.69 In the coming years,
American officials would rely particularly on ordinary Americans as exemplars of the
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quality and superiority of American life by sending them on missions and exchanges
abroad.
Despite the Truman administration’s public support for cultural diplomacy, the
official agencies designed to oversee these efforts barely limped along during the
president’s two terms and were beset by constant reorganizations and major staff
changes. The newly-appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, William
Benton, immediately faced cutbacks to his office after the war. The State Department
reduced the staff from its war-time high of 13,000 personnel to merely 3,100 and slashed
the budget by 80% in just a few months.70 Exacerbating this stark situation, America’s
cultural and informational division went through four periods of major reorganization in
just seven years, each time changing the name, focus, and director of the organization.71
In the midst of these perpetual fluctuations, Truman created yet another cultural agency
in 1951, the Psychological Strategy Board, through which he intended to bring
propaganda, information, and psychological warfare under a single umbrella. Similar to
the State Department’s Office of Public Affairs, the Psychological Strategy Board was
both inadequate and underfunded and further plagued by bureaucratic infighting.72
Arguably more effective than Truman’s personal efforts to organize cultural
exchange, Congress passed new legislation in this period, the Fulbright Act and the
Smith-Mundt Act, which provided the framework for educational exchange for the
remainder of the twentieth century. Arkansas Senator J. William Fulbright had for years
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desired to establish an official student exchange program. As a former Rhodes Scholar
who had studied abroad at Oxford University through the British exchange program,
Fulbright held a deep appreciation for cultural exchange.73 However, it was the goal of
avoiding another world war that firmly pushed him to draft the new legislation in 1945.
As Fulbright recalled years later in 1965, he believed that educational exchange was
“primarily concerned with increasing man’s understanding of himself and of the national
world societies in which he lives.”74 He asserted that post-war foreign policy could no
longer be solely based on military or diplomatic maneuvering, but instead would be
“influenced far more by how well we communicate the values of our society to
others...through people-to-people contacts outside formal diplomatic channels.”75
The senator fashioned the Fulbright Act of 1945 to be utterly inconspicuous and
uncontroversial, and as such, Fulbright was able to move it through Congress skillfully
and quickly. The bill required that the capital accrued through the sale of surplus war
property in Europe be used to fund a new international exchange program that would
allow American students to study overseas.76 Arguing that it would “cost nothing,”
Fulbright watched his bill win easy approval by Congress and be signed into law by
President Truman on August 1, 1946. This was a monumental moment in the expansion
of American educational exchange, and throughout the rest of the twentieth century,
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Fulbright’s program provided funding for hundreds of thousands of scholars from the
United States and sixty other countries to study abroad.77
The passage of the Smith-Mundt Act two years later in 1948 created the means to
maintain the Fulbright exchange program and further expand its capabilities. Influenced
by a 1948 tour of Europe, New Jersey Senator H. Alexander Smith and North Dakota
Representative Karl Mundt, both Republicans, felt that the Soviet Union was in the midst
of a propaganda campaign of “vilification and misrepresentation” aimed primarily at the
United States. Therefore, they argued, the United States had to counter these Soviet
efforts by explaining American “ideals, motives, and objectives to a demoralized and
groping Europe.” They believed that maintaining educational exchange could be a
successful way to accomplish that goal and thus worked to expand on Senator Fulbright’s
work. The original Fulbright legislation only supplied funding for Americans to go
abroad, but the Smith-Mundt Act established the program’s reciprocity and allotted
scholarships for foreign students to study in the United States. Furthermore, the new law
provided a stable budget to sustain the program once the proceeds from sales of military
surplus goods had been depleted. As with the Fulbright Act, the motivation for this bill
was not only to promote academic achievement but “to promote the better understanding
of the United States among the peoples of the world and to strengthen cooperative
international relations.”78 These two new pieces of legislation signified that in the postwar world, the United States government would take the lead in the formerly private
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sphere of educational exchange and these efforts would be harnessed to advance
America’s foreign policy interests.79
The Fulbright Act and the Smith-Mundt Act had a profound effect on the rate and
scope of American academic exchange in the years immediately after the Second World
War, though its ambit would not yet extend to the Soviet Bloc. The number of foreign
students traveling to the United States in this period ballooned from 7,000 in 1945 to
30,000 in 1950.80 American exchange organizers reached the first Fulbright agreements
with China and Burma in late 1947. Through the early 1950s, the program expanded
quickly, encompassing many nations in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and South
America.81 Throughout this time, program organizers continued to espouse the purpose of
the exchanges as primarily a means of developing international goodwill. Senator
Fulbright himself wrote that while the encouragement of academic achievement and
cooperation was important, “the purpose of the program is not the advancement of
science nor the promotion of scholarship” but instead “these are only by-products of a
program whose primary aim is international understanding.” This was tangibly illustrated
by the participant selection process, which took into account much more than an
individual’s academic qualifications. For instance, the selection committee considered
such factors as an applicant’s emotional stability and political leanings in order to ensure
that the individual would be an effective and positive representative of the United
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States.82 Selection committee members and proponents of the exchanges believed that
properly-chosen exchangees would present a favorable impression of the United States
abroad by directly demonstrating American wealth, technology, and its democratic
political system.83
Still, American exchanges with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe remained
outside the scope of the Fulbright program in this period. Instead, academic relations
between the United States and the USSR occurred only on a limited and ad hoc basis. For
example, individual institutions, such as Cornell University and Princeton University,
invited specific Soviet professors and graduate students to study on their campuses, and
the Rockefeller Foundation sponsored a small number of Soviet academics to visit
American universities.84 Due to the intensifying Cold War and the complications with
forming official exchanges between the two rival superpowers, though, large-scale
exchanges could not be established for almost another decade.
In addition to the lack of Fulbright educational exchange agreements between the
United States and the Soviet Union, other types of government-sanctioned cultural
interactions also remained elusive in the early years after World War II, owing both to
Soviet and, later, American reluctance to engage one another in large-scale cultural
exchange. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin repeatedly resisted American overtures for opening
cultural relations. Historians such as Lisa Berman have argued that was due to many
factors, such as Stalin’s frustration with the lack of economic relations between the
United States and the Soviet Union, the cancellation of the Lend-Lease Program by the
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United States in 1945, and the announcement of the 1947 Truman Doctrine to contain
communist influence in Greece, Turkey, and elsewhere. As early as the fall of 1945, the
State Department suggested to the Kremlin the possibility of conducting exchanges in
music, dance, theater, art, science, and education, but the Soviet government ignored
these proposals and similar subsequent offers. Private groups, such as the American
Council of Learned Societies, also petitioned Soviet leaders to allow for an exchange of
scholars in the immediate years after World War II, but Soviet officials merely replied
that their universities were already over-crowded and their teachers in high demand, thus
rendering such agreements logistically impossible.85 As Cold War anxieties began to take
hold within the United States in the late 1940s, some American policy-makers similarly
began to resist cultural accords with the Soviet Union for a brief period after the war.
Though some officials, such as US Ambassador to Czechoslovakia Lawrence Steinhardt,
saw great merit in American cultural incursions into the Communist Bloc, officials within
the State Department asserted that the expansion of cultural agreements, like the
Fulbright program, into those areas would merely project America as weak and
attempting to appease the Soviet Union. This sentiment became even more pronounced
after American entrance into the Korean War. Therefore State Department officials
directly opposed efforts by Fulbright program organizers to negotiate agreements with
the Soviet Union, though they pledged not to obstruct any private educational exchange
agreements with the communist regime.86 Thus, by the early 1950s, the United States and
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the Soviet Union had still not established significant cultural exchanges between their
nations.
The legacy of the Truman Administration and cultural exchange was somewhat
mixed. While its programs were plagued by problems, they also helped to lay the
groundwork for future endeavors. As one historian aptly described it, when Truman left
office in 1952, “the information program remained beset with bureaucratic infighting,
Congressional skepticism, and lack of coherence.” Not yet fully understanding the
importance of public perceptions and popular opinion, leaders in the administration failed
time and time again to effectively counter anti-American Soviet propaganda, and many
Soviet assertions of American imperialism and warmongering were left unanswered. The
programs that did exist to counter such messages were repeatedly hampered by constant
administrative reorganization. However, Truman’s actions were significant in
maintaining American propaganda efforts during peacetime and thus cementing cultural
diplomacy as a vital facet of US foreign policy. Furthermore, the next administration,
headed by Dwight D. Eisenhower, would effectively use Truman’s efforts as a solid
foundation on which to build up America’s information programs to an unprecedented
level and finally create a successful large-scale cultural interchange directly between the
United States and the Soviet Union.87
President Dwight D. Eisenhower came into office in 1953 as a great believer in
the effectiveness of psychological warfare and sought to create an organized and effective
international information program. Eisenhower’s experience as a general in the Second
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World War convinced him of the importance of psychological warfare as a significant
component of total war. He carried this dedication to winning hearts and minds into his
presidential campaign, repeatedly espousing his ambition to take such an endeavor
seriously. In a number of campaign speeches, Eisenhower asserted that the Cold War
was, at its heart, a struggle over ideas, and therefore the United States had to have a
comprehensive plan for psychological warfare, which he promised to establish if
elected.88 Eisenhower even singled out educational exchange, stating that academic
exchange programs were “an important step toward world peace” and thus should be
continued and expanded.89
As president, Eisenhower continued to espouse the power of cultural exchange
and informational programs, and early in his first term developed a plan for establishing
it as an important facet of his foreign policy. In both his inaugural and State of the Union
addresses, Eisenhower insisted on the necessity of creating more effective international
information programs to combat communism.90 More than merely trumpeting these ideas,
the president also took tangible steps to reorganize the haphazard Truman-era approach.
Becoming the first and only executive to appoint a propaganda adviser to his presidential
cabinet, Eisenhower chose Charles Douglas “C. D.” Jackson as his special assistant for
psychological warfare. As the former deputy director of psychological operations in the
Mediterranean during the Second World War, Jackson had learned firsthand the merits of
such methods and constantly pushed the president to overhaul the failing Truman
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propaganda infrastructure. At Jackson’s urging, Eisenhower formed the Committee on
International Information Activities, headed by New York investment banker William H.
Jackson, which soon became known as the Jackson Committee. After conducting a
thorough study of the American propaganda apparatus, the Jackson Committee made
several logistical recommendations, including an emphasis on choosing high quality and
reliable personnel to work overseas, providing strong support to these individuals and
their installations, and allowing fieldworkers to determine their own methods instead of
requiring them to follow strict instructions from Washington. Furthermore, the Jackson
Committee urged a change in tone and message for America’s propaganda operations.
Instead of a focus on demonizing communism, the Jackson Committee suggested that
American tactics should strive to convince peoples around the world that the United
States supported them and their interests and would work to advance “freedom, progress,
and peace.” The Eisenhower Administration heeded these recommendations and began to
adopt a more positive message, recognizing that instruments such as American jazz
music and cultural exhibitions appealed to foreign peoples more than anti-communist
diatribes. Eisenhower reiterated this sentiment in a November 1953 speech, stating that
the American system would ultimately triumph over the Soviet Union simply because of
its “greater appeal to the human soul, the human heart, [and] the human mind.”91 Soon,
Eisenhower put those ideas into action by launching the most comprehensive propaganda
agency in American history.
On June 1, 1953, President Eisenhower presented a proposal to Congress to
reorganize all American propaganda efforts (exempting academic exchange, which would
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remain in the State Department) under a new organization called the United States
Information Agency (USIA). Reflecting the suggestions of the Jackson Committee, the
USIA focused on relaying a positive image of the United States abroad. Instead of
focusing on the evils of communism, the USIA programs trumpeted the ways American
society promoted prosperity, peace, freedom, and happiness.92 Outlined in a 1954 USIA
policy statement, agency organizers stated that “the hard-hitting anti-communist approach
just doesn't pay off,” but instead a “more subtle” approach works more effectively. That
approach mainly consisted of portraying the characteristics of everyday American life to
foreign audiences, allowing them to infer for themselves the superiority of capitalist
democracy over communism. The most effective way to relay this message, according to
the USIA, was through personal contacts between Americans and foreigners. Supposing
that foreign individuals were more likely to believe ordinary Americans over impersonal
informational campaigns and printed material, USIA valued sending Americans to the
field to communicate their country’s virtues firsthand.93
Educational exchange through the Fulbright program continued and expanded
through the Eisenhower years, though Fulbright and his supporters were steadfast in
ensuring a separation between academic exchange and the USIA’s propaganda efforts. It
was Fulbright’s political maneuvering that allowed his program to remain within the
State Department while all other cultural endeavors came under the domain of the US
Information Agency. The senator claimed that by keeping his program from the grasp of
the USIA, this would avoid politicizing the exchanges or having them “tainted” by
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official government propaganda operations.94 However, Senator Fulbright’s own avowed
purpose of the program to promote “international understanding” was itself a form of
propaganda and, whether the senator admitted as much or not, aligned exactly with the
methods of the USIA. Regardless of the separation between the two on paper, USIA
employees in the field were almost always the same personnel who actually guided and
administered the educational exchanges.95 Furthermore, by the mid-1950s, the State
Department began requiring American scholars to attend official orientation programs
before traveling on their Fulbright scholarship. Exchangees received these training
sessions directly from USIA officials, including instruction on how best to portray
American values to foreign individuals. Therefore, the Fulbright program continued to
provide a means to spread American values globally into the 1950s.
Soon after Eisenhower took office, dramatic events in the Soviet Union would, for
the first time, make possible large-scale cultural exchange between the United States and
the Soviet Union. Stalin’s death on March 5, 1953, merely weeks after Eisenhower
became president, immediately softened US-Soviet relations, with the new Soviet
coalition government calling for peace with the West and helping to bring an end to the
Korean War.96 By 1955, Western and Soviet leaders agreed to meet at a summit in
Geneva, the first such gathering since World War II, illustrating a further easing of
tensions. At the conference, the United States, Britain, and France put forth a seventeenpoint cultural exchange plan to the Soviets, urging them to open up interchanges in areas
such as culture, education, tourism, and information. Though the delegates failed to reach
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a formal agreement on this comprehensive treaty, the Soviets did relay their openness to
future bilateral agreements on cultural exchange. Soon after the Geneva Summit, the
Soviet government began allowing more tours by American musicians and theater groups
and an exchange of magazines, showing that an opening was gradually materializing.97
The 1956 “Secret Speech” by Nikita Khrushchev, the emerging leader of the Soviet
Union, further heartened supporters of US-Soviet cultural exchange. Rejecting Stalinism
and promoting “peaceful coexistence” with the West, Khrushchev’s speech helped open
the way for more Soviet interaction with the capitalist powers. Within a year, Soviet
officials had established cultural agreements with many Western European nations,
including Belgium, Norway, and France.98 Much of the Soviet impetus for these openings
resulted from a combination of a desire to make a tangible effort towards “peaceful
coexistence” and a continued wish to acquire access to Western science and technology
through cultural interactions. It seemed only a matter of time before such negotiations
would take place between the Soviet Union and the United States.
Though American and Soviet officials were on the verge of creating a
comprehensive official cultural exchange agreement, a trickle of academic exchanges
between the US and the Soviet Union had already begun in the second half of the 1950s.
A group of universities interested in promoting US-Soviet exchanges created the InterUniversity Committee on Travel Grants (IUCTG) in 1956. Funded by the Ford
Foundation, universities, and the State Department, the Committee dealt directly with the
Soviet Ministry of Higher Education to arrange short-term educational exchanges. As no
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official government agreement yet existed, these students and scholars participated
through thirty-day tourist visas. Roughly 200 academics went to the Soviet Union in the
late 1950s with the help of the Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants.99 In 1958,
American and Soviet officials would finally reached an official agreement on cultural
exchange, and this greatly accelerated academic interchanges across the Iron Curtain and
allowed the most personal interaction between American and Soviet citizens since the
1920s.
While the 1950s was a momentous decade in terms of increasing prospects for
US-Soviet cultural connections, it was, conversely, a period in which American public
opinion toward the Soviet Union was hardening. The consensus of Western superiority
that emerged from this period profoundly shaped perceptions and interactions between
American and Soviet people in the decades to come. Therefore, before exploring exactly
how large-scale US-Soviet cultural exchange became a reality and how more Americans
than ever were able to travel to the Soviet Union through academic exchanges, it is first
necessary to understand the assumptions and preconceptions instilled in these Americans.
In other words, it is imperative to explore the notions about America and the Soviet
Union that many of them would eventually take with them to Eastern Europe. Therefore
the concluding pages of this chapter will examine how the Cold War consensus emerged,
analyze the ideas it encompassed, and describe how it influenced the worldview of many
Americans.
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As many historians have contended, the strong anti-communist and anti-Soviet
consensus that manifested itself at the start of the Cold War was an extremely powerful
cultural force in post-war America. While dissenters certainly existed, the majority of
Americans did “inhabit a recognizable mental world” that conformed to the Cold War
consensus.100 Furthermore, those voices that opposed this worldview were easily
marginalized and ostracized.101 However, while anti-communism was an extremely
formidable force throughout the Cold War, historians have also shown that it was not a
“natural” reaction to events of the time but instead was a constructed ideology that served
a variety of purposes. As anthropologist Clifford Geertz has explained in his work on
culture, symbolic activities such as ideology constitute humanity’s attempt to “make
sense out of experience” and be better able to understand the world.102 Cold War America
was not exempt from this common process, and elements such as language and rhetoric
were repeatedly used to create a seemingly unified national ideology. American leaders
promulgated such terminology as “the free world,” “totalitarianism,” and “the Soviet
threat,” and this type of language shaped the public discourse and set the perimeters
within which acceptable debate could be conducted.103 This process not only served to
help Americans handle the changing world they lived in, but it was also an attempt to
produce a stable American identity. Repeating a practice that had been ongoing since the
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American Revolution, post-war ideology was not the result of “an externally induced
crisis,” but instead it was an attempt by American leaders to unite the population under a
unified set of principles by setting them against a common enemy.104 Still, its constructed
nature did not make the Cold War consensus any less powerful, as this framework of
anti-communism was present in the minds of almost every American and shaped their
perception of the Soviet Union and its people.
A series of events and a framework of ideas propagated by American leaders,
especially in the first five years after World War II, further entrenched in American
culture a fear of communism and the Soviet Union that endured for decades thereafter.
Historian John Fousek contends that this process of creating a unified post-war national
ideology began as early as 1945 with three core themes that dominated public discourse.
Specifically, American leaders championed notions of America’s national greatness, its
global responsibility, and its role in the ultimate triumph of freedom, constraining
acceptable public discourse within the perimeters of these ideals. The Soviet Union
emerged as the exact antithesis to this American eminence and its contrasting image
helped further solidify these ideals.105
The task of constructing the Soviet Union as the ultimate evil in world affairs
began just months after the cessation of World War II. In early 1946, George F. Kennan,
the State Department’s prominent expert on Russia, sent his “Long Telegram” from
Moscow espousing the dangers of the Soviet threat. Later published in revised form in
the journal Foreign Affairs, Kennan’s article argued that the Soviet Union’s imperialistic
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behavior was not due to traditional geopolitical concerns; instead, the Soviets had a
uniquely aggressive national character that drove them to expand their ideology and way
of life at all costs.106 This interpretation caused policy-makers, and thus much of the
American public, to understand the Soviets as an unreasonable and unrelenting force that
could not be halted without force or subversion, and despite the waxing and waning of
the Cold War over the next decades, this line of thinking would remain in most
Americans’ minds throughout the conflict.
President Truman’s actions in these pivotal years only further cemented the Cold
War consensus in America’s ideological framework, particularly his establishment of the
Truman Doctrine and the Federal Employee Loyalty Program. In March 1947, Truman
asked Congress for economic aid to Greece and Turkey in order to support anticommunist forces in Greece and bolster Turkey against Soviet pressure. Truman asserted
that the United States had the duty and responsibility to stop communism and Soviet
influence wherever it attempted to spread. By doing so, historians such as Walter Hixson
have contended, Truman helped create the discourse that divided the globe into “a binary
world of good and evil.” This framework helped Americans better understand their place
and responsibility in the post-war world and served as a simple justification for American
intervention abroad.107 The administration’s formation of loyalty review programs that
same month brought this binary understanding of the world directly into American
society. Through Executive Order 9835, Truman created the Loyalty Review Board to
ensure that communists or communist-sympathizers were eliminated from employment in
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the federal government. This set a precedent that would be followed all over the country,
and soon local public and private officials were implementing similar political loyalty
tests in areas ranging from insurance policies to fishing licenses. Though the threat of
communists infiltrating the government, or any other segment of American society, was
most likely overstated by the administration and merely used for political gain, historian
Ellen Schrecker contends that it did succeed in “establishing anti-communism as the
nation’s official ideology.”108 Furthering this ideological direction was the contentious
presidential election of 1948. Truman had to contend with former Vice President Henry
Wallace, who ran on the newly-created Progressive Party ticket and attacked the
president from the left. Wallace welcomed support from communists and socialists and
believed that the United States should attempt to work with the Soviet Union instead of
antagonizing it. In order to repudiate his own critics’ accusations of being soft on
communism, Truman heatedly attacked Wallace’s liberal politics and accused him of
favoring Soviet communism. Truman’s “red-baiting” crippled liberalism in the United
States and effectively eliminated, or at least thoroughly marginalized, any critics of the
Cold War and American foreign policy. Just three years after being an ally of the USSR
against Nazi Germany, the United States and most of its people now firmly viewed the
Soviet Union as the preeminent threat to world stability and peace and as a purveyor of
an ideology that was the single greatest domestic danger to American society.
Truman’s second term as president witnessed an even harder solidification of this
staunchly anti-communist belief system, and this had tangible effects on American
foreign policy. For instance, the United States began pouring increasing amounts of
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funding into defense and national security initiatives.109 The impetus for this shift was set
out in the administration’s National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68) in 1950.
Building on Kennan’s “Long Telegram,” NSC-68 argued that Soviet character and
ideology would constantly push the communists to expand, and therefore the United
States had to aggressively confront the Soviets when they attempted to spread their
influence. This policy statement provided the justification for tripling the national defense
budget at the onset of the ensuing Korean War and further marginalized any policymakers who held alternative ideas of Soviet intentions. This, in turn, shaped public
discourse and perceptions of the growing “Soviet threat.”110 Thus, when the communist
North Korean forces launched an invasion into American-backed South Korea in June
1950, most American officials and citizens perceived US intervention as utterly
necessary. American entrance into the Korean War became the ultimate show of strength
that displayed national willingness to combat “evil” communist influence wherever it
manifested itself.111
The Cold War consensus, while it emerged out of this specific set of social and
political circumstances after World War II, contained ideological underpinnings that were
not new to American culture, namely the conception of the “other.” In his 1978 book
Orientalism, literary critic Edward Said conceived of the “other” as a concept used to
describe the European perception of the Orient. Viewing the East as a place of exoticism,
Europeans set themselves up as the antithesis of such a barbarous place. Through this
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contrasting image, “the Orient...helped to define Europe” by forging a consensus on what
Europe was not rather than what it was.112 Similarly, during the Cold War, American
policy-makers constructed the Soviet “other” and this image filtered down to the
populace, helping to create a more unified American identity. American rhetoric
repeatedly colored the Soviets as “evil,” “brutal,” “immoral,” and “aggressive,” and
though these characteristics were simplified caricatures generated by American leaders
and not always a reality, the consequences of these perceptions were definitely real.113
Providing justification for an aggressive American foreign policy, the Cold War
consensus allowed policy-makers to convince American citizens to support a vigorous
and global national security program to combat the Soviet menace. Those Americans
who disagreed with this course were merely associated with the Soviet other and thus
thoroughly demonized.114 Therefore, just as the Orient did for Europe, this emerging
Soviet other provided reassurance to the American people of what they were not, helping
them to then achieve a (nearly) unified sense of American identity during an uncertain
time. This firmly embedded worldview would influence, at least to some degree, every
American who travelled to the Soviet Union and interacted with the Soviet people. The
following chapters will explore those interactions and use them to illuminate in detail the
mindset and sense of national identity possessed by Americans who did have the
opportunity to traverse the Iron Curtain.
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“AN ABNORMAL PLACE IN WHICH TO LIVE,” 1958-1968
The first decade of official US-Soviet academic exchanges, beginning with the
signing of the 1958 Cultural Agreement, constituted the fruition of the American
government’s new role in international cultural exchange. American policy-makers
sought to use a positive national message, especially focused on the Western ideals of
democracy, freedom, and consumer culture, to appeal to the citizens of communist
nations. Throughout this period, many of these strategists viewed cultural exchange
programs, such as educational exchange, as an effective way to relay these values by
putting Americans directly in contact with peoples abroad.115 Still, despite the rhetorical
support the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations gave to cultural
exchange, the programs were plagued by constant budgetary concerns and relegation to a
minor role in American Cold War strategy. While it was true that this new level of US
government intervention in cultural affairs was unprecedented, these administrations
never afforded cultural diplomacy the same significance as more traditional military and
diplomatic tactics.116
The significance of these programs, though, lies not in their place in America’s
Cold War strategy but instead in their ability to illuminate in detail the ideology and
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values held by those who participated in the exchanges. Specifically, the recollections of
academic exchange participants to the Soviet Union provide unique insights into how
ordinary Americans perceived the USSR, the Cold War, and their own national identity.
Since the Cold War was largely an ideological struggle, with both superpower rivals
contending to spread not only their geopolitical power but also their ideas, it is significant
to determine to what extent the American people shared these same values and
objectives. As their post-exchange reports show, the participants in this first decade of the
exchange, from 1958 to 1968, largely shared their leaders’ objectives and ideals. While
exchangees to the Soviet Union claimed that the value of their experience rested in a
higher level of cultural understanding and academic enrichment, their internalization of
the Cold War consensus manifested itself oftentimes in more subtle terms throughout
their reports and recollections. Almost none of the exchange participants in this period
claimed that their time in the USSR confirmed their convictions in Western superiority or
American exceptionalism. However, almost all of them asserted their American values
and identity through negation, by noting characteristics of the Soviet Union that they
found unusual or disturbing.
Furthermore, these Americans overwhelmingly showed their commitment to
serving as positive representatives of the United States during their time abroad. Through
their conversations with Soviet citizens and their dissemination of American products and
publications, exchangees often took it upon themselves to be personal exemplars of the
American way to the Soviet people. The most notable aspects of this first set of reports,
however, are the exchangees’ recollections of how most Soviet people responded to their
overtures. Far from describing Soviets as fiercely dogmatic and incapable of reform, the
60

vast majority of participants characterized most of them as incredibly friendly, very
willing to associate with Westerners, and constantly curious about life in the United
States. Remembering the Soviet people in this way reaffirmed the most important aspect
of American identity, its universality. It reassured these Americans that their system was
not only correct but that it also had inherent appeal to the world’s people. This implied
that the United States would eventually prevail in the global ideological struggle. The
following chapter will recount American policy-makers’ conceptualization and
implementation of the exchange program and then compare their aims to the exchange
participant experience in this era.
Although the momentum for establishing official cultural exchange between the
United States and the Soviet Union had been gradually building throughout the decade, it
was not until the end of the 1950s that cultural diplomacy became possible. The public
prodding by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev constituted one factor that convinced the
Eisenhower administration to act. In May 1957, Khrushchev appeared on CBS’s Face the
Nation. When asked to discern the most pressing issue in Soviet-American relations, he
asserted that, “There must be more contacts between our peoples,” and such contacts
could be established only if the United States stopped resisting cultural exchanges with
the Soviet Union. Just four days later, the Soviet government proposed a number of
possible exchanges with the United States in culture, science, and technology. Surprised
by this overture, President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles initially
refused to engage with Khrushchev’s offer. However, Congressional Democrats such as
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Texas Senator and Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson and Arkansas Senator J. William
Fulbright urged the administration to consider opening more contacts with the Soviets.117
This growing impetus for cultural exchange finally led the Eisenhower
administration to form the East-West Contacts Staff within the Department of State. This
body held the responsibility of developing and coordinating interchange between the US
and the Soviet bloc, and by the fall of 1957 the group began working on cultivating
student exchange. That year, the East-West Contacts Staff approached an organization
called the Council on Student Travel (CST) to help arrange US-USSR exchanges. The
CST was a private organization established in 1947. Though the CST had worked in
cooperation with the State Department since its inception, its thirty members mostly
consisted of universities and nonprofit educational and cultural agencies interested in
promoting international educational exchange. It began as an organization almost solely
concerned with providing low-cost transportation for students to travel overseas, but by
1957 it was acting in a more advisory capacity by providing prospective exchangees with
travel information and cultural preparation for their time abroad. By the summer of 1958,
the Council on Student Travel had aided in the State Department in creating the first
official reciprocal educational exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union.
After negotiating with the Soviet Youth Committee for three months, CST organizers
were able to send forty-four Americans to the Soviet Union and bring twenty Soviets to
the United States, each for roughly one-month periods. The group of Americans consisted
of both undergraduate and graduate students from twenty-six different colleges and
twenty states. This represented a remarkable achievement. No significant group of
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American students had visited the Soviet Union since 1935 and this was the first
government-sponsored educational exchange between the two nations.118
Still, regular exchanges necessitated a formal cultural exchange agreement, and
deliberations toward such an end began in the last weeks of 1957. Leading the
negotiations were William S. B. Lacy, head of the East-West Contacts Staff, and Georgy
Zarubin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States. The resulting agreement, formally
titled “Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on Exchanges in Cultural, Technical, and Educational Fields,” had
fourteen sections, one of which involved education. It provided for exchanges of radio
and television broadcasts, artists, actors, dancers, athletes, agricultural specialists,
industry leaders, and traveling exhibitions. In regards to academic exchange, the
American representatives originally proposed an exchange of one hundred students each
year, while the Soviets countered with a suggestion to exchange just ten. The final
agreement settled on an exchange of twenty students each way for the 1958-1959
academic year and thirty students in the 1959-1960 year. Following three months of talks,
Soviet and American representatives signed the final Lacy-Zarubin Agreement on
January 27, 1958, with the stipulation that the accord would be subject to possible
revision and renewal every two years. The State Department designated the InterUniversity Committee on Travel Grants (IUCTG), the university-led organization that
had overseen many of the unofficial short-term exchanges between the United States and
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the Soviet Union since 1956, to administer the exchange of students and professors under
the new agreement.119
American policy-makers attached significant national goals and strategies to the
new exchanges that they believed trumped any possible Soviet advantages. The sudden
Soviet acquiescence to cultural exchange with the United States reflected, in part, the
rising confidence of the Khrushchev regime in the wake of Sputnik. The prospect of
surpassing the capitalist West seemed more attainable than ever to the Soviet leadership,
and cultural exchange offered the opportunity to publicize Soviet achievements directly
to the American people. In essence, Soviet government officials now believed that they
had much less to lose in open exchanges with the West.120 By agreeing to such an
exchange, the Soviet regime sought to portray itself as a world leader in progress,
enlightenment, and culture, and as a peaceful power that sought to work with the United
States to ease Cold War hostilities. Perhaps most importantly, regarding their more
tangible goal, the Soviet Union wanted easier access to American scientific, industrial,
and technological advancements through academic exchange.121
Still, despite these Soviet advantages, American strategists in the Eisenhower
administration believed they had much more to gain from this interchange than their
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communist rival. In a 1956 policy document, the National Security Council articulated
the principles guiding the implementation of US-Soviet exchanges, both in the late 1950s
and beyond. They argued that the objective of cultural diplomacy was to bring Western
ideas and influence to the Soviet Union, such as freedom of thought and a desire for
increased access to consumer goods.122 Reflecting a shift in policy away from the
aggressive psychological warfare practiced in the first years of the Cold War, by the late
1950s American leaders desired a more subtle and gradual strategy based on using
Western ideas and consumer culture to appeal to the people in the communist bloc, with
the hope that this would eventually force a liberalization of the Soviet regime.123 Though
it was clear that the Soviets would obtain many short-term benefits through this
reciprocal exchange, the assumption that American ideals and values would eventually
triumph made this cost acceptable.124
With this new agreement in place, the first official US-Soviet educational
exchanges began in 1958. Administered by the Inter-University Committee on Travel
Grants (IUCTG), this reciprocal interchange took three different forms. The central
program, which allowed its participants the longest stay in the USSR, was the Graduate
Student/Young Faculty Exchange. These early-career scholars spent one to two semesters
in the Soviet Union and were often treated similarly to their Soviet counterparts, living in
university dorms and working with a Soviet advisor and his or her respective department.
The Summer Exchange of Language Teachers provided a means for American teachers
of Russian to immerse themselves in the language, through coursework and social
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interactions, for about two months. Finally, the Senior Research Scholar exchange
catered to a relatively small number of advanced-career academics who were allowed two
to five months of research in the Soviet Union.125 The funding for these programs drew
from three different sources, all administered on the American side by the IUCTG.
Private philanthropic foundations and the Department of State contributed to some of the
costs, especially for travel, while participating universities agreed to assume financial
responsibility for the foreign students accepted by their institution, covering such costs as
tuition, lodging, and stipends.126
Although the Department of State and the Inter-University Committee on Travel
Grants maintained that their primary goal for the exchanges was the advancement of
knowledge and international understanding, the implicit goal of using cultural exchange
to subvert the communist regime was apparent even in the participant selection
process.127 For instance, a 1958 internal Department of State document outlined the
merits of focusing on an exchange of graduate students, instead of undergraduates. A
graduate student, it argued:
is likely to be more mature. His judgment and perspective on both the USSR and
the United States are likely to be better. He is likely to learn more from a sojourn
in the Soviet Union because he already has a substantial foundation of knowledge
on which to build. He is more likely to make a good impression on those he meets
in the Soviet Union, especially among the intelligentsia. He is in general more
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likely to bring balance and perspective to his experiences and his interpretation of
those experiences.128
Furthermore, according the policy statement, exchangees to the Soviet Union should have
a “good knowledge of the United States, especially American history and current events,”
so he would be prepared to answer any questions Soviets may ask him. In essence, State
Department officials argued that an exchange participant had to be chosen carefully
because he would “play the role of ambassador as well as of scholar and tourist.”129 This
illustrates clearly that the purpose of the exchange, in the mind of State Department
organizers, was not purely academic. Instead, a significant component of the exchange
program was to improve US-Soviet relations through positive relationships formed
between American exchangees and Soviet citizens. With these objectives in mind, in the
fall of 1958 the IUCTG sent to the Soviet Union the first set of twenty-two American
graduate students, specializing in a variety of fields including Slavic languages, literature,
history, political science, law, government, and geography.130 Thus began a new era in
Soviet-American academic exchange that would expand in the coming decades.
Despite the State Department’s concerns with choosing suitable participants who
would best serve America’s national interests, IUCTG officials simultaneously sought to
eliminate any direct or visible link between their program and government influence,
especially in regards to involvement by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The IUCTG officials were aware of several CIA

Committee on Educational Interchange Policy, October 1958, “Academic Exchanges with the Soviet
Union,” Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Collection, University of Arkansas Library,
Fayetteville, Arkansas.
129
Ibid.
130
US Department of State, December 1958, “Report on the East-West Exchange Program,” Bureau of
Educational and Cultural Affairs Collection, University of Arkansas Library, Fayetteville, Arkansas.
128

67

front organizations, established in the late 1950s and early 1960s, that posed as
educational foundations and gave grants to “students” to travel to the Soviet Union as
short-term tourists.131 To firmly separate themselves from these fraudulent organizations
and protect the academic integrity of their program, IUCTG officials, including Director
Robert Byrnes, went to great lengths to ensure that the US government could not obtain
any services or information from officials or participants within the exchange.132 IUCTG
policy stipulated that the executive director was the only staff member allowed to hold
discussions with the FBI or the CIA.133 Additionally, upon acceptance, each exchangee
was required to sign a statement agreeing that they would not “perform any service in any
capacity whatsoever for any private or governmental persons, organization or agency of
any kind while in the Soviet Union as a participant in this exchange.”134 Implicit in these
policies was the idea that not only would intelligence activity within the exchange
program discredit its academic virtues, but that if such obviously subversive activities
became public the Soviets would view these Americans as mere propaganda machines
instead of sincere representatives of American culture and life.
While the Eisenhower administration had established an important precedent by
making cultural exchange a significant, though certainly not central, part of American
foreign policy, many problems plagued the newly-founded academic exchange program
going forward into the 1960s. The incoming John F. Kennedy administration publicly
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lauded the use of cultural exchange as an important and useful aspect of American
foreign policy. In a 1961 press release, President Kennedy stated, “there is no better way
to strengthen our bonds of understanding and friendship with other nations than through
educational and cultural interchange.”135 Secretary of State Dean Rusk concurred when
discussing East-West exchanges, asserting, “both the communist nations and ourselves
have found programs for exchange of persons and information to be of mutual
advantage.”136 Still, despite their rhetorical support, the Kennedy administration, like the
Eisenhower team before it, accorded much more prestige to traditional military means of
national defense than to informational and cultural programs, as exemplified by their
minuscule budget. In 1960, only one percent of the total $50 billion national security
budget went to international cultural projects.137
Other problems, in addition to budget concerns, that would plague the program
throughout the coming decades became apparent in these early years, namely the
imbalance between humanities and science applicants on both sides of the exchange. As
IUCTG and State Department officials noted early on, since the Soviets’ main goal was
to obtain access to American technological and scientific research, the majority of Soviet
exchangees were specialists in these fields. Specifically, in the period between 1958 and
1963, 64% of Soviet participants were in scientific fields, while only 30% were in the
social sciences and humanities. In stark contrast to the academic make-up of Soviet
participants, American exchangees were overwhelmingly in the fields of social sciences
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and humanities, making up 89% of American participants, while only 11% of Americans
who went to the USSR were scientists.138 This trend of the Soviets sending mostly
scientists and the Americans sending mostly liberal arts students continued throughout
the life of the exchange program, and the perceived disadvantage this placed on the
United States would be a constant source of criticism for opponents of the exchange. For
instance, the American Security Council, a non-profit foreign policy think tank, published
a statement by Ohio Democratic Congressmen Michael A. Feighan in March 1964.
Feighan argued that the Soviets were using educational exchange to gain access to
American science and technology. “Russian exchangees coming to the United States,” he
contended,” are all in the age brackets characteristic of advanced scientific researchers.
The subject matters they pursue have a direct and practical relationship to the scientific
needs of the Soviet Union.” Furthermore, he noted that while the most advanced Soviet
research facilities remained closed to Americans, Soviet exchangees were meanwhile
permitted to benefit from placement in prestigious institutions such as the California
Institute of Technology, Yale, and Columbia.139 Other publications echoed these
sentiments, such as a 1966 article written by a journalist for The Reporter, George Bailey.
In a scathing review of the exchange program, Bailey remarked that the main objectives
of the exchanges for the Soviet Union were to “gain as much scientific and technical
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knowledge as possible [and] to propagandize the American government and
nongovernmental institutions.”140
In addition to these criticisms and others, it also became apparent in this early
period that, as a result of Cold War tensions, the exchanges to the Soviet bloc presented
their own unique challenges that would persist throughout the following decades. Most
notably were the difficulties with KGB surveillance of American participants, perceived
provocations, and periodic accusations of espionage. For instance, one exchangee in the
early 1960s had befriended a Russian ballet dancer in Leningrad, whom he often visited
in his home. After one such occasion, during which the American claimed he was so
intoxicated that he could not recall exactly what happened, he was arrested by Soviet
police and charged with homosexuality. Soviet officials threatened him with an eightyear prison sentence if he refused to confess, though they eventually did release him.141
In 1963, another incident arose with a participant on the language exchange. Margaret
Drucker, after drinking heavily with Russian friends, was accused by Soviet police of
attempting to strike one of their officers. Drucker claimed that she was possibly drugged,
and that Soviet officials used this episode as leverage in order to recruit her as an
informant.142 Another tense encounter between exchange participants and the KGB
involved Frank Silbajoris, an American participant who was originally native to
Lithuania. KGB officials accused Silbajoris of being a “traitor to the fatherland” by
serving in the German army during World War II. The officers did not believe his
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assertion that while he had indeed joined a Lithuanian military unit, he was never a part
of the German army. They then threatened Silbajoris with a ten-year prison sentence
unless he formed a “mutually advantageous relationship” with them and informed KGB
officials about US Embassy personnel and exchange participants. Upon alerting the
American Embassy of this offer, exchange officials quickly returned Silbajoris to the
United States.143 Other Americans stood accused of being spies, such as law student
Edwin B. Morrell, whom Soviet authorities eventually expelled from the country, and
even a member of IUCTG’s Executive Committee, Frederick Barghoorn, who was briefly
arrested for alleged espionage.144 In regards to each of these cases, IUCTG officials
expressed their belief that these were blatant Soviet provocations in an attempt to falsely
incriminate Americans or recruit them as informants.145 While the complete veracity of
these claims and recollections cannot be proven, the unequivocal acceptance of these
accounts by Committee officials shows an automatic distrust of Soviet authorities; this
was emblematic of the pervasive suspicion that surrounded the administration of the
exchange program.
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Despite the challenges of organizing and administering the exchanges during the
course of the Kennedy era, both the Department of State and the Inter-University
Committee on Travel Grants maintained that the benefits to education and American
national interests made the exchange more than worthwhile. The Soviet and Eastern
European Exchanges Staff, the successor to the State Department’s East-West Contacts
Staff, asserted in its policy papers the important scholarly and educational benefits of the
program, especially in revitalizing Russian and Soviet Studies in the United States, which
had long been forced to operate without direct archival access or fieldwork. However,
they concentrated more frequently on ways the exchange could help advance America’s
cause in the Cold War, especially by promoting a positive image of American life to the
Soviet people. Over the long term, State Department officials believed, this free flow of
information could force the Soviet regime to reform, become more open, and be more
receptive to a peaceful relationship with the United States. This could only be
accomplished, however, by selecting mature and impressive exchangees who could best
represent the United States.146 In addition to allowing the Soviet people more knowledge
of the West, State Department strategists also saw the exchange as beneficial because it
allowed Americans to obtain an in-depth and firsthand knowledge of the Soviet Union.
One 1962 State Department report asserted that: “if we are to cope with the Soviet system
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we must know as much about it as possible. Exchanges have proved to be a valuable
source of information.”147
The Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants, while repeatedly asserting its
independence from government influence and its virtue as an educational foundation, was
in ideological agreement with the Department of State’s vision for the exchange. While
Director Robert Byrnes asserted that the organization’s goals “must not be confused with
or subsumed under a political rubric,” he readily admitted that it was the seemingly nonpoliticized nature of the academic exchange that allowed it to have such a large impact on
the Soviet people. Allowing American students and professors to develop personal
relationships with Soviet citizens, Byrnes asserted, would have “enormous political
consequences.” According to Brynes, “free intellectual exchange is [America’s] strength,
not theirs” and thus Americans simply living and working among Russians would
automatically spread a desire for freedom. Again, according to the Committee leadership,
this could only be accomplished if the exchangees were chosen carefully and with a mind
to their maturity and ability to represent the United States favorably.148
After Lyndon B. Johnson’s ascension to the presidency in 1963, US-Soviet
academic exchanges continued, with many of the same goals and challenges of the
previous years, though compounded with the growing international crises of the mid- to
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late-1960s. IUCTG officials noted that the trend of Soviet participants mainly coming
from science and technology fields while American participants remained
overwhelmingly in humanities and social sciences specializations continued to grow in
this period. For instance, in the 1964-1965 academic year, only one of the twenty-four
American exchangees was in a scientific field, while seventeen of the twenty-four Soviets
came to the United States to do research in the physical sciences or technology. Another
problem that had yet to be alleviated by this time was the Soviet officials’ extreme
reluctance to place any Americans outside of Moscow and Leningrad. With the exception
of a single graduate student who spent a semester in Kiev, the Soviet Ministry of Higher
Education repeatedly refused IUCTG’s request to allow Americans to study in smaller
Soviet cities. Conversely, Soviet students coming to the United States had a much wider
range of universities and cities available to them. The American exchange officials also
faced the problem of perceived arbitrary rejections of applicants by Soviet administrators.
The Soviet side, they argued, had the tendency to reject anyone who was researching a
topic “which may prove ideologically embarrassing or may suggest a weakness in the
Soviet administrative or economic systems.” This policy was particularly problematic for
those applicants who desired to study recent Soviet history or contemporary Soviet
economic policy.149 Finally, IUCTG officials such as Deputy Chairman Stephen
Viederman complained of the slowness and inefficiency of the Soviet exchange
administrators. The cause of the constant delays in communication and acceptance of
American participants, he argued, could have been the result of “traditional Russian
bureaucratic inefficiency or may be based upon ill-will and deceit,” but regardless
“Some Observations on the US-USSR Educational and Scientific Exchanges,” 1964, International
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IUCTG officials named this as a constant problem in administering each year’s
exchanges.150
In addition to the routine obstacles and problems exchange officials faced, the
course of the 1960s brought international crises and increasing Cold War tensions that
had an effect on the program. America’s increasing involvement in Vietnam, along with
other sources of discontent between East and West, made the biannual negotiations for
the renewal of the Cultural Exchange Agreement increasingly tense and arduous. For
instance, whereas previous deliberations on the exchanges had taken less than two weeks,
the 1964 meeting of Soviet and American representatives lasted almost two months
before a final cultural agreement was reached, the terms of which substantially reduced
the number of academic exchanges. The following two meetings, in 1966 and 1968, only
served to continue this decline.151 It was the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia,
though, that convinced American exchange officials to temporarily scale down cultural
contacts with the Soviet Union. The State Department immediately suspended all “high
visibility” exchanges with the USSR, such as performing artists and exhibitions, in order
to “punish” the Soviet Union, while scholarly exchanges conducted by IUCTG remained
the only segment of the cultural agreement allowed to persist.152 In a confidential
correspondence on the recent incident, Executive Director of the exchange Allen H.
Kassof frankly expressed his relief that most of the exchange participants were already
nominated, accepted, and placed in Eastern Europe before the events in Czechoslovakia
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unfolded, sparing his agency “the awkward question of evaluating our relations with the
USSR.” Reiterating the sentiment American exchange organizers had expressed since the
program’s inception, Kassof conveyed his intention to insulate the exchange program
from political considerations as much as possible and maintain an independent course
from State Department desires and actions. However, not wanting to appear completely
tolerant of Soviet actions, Kassof did suggest terminating contacts with Soviet education
officials until a “proper period of mourning” had passed and resuming the exchanges per
usual only if the situation did not deteriorate substantially. Kassof stated that he was well
aware that this action was likely to have no affect on Soviet policy and actions toward
Czechoslovakia. Still, he wanted to avoid the possibility that Soviet officials could use
their inaction “to persuade the academic and intellectual communities…that we acquiesce
in regarding the current situation as normal and acceptable.”153 As much as American
exchange organizers desired to remain above and independent of the international
frictions of the 1960s, the program did not occur in a vacuum and the foreign policy
crises affected both the organizers at IUCTG and the exchangees on the ground in the
Soviet Union.
While it is important to understand the views and goals of American strategists
and exchange program organizers, the more significant aspect of the program was
arguably its implementation by participants on the ground in the Soviet Union. The
remainder of this chapter will explore American exchangees’ ideology, beliefs,
experiences, impressions, and the objectives they sought through their encounters with
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the Soviet people. In addition, this will serve as a specific example of the contrast
between the more aggressive and blatant anti-communism of the late 1940s and early
1950s with the subtler brand that emerged by the end of the decade. As articulated in the
previous chapter, the Cold War consensus that arose in the post-war United States
engulfed the majority of Americans in an ideological battle between the “free world” and
Soviet totalitarianism.154 This “good versus evil” dichotomy produced a stable and
unifying America identity that was very effective at marginalizing those who questioned
it.155 In essence, the Saidian “othering” of the Soviet Union, with American leaders
characterizing their communist rival as “brutal,” “aggressive,” and “immoral,” convinced
the majority of Americans that the Soviet threat must be forcefully confronted.156
This sentiment was not isolated to American popular culture but also became
deeply ingrained in American academia in the years after World War II. According to
historian Michael Hogan, the Cold War consensus of the late 1940s and early 1950s
united academics and intellectuals at both ends of the political spectrum. Liberal and
conservative academicians alike shared a strong belief that the expansionist aims inherent
in communist regimes had to be resisted by the United States, by military force if
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necessary.157 Many leading academics were outspoken about their commitment to
American exceptionalism. In 1949, the president of the American Historical Association,
Conyers Read, declared that the United States must “assume a militant attitude if we are
to survive.” To do so, he proclaimed, all Americans must do their part by holding
strongly to their belief in democracy and social responsibility, and “the historian is no
freer from this obligation than the physicist.”158 In another instance, the American
Association of Universities declared in a 1953 statement, endorsed by thirty-seven
American universities, that the primary threat to academic freedom was world
communism. Composed by a committee chaired by the president of Yale University,
“The Rights and Responsibilities of Universities and Their Faculties” declared that
American universities were unified in their dedication to the United States, its form of
government, and “free enterprise.”159 These sentiments affected university faculty as
well. As McCarthyism and an obsession with the danger of communist saboteurs
overtook much of the nation in the early 1950s, this created great pressure on universities
to eliminate any professors who could be considered disloyal or politically undesirable.
The majority of American states required teachers to take loyalty oaths and most
academics did not challenge the legality or appropriateness of the Congressional loyalty
investigations into their universities.160
The Eisenhower administration eased these loyalty investigations in the mid1950s, corresponding with the decline of McCarthyism and a shift in the strategies used
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by American policy-makers to confront the communist threat.161 By this period, the
American government began to reject the old aggressive approach of focusing on the
evils of communism and instead opted for a subtler tactic that promoted the positive
characteristics of American society.162 The perceptions and recollections of American
academic exchangees illuminate how this shift in rhetoric directly affected ordinary
American citizens. Far from forcefully spouting the dangers of communism to the Soviet
people they encountered, American exchange participants emulated this tactical change
of their government by developing their own more indirect methods to assert American
superiority.
In the first decade following its inception in 1958, the Graduate Student/Young
Faculty Exchange, administered by the Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants,
sent 321 early career academics to conduct research in the Soviet Union.163 A comparable
number travelled to the USSR under a combination of IUCTG’s two other programs, the
Summer Exchange of Language Teachers and the Senior Research Scholars Exchange.
The following analysis is based on roughly 220 individual reports, written by those who
took part in the exchanges of this period. Most reports come from participants in the
Graduate Student/Young Faculty program who, compared to other types of exchangees,
usually spent the longest period in Eastern Europe.
Experiences of these participants varied, sometimes in dramatic ways, with many
leaving the Soviet Union holding starkly divergent views on its educational system, its
Jessica Wang, American Science in an Age of Anxiety: Scientists, Anticommunism, and the Cold War
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 285; Thomas F. Richards, The Cold War Within
American Higher Education: Rutgers University as a Case Study (Raleigh: Pentland Press, 1999), 156.
162
Leo Bogart, Cool Words, Cold War: A New Look at USIA’s Premises for Propaganda (Washington,
DC: American University Press, 1995), 73.
163
Department of State, 1968, “Exchanges with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,” Bureau of
Educational and Cultural Affairs Collection, University of Arkansas Library, Fayetteville, Arkansas.
161

80

people, and its society. However, certain commonalities in these reports indicate the
extent to which these individuals were imbued with American Cold War ideology.
American policy-makers and exchange organizers assumed exchangees would use their
time in the USSR to spread a desire for democracy and capitalism among the Soviet
people, and these reports provide insight into the extent to which that assumption held
true.
Illustrating a break from the 1950s, with its fierce anti-communism and
widespread acceptance of American exceptionalism, very few exchangees between 1958
and 1968 explicitly stated that their time in the Soviet Union convinced them of the
superiority of the West or the United States. Of the roughly twelve instances of such
direct sentiment, none of them were expressed by exchangees after 1961. For instance,
Frederick Barghoorn, a professor and IUCTG official visiting the Soviet Union in 1958,
spoke to many of the exchangees in Moscow and Leningrad. While he noted that many
remained exasperated by the “restrictive atmosphere” to which they were subjected, he
argued that at least spending time in the Soviet Union reminded them of the value of
freedom and the virtues of American society.164 One 1961 participant bluntly remarked
that his sojourn in the USSR had made him “more critical of the Soviet Union than I had
ever been before.”165 Stanford Couch, another 1961 exchangee in philology, concurred,
asserting that after becoming familiar with the workings of Soviet society, he more firmly
believed that the American system was “closer to answering the needs of the individual
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than this one is.”166 Others remarked on the “cleavage between the communist and free
worlds” and the “spiritual distance” between the United States and the Soviet Union.167
Finally, exchangees such as Frederick Kaplan and Leonard Kirsch believed that the
experience heightened their appreciation of being an American and reminded them of the
“true meaning and worth of freedom.”168
Although later Americans certainly critiqued specific aspects of the Soviet system
and way of life, only participants from those very first years stated so forthrightly their
belief in Western superiority. The absence of such remarks throughout most of the 1960s,
in one way, reflects the change in the American government’s propaganda strategy,
which began to focus on appealing to the Soviet people by promoting a positive image of
American democracy and capitalism, instead of merely relying on anti-communist
diatribes. In another way, it illustrates the growing challenges to militant anticommunism and bold American exceptionalism in American higher education.169 For
instance, some cotemporary academics, such as historian William Appleman Williams in
1959, condemned American foreign policy and its insistence that other nations could not
solve their problems unless they adopted American values.170 Still, more academics, such
as most of those who went to the Soviet Union on academic exchange, upheld American
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exceptionalism, just not in such direct terms as had characterized the immediate post-war
years.
Not only did most of the participants of the 1960s not directly tout Western
superiority, but they also repeatedly expressed the great value in gaining cultural
enrichment and understanding through experiencing Soviet life firsthand, conversing
directly with Soviet citizens, and being a part of Soviet academia. Over seventy-five of
the decade’s participants stated in forthright terms the personal benefit they obtained by
merely living in Soviet society and attending Soviet universities. Woodford D.
McClellan, a historian on the 1961 graduate student exchange, summarized the sentiment
of many of the participants, arguing that even if he had accomplished no academic
objectives, just the process of “getting the feel” of the Soviet Union enhanced his value as
an academic in Soviet studies.171 Others, such as literature student Marguerite Barerat,
believed that her time in Eastern Europe not only enhanced her dissertation and research,
but also gave her more confidence as an instructor when discussing the Soviet Union with
her students.172 Teacher of Russian language and 1967 exchangee Masha Nikolai
Vorobiov shared this view, noting her anticipation to impart her impressions of the
country to her students, including descriptions of the university, the architecture, the
food, the crowds, the streets, the culture, and a myriad of other small details that she
could not have obtained without spending a lengthy amount of time in the Soviet
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Union.173 Beyond educational and pedagogical benefits, many exchangees underscored
that their experience made the Soviet Union “real” to them. Historian Gilbert McArthur
remarked in 1965 that the most fundamental change that resulted from his time abroad
was that a previously “vaguely unreal, grayish world…has now become a living entity…
[with] an infinitely greater complexity and diversity than I had appreciated before living
there.”174 Others concurred with this sentiment, such as Senior Research Scholar Robert
Belknap, who in 1966 noted that one of his top objectives for his exchange was simply
“to get the feel of living in Russia.” He believed this goal was made more possible by the
presence of his wife and children, because of whom he had dealings with more elements
of ordinary Soviet life, such as schools and grocery shopping for a family.175
This first-hand knowledge not only enriched them culturally, according to many
exchangees, but it also gave them a clearer insight into their nation’s Cold War rival.
Joseph Fuhrmann, a graduate student participant in 1966, remarked that “spending an
academic year in the Soviet Union has provided a better understanding on my part of one
of the world’s greatest and important nations. For this, and more, I am grateful.”176 Joe
Malik, a participant on the 1965 Summer Exchange of Language Teachers, agreed with
this view, and lamented that more Americans could not have the same enlightening
opportunity.177 The key to obtaining these insights rested in the level of immersion these
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academics received and the perceived “non-tourist” nature of their visit. Nicholas
Vontosolos, a linguist, visited the Soviet Union twice before 1968 as a tourist, but he
believed that, unlike his most recent visit on the exchange, those previous trips did not
allow for an authentic immersion into Soviet life.178 Douglas Jackson, a geographer
whom Soviet officials housed in a hotel, as was customary with those on the Senior
Scholar Exchange, happily dealt with his hotel’s inconvenient location and substandard
dining room because it was not a Western tourist hotel. He could have requested a new
set of accommodations but refused because the hotel offered “the opportunity to see daily
more of Moscow life” than would be possible in the city center.179 In fact, multiple
participants in almost every year of the exchange in this period remarked that though
there were frustrations, obstacles, and hardships involved with living in the USSR, the
educational, cultural, and personal value heavily outweighed the disadvantages and made
the endeavor more than worthwhile.
In addition to learning what it was like to live in Soviet society, over thirty
exchangees in this period specifically underscored the importance of conversing directly
with the Soviet people in order to reach a deeper appreciation of life in the USSR. Many
participants urged future exchangees to resist surrounding themselves with only
Americans. They asserted that Soviet citizens would welcome an American acquaintance
and such a relationship would help the exchangee gain a new and valuable perspective.
Leonard Kirsch, a 1961 exchangee in economics, argued that it would be a “tragedy” for
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participants to spend their entire social life in the USSR in the company of Americans.180
Russian literature student, Bryon Lindsey, urged IUCTG officials to discourage
Americans from being “clannish” and not befriending Russians. He reported that some
exchangees in 1968 did not even attempt to adjust to Soviet society and therefore they
remained “too withdrawn from the Russian environment.”181 Despite some reclusive
participants, many noted throughout this decade how readily Soviets would befriend
Americans. A. V. Riasanovsky, a 1959 exchangee and a native Russian who had since
obtained American citizenship, wrote that “the majority of the Soviet citizens whom I
met seemed genuinely pleased to encounter a Russian-American” since he had obviously
maintained his interest in Russian culture and language.182 In 1966, Jo Ann Hopkins
claimed that meeting ordinary Russians was the most “delightful” and “easiest” part of
her stay, as she effortlessly struck up conversations with people she met in public
spaces.183 These conversations and friendships, many Americans agreed, contributed to a
deeper understanding and more accurate perspective on the Soviet Union. One graduate
student participant in 1962 noted his “wonderful personal experience” and how talking
with his Soviet friends created “new awareness, greater understanding, [and] greater
sympathy for the poor devils who have suffered so much and continue to suffer.”184
Political scientist Paul Cocks asserted in 1967 that conversations with ordinary citizens
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“sharpened and tempered” his understanding and perspective of the Soviet people.185
Other academics repeatedly urged future participants to meet Soviets outside of the
university setting. A 1959 graduate student implied that academics did not represent the
“real” or “average” Soviet citizen, and therefore Americans should seek out encounters
with workers by frequenting public cafeterias, the transportation system, sporting events,
and stores.186 Historian Robert Jones agreed, stating that during his 1967 stay in the
USSR, his friends outside of the dormitory broadened his experience “beyond the narrow
limits of student life.”187
Although they were the minority, some exchangees in the first decade of the
program did not have such valuable experiences in their encounters with Soviet citizens.
For instance, a small number of mostly early exchange participants noted that they never
felt entirely welcomed or comfortable among the Soviet people. Willis Konick, a 1959
language program student, warned that while it was possible to form a small group of
close friends, Muscovites on the whole were wary of foreigners. He contended that
making acquaintances at Moscow State University was not easy due to the “natural
timidity and inherent fears of your fellow Soviet students.”188 Seymour Slive,
participating in a 1960 exchange of professors program to Leningrad State University,
happened to arrive the day that Nikita Khrushchev announced the capture of the
American U-2 spy plane pilot. At this point of high international tensions, he
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remembered, “It was crystal clear that the university wanted nothing to do with me [and]
officials would have been happier had I not shown up.” He subsequently urged future
participants to come to the Soviet Union if necessary for research but to be prepared “to
be pushed around a bit.” 189 One of only a few participants who expressed this sense of
feeling unwelcome after 1961, political scientist Donald Barry noted in 1968 that he felt a
definite decline in friendliness and cooperation as compared to his previous visit in 1961.
His assigned department at Moscow State University, he recalled, cared very little about
his views, ideas, or work.190 Historian Robert Jones had even more sinister warnings for
future participants in 1967, cautioning them to choose their friends wisely. He believed
that fellow Soviet historians actively involved in the Communist Party merely sought out
American friendships so as to report on their activities to the Soviet government. “One
American participant was disappointed this year,” he recalled,” to find out that his yearlong friend had been feeling him out and setting him up for an offer to become a spy in
the pay of the Soviet government.”191 These accounts illustrate that not all exchange
participants had such satisfactory or valuable experiences with the Soviet people they
encountered. Still, these sentiments represented only a minority of exchangees, with most
in agreement that meeting Soviet citizens was an enlightening and positive opportunity.
Continuing to express how their time in the Soviet Union led to personal and
professional enrichment, not an explicit solidification of Western superiority, many
participants recounted their academic experience in favorable terms. Though most
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certainly faced obstacles in their attempts to do research in the Soviet Union, and though
academic experiences varied greatly from the highly productive to the intensely negative,
the positive remarks tended to outweigh the critical. For instance, despite several
exchangees bemoaning the dogmatism and ideology present in Soviet academia, many
more complimented Soviet researchers and applauded the quality of work they had
accomplished, in spite of the hardships they were forced to overcome. Raymond T.
McNally, a graduate student in philology in 1961, outlined this sentiment most directly,
stating:
[Prospective American exchangees] should be made to understand that the Soviet
scholars can be just as good as American scholars, and sometimes better, in
certain fields. Unfortunately many American students have the false idea that,
because the Soviet system is totalitarian, therefore, Soviet scholars are a pack of
stupid ideologues. If you are in a field such as mine, or in old Russian literature,
you will find that Sovietology does not prevent solid scholarship here.192
Multiple other participants recalled the broadmindedness of Soviet academics and their
helpful professional critiques, which “never sunk to political agitation.”193 In almost forty
instances, exchangees specifically commended their Soviet advisor for his or her
cordiality and insight. Linguist Charles Gribble, in 1961, recommended his advisor as a
“real scholar who is also a fine person,” and another 1962 graduate student praised the
advice his advisor provided, noting that it helped him “expose any false impressions” he
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held.194 Karl F. von Loewe, a history graduate student in 1966, even asserted that his
Soviet advisor was so helpful that he was just as important to the final formulation of his
dissertation as his American advisor back in the United States.195 Many others went
further and recalled the valuable help received from other faculty members and graduate
student peers, such as George P. Majeska and Joan Afferica, who in 1965 both recounted
that the members of the History Department at Leningrad State University treated them
as colleagues, going out of their way to aid in their research.196
While some American exchangee reports dwelled on the negative aspects of
academic work in the Soviet Union, the majority of participants claimed to have had a
generally positive academic experience. For instance, a relatively small number of
exchange participants asserted that Soviet academics were below American standards, the
classes were subpar, or that they had many problems conducting their research. Roland J.
Fuchs, a 1961 graduate student in geography, recorded that while he gained many
personal benefits from living in Soviet society, it did not lead to much professional
development because “Russian methodology in urban geography is several decades
behind that in the United States.”197 A few others echoed this sentiment, such as linguist
Robert Lefkowitz in 1968. He believed Soviet theoretical linguists to be “of depressingly
low quality.” This was not totally a result of communist repression, he asserted, but more
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due to an “authoritarian educational and social pattern” that discouraged creativity and
originality.198 A small number of the early participants recalled their disappointment with
Soviet university classes. For example, Marguerite Barerat recalled that the literature
classes she attended in 1961 were generally “rather bad” and simply repeated the
unimaginative and propagandistic material found in Soviet textbooks.199 The most
common criticism of Soviet academia, however, had nothing to do with classes or
inferior faculty and colleagues. The most frequent problem was due to the restrictive or
counterproductive nature of Soviet libraries, archives, and research institutions. Graduate
student Donald R. Lesh reported in 1961 that he and his colleagues were “banging their
heads against a stone wall of Soviet bureaucracy in an attempt to get into archives.”200
Historian Robert Jones relayed his advice for future exchange participants after his 1967
visit. He claimed that in order to be productive in Moscow archives, exchangees must
“haggle and bicker” until they get the records they require. “If the material brought is
irrelevant, send it back,” he urged. “Be impatient and demanding when necessary.”201
Despite the frequency of similar negative reports, a majority of Americans still reported
an overall positive experience in Soviet libraries and archives. Far from simply asserting
that their time in Eastern Europe merely confirmed their sense of American superiority,
as many academics had done in the immediate post-war years, these individuals more
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often than not commended Soviet academia for the educational enrichment it provided
for both themselves personally and their research.
While the blunt acclamation of American exceptionalism largely dwindled during
the 1960s, many accounts show that the Cold War consensus certainly resonated with
these academics during their time in the Soviet Union and simply manifested itself in
more subtle ways. Namely, these exchangees asserted their American values and identity
through negation by noting the aspects of the Soviet Union that they found unusual or
disturbing. Although these participants often made no direct comparison between Soviet
and American conditions, and sometimes even provided excuses for the negative
attributes of the USSR, the mere process of noting those perceived aberrations confirmed
their own American identity and values. Just as Edward Said argued in his work
Orientalism that Europeans of the nineteenth century used the contrasting image of the
Far East to define themselves, so these Americans in the twentieth century used their
negative assessments of Soviet life to confirm their own confidence in Western
democracy and capitalism.202 So while they expounded on the virtues of experiencing
Soviet life and academia and the increased cultural enrichment it provided, most
criticized the Soviet system as a whole, especially dwelling on the inefficient
bureaucracy, the presence of state surveillance, the difficulty of buying consumer goods,
and the drudgery of Soviet life.
Consistently throughout this decade, in almost fifty instances, American
participants discussed their frustrations in encounters with Soviet bureaucracy. They
frequently focused their disdain on Inotdel, the foreign office in all Soviet universities
202
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that handled exchange students. For instance, Willis Konick, a 1959 participant on the
Summer Exchange of Language Teachers, called Inotdel officials “sly, conniving liars”
who represented the worst of Soviet bureaucracy. He advised future participants that the
only way to accomplish anything through Inotdel was by presenting demands as a group,
and though this was “difficult for a group of American individualists…it must be
done.”203 Leslie Brady, who in 1959 worked with many exchangees in Moscow through
his position on the American Embassy’s Council for Cultural Affairs, recorded in an
article his impression that the Soviet system fostered “buck-passing” and no sense of
responsibility among Soviet officials to accomplish anything significant.204 Philologist
Sanford C. Couch even told his university’s Intodel officials that he hoped they could
visit the United States in the future so they could see “how foreign guests should be
treated.”205 David Braslau echoed Couch’s sentiment in 1961, noting that Soviet
bureaucracy had prohibited him from taking a research trip to Tblisi. He recalled that this
was all the more frustrating considering that “Soviet students practically pick any school
in the United States” where they want to study.206 Still, some exchangees noted that
clashes with bureaucracy were merely a normal part of the Soviet experience. Literature
researcher Robert Belknap commented in 1966 that one of his major objectives for his
time in the Soviet Union was getting the feel of living in Russia, and thus “the red tape
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produced awareness I’d have missed otherwise.”207 Through criticizing the bureaucratic
hurdles imbedded in the Soviet system, and especially by some comparing these
conditions to those in the United States, these exchangees implicitly asserted their
confidence in the American system for its efficiency and its fostering of diligence and a
powerful work ethic.
In addition to bureaucratic difficulties, the second most discussed problem of life
in the Soviet Union was the prospect of state surveillance, and over forty participants
argued that this constituted a real and present threat to themselves or their Soviet friends.
While a few exchangees believed that state surveillance was not a problem for them or
that their colleagues exaggerated this issue, the majority of participants who discussed
surveillance characterized it as a very real part of Soviet life. Many of these Americans
assumed that Soviet officials screened all of their incoming and out-going mail, even if
physical evidence of such tampering was absent. Thus some urged future participants to
take “normal precaution” in written correspondence.208 Many, such as 1967 Senior
Research Scholar Robert Maguire, believed Soviet officials used hidden microphones to
gather intelligence on American exchangees. Maguire claimed that he “took for granted
that the walls and telephone in [his] room were bugged.”209 One graduate student in 1960
even removed a hollow tile in his bathroom that he suspected of concealing a
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microphone. He found no such device and had to reinstall the tile, recalling that he
“probably [had] the only bathroom in Russia that has been reset with Borden’s glue.”210
Other exchangees asserted their suspicion that they were followed by KGB agents while
in the Soviet Union. Political scientist William Taubman remembered his 1965 encounter
with such surveillance in his memoir. He contended that upon his early weeks in the
Soviet Union, he did not worry about the prospect of surveillance unless an occasional
“James Bond mood” was upon him. However, one day when leaving his dorm, he noted
two well-dressed men began to follow him, and these men, whom he soon called his
“shadows,” continued this tailing for weeks. In sometimes comical ways, he sought to
test their commitment to pursuing him. In one instance, he remembered:
I was standing under the shelter of an awning, and one of them was standing right
next to me, when it occurred to me that I had an umbrella and he didn’t. I waited
for a particularly drenching downpour and marched out into it. He dutifully
followed and took the soaking consequences
Still, Taubman noted that despite the sometimes ludicrous aspects of these encounters, it
was also unnerving and he hesitated to be too friendly with Soviet acquaintances because
of this surveillance.211 Many others, like Taubman, were concerned not for themselves,
but for the safety of their Soviet friends. One 1960 graduate student advised future
participants that despite the fact that life sometimes seemed “normal” in the Soviet
Union, one should not forget that “there are certain rules of conduct, the breaking of
which can mean real trouble for you and for your Russian friends.”212 Economist Leonard
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Kirsch recalled in 1961 that after spending several weekends with a Soviet Jewish friend,
his acquaintance was called in for an “interview” with the KGB. Although their
relationship and actions were wholly innocent, Kirsch recommended that exchangees
always remember that they could be under surveillance at any time and “for the sake of
your Soviet friends, be careful.”213 Other incidents such as this did not resolve themselves
so easily. John W. Beckley befriended a Soviet dissident named Slava, and during their
visit to Slava’s family dacha, the police arrested and questioned both of them. The
officials subsequently let them go, but soon Beckley could no longer contact or find
Slava. Fearing his presence endangered his friend, Beckley decided to leave the Soviet
Union early.214 The records on the academic exchange program provide no way to
definitively determine the truthfulness of these suspicions and recollections on Soviet
surveillance. Regardless of the extent of their validity, however, the fact that state
surveillance constituted one of the most frequently discussed aspects of Soviet life by the
exchange participants reveal it to be a major part of their perception of Soviet society.
One of the other most frequently discussed topics about Soviet society in
exchangee reports concerned the low quality or unavailability of foods and consumer
goods and the substandard nature of Soviet housing. Some exchange participants directly
compared these deplorable conditions to more favorable circumstances in the United
States, but even if they made no such explicit comparison, these academics clearly
articulated their confidence in American capitalism to provide for its citizens better than
Soviet communism. Multiple exchangees recounted the “tremendous effort” they spent
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merely to obtain their daily meals because many food items were scarce and the Soviet
Union was “still so far behind the United States in the average standard of living and
consumption.”215 They often described the food as “invariably the same” and “inferior.”
Multiple exchangees even urged future participants to bring vitamins to supplement the
“appalling” Soviet diet.216 Exchangees also suggested that future visitors to the Soviet
Union should bring American-made goods such as deodorant, toothbrushes (in order to
avoid “the monstrous things sold locally”), thread, and masking tape because such basic
items were either unavailable in Soviet stores or too poorly made.217 Many further
recommended bringing all necessary clothing, since Soviet garments were expensive, of
poor quality, and “stodgy” or “drab” by Western standards.218
Most of the exchangees lived in a university dormitory during their time in the
USSR, with some of the Senior Scholars assigned to hotels, but regardless of their
placement, many harshly criticized Soviet housing in their reports. One 1959 graduate
student in Leningrad described living conditions as “considerably below American
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standards,” with no elevator, sparse hot water, and unsanitary bathrooms.219 Moscow
students had complaints as well, such as historian Robert Clawson who had to use
masking tape, “wisely brought into the country by one of the other participants,” to seal
his windows and block the frigid draft.220 Historian Robert Jones, in 1967, called the
housing in Leningrad “primitive” by American standards, and language student H. W.
Dewey even suggested that the spartan conditions inflicted upon them by Soviet officials
was a “deliberate insult to American professors and teachers.”221 Even those participants
who were not so offended by their accommodations still remarked upon the contrast
between American and Soviet living conditions. For instance, language student Willis
Konick asserted that his dorm was merely comfortable to him, but “by Soviet standards,
[it was] absolutely luxurious.”222 Interestingly, these Americans almost never stated
directly that communism was to blame for these numerous problems in Soviet society.
Without resorting to strong anti-communist diatribes, which was increasingly
unfashionable in the academic community and wider American society into the 1960s,
these exchangees still suggested the success of American capitalism compared to the
inadequacies of Soviet communism.
In addition, descriptions of the drudgery of Soviet life and the taxing nature of
merely living in Soviet society appeared regularly throughout the first decade of
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exchange reports. Participants often contrasted the depressing nature of life in the USSR
to the vibrancy of the West. They frequently described the Soviet Union as “depressing
and cold,” “dull,” and “drab.”223 Multiple academics throughout this decade urged future
exchangees to take a trip outside of Moscow or Leningrad during their stay. One 1959
graduate student suggested vacationing in smaller Soviet cities, such as Vladimir and
Suzdal, to have a brief relief from crowded city life.224 Others recommended even leaving
the Soviet Union altogether, arguing that their short vacation in places such as Austria,
Finland, or West Germany provided a “wonderful morale lifter” and “a period of
recuperation…for both body and soul.”225 The importance exchangees place on being
able to obtain a brief respite from Soviet society through travel became especially
apparent in the late 1960s when the Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants
withdrew funding for accompanying wives to participate in the end-of-the-year trip with
their husbands. Political scientist Donald Barry argued in 1968 that the trip “was a very
welcome and much-needed change from a hard, depressing winter.” However, because of
IUCTG’s withdrawal of funding for wives, only two of the twelve couples had the
financial means to make the trip. “It seems strange,” he argued, “to transport the wives
half-way around the world (with good purpose) and then deny the approximately $300
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more that it would cost…for two weeks of rest and travel out of ten hard months of
work.”226 Literature researcher Nancy McAuliffe agreed with Barry’s argument,
contending that most couples could not afford the trip without the monetary assistance
and this really harmed morale and created depression because these couples remained
stuck in Moscow throughout the entire winter.227 While these exchangees were not
directly touting the superiority of Western society, the clearly articulated contrast
between the drudgery of Soviet life versus the comfort and serenity of Western society
show their confirmation of American Cold War values.
While exchangees’ negative descriptions of the Soviet Union served as one way
to illustrate their values and ideology, especially in regards to Western superiority and
American exceptionalism, their overwhelming commitment to serving as cultural
ambassadors and positive representatives of the United States further elucidates their
dedication to spreading American democracy and capitalism. In more than twenty
instances, exchangees explicitly stated their belief that they served as representatives of
the United States during their time on exchange. But even more often, exchangees
recorded these beliefs in slightly more subtle ways. For example, in thirty instances past
participants urged that IUCTG should choose future grantees wisely, considering not only
their academic achievements but also their emotional maturity and ability to represent the
United States in a favorable way. Just as many reports suggested that American products
and publications made great gifts for Soviet friends. These sentiments were not isolated,
but remained consistent throughout the first decade of the exchange program. So while
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almost no exchange participants argued for Western superiority in direct terms, their
recollections show that most still held the missionary zeal to convert the Soviet people to
the American way. Far from using the exchange experience as merely a way to achieve
cultural understanding, most participants not only reaffirmed their own convictions in
democracy and capitalism but also indicated their willingness to take part in spreading
those values to those who needed it most.
Many exchangees articulated their belief that they had a personal responsibility to
be a positive representative of the United States. Some noted the value of the personal
interaction with Soviets and how it allowed them to be a “representative of the American
people.”228 Historian Frederick Kaplan concurred in 1961, urging future exchangees to
understand that “in terms of cultural exchange, [an academic exchange participant] is
more effective than the occasional performer or musicians in acquainting educated
Russians with the attitudes, ideas, and behavior of Americans.”229 While some advised
prospective exchangees to “be ready to give facts and figures” in response to Soviet
questions regarding American society, most merely suggested being personable and
honest. Multiple graduate students asserted that an American’s “best weapon” was a nice
and objective demeanor because “abusive or insulting language” merely insulted Soviet
acquaintances and caused them to ignore the ideas presented by exchangees.230 In his
memoir, political scientist William Taubman further contended that, especially in
contacts with Soviet youth, the best way to relay American values was not to attack the
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shortcomings of Soviet society but to merely “be ourselves.” Exchangees should strive to
be honest when talking about the United States with the Soviets, Taubman argued, even if
that meant being critical, because “what really impresses the Russians…is our right to
criticize our government and social system openly.”231 Even the wives of exchangees
could contribute to this effort, and multiple participants urged the IUCTG to appreciate
the important ways that American wives could serve as favorable representatives of the
United States.232 Overall, all these Americans felt it their duty to help the Soviet people
broaden their worldview in spite of their closed and restricted society. Linguist Robert
Lefkowitz summarized this view succinctly in 1968:
As for my impact on them, I admit with regret that I have not taught even the few
Russians I knew to love truth or to be good boys in international politics. But isn’t
it an awful lot to have exposed even a few to just a little more of a world that, in
in spite of its faults, lies far beyond their poor imagination?233
Despite the perception among many of these individuals that their mission to
spread American values was a personal conviction, devoid of government instruction or
influence, their attempts to use soft power to convince the Soviet people of the merits of
democracy and capitalism directly paralleled the US government’s methods in this era.
Regardless of their denial of the influence of American ideology or government
propaganda efforts on themselves, these participants were clearly transporting the Cold
War consensus with them behind the Iron Curtain.

Taubman, The View from Lenin Hills, 162, 248-249.
Norman E. Saull, 1961, Exchange report, International Research and Exchanges Board Collection,
Indiana University Library, Bloomington, Indiana; Bryon Lindsey, 1968, Exchange report, International
Research and Exchanges Board Collection, The Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
233
Robert Lefkowitz, 1968, Exchange report, International Research and Exchanges Board Collection, The
Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
231
232

102

Furthermore, over thirty exchangees even pleaded with the IUCTG in their reports
to select future participants carefully, taking into consideration their knowledge of both
America and the Soviet Union, and their ability to serve effectively as cultural
ambassadors. As the first year of the exchange program concluded, one graduate student
argued that the continued success of the program depended entirely on the correct
selection of students. He suggested the Committee do a thorough background check of
prospective grantees, even delving into the applicant’s family, medical, and
psychological background because, as the Soviet Union was an “abnormal place in which
to live,” selected academics needed to be equipped with “mental stability and moral
responsibility.”234 Multiple exchanges warned that future participants should have a good
knowledge of current events, as well as a general grasp of both American and Soviet
history so, as Charles Gribble contended, they could “present our side intelligently.”235
Many believed that the “daily ideological combat” involved in discussions with Soviets
required participants to have proper “ammunition” at their command. Woodford
McClellan, one of these individuals, asserted that “this does not necessarily mean that [an
exchangee] must be an expert on communism; a good sound knowledge of why one is
proud to be an American will suffice admirably.”236 Others, such as Donald Lesh in 1961,
even argued that if the selection committee had a choice between two applicants of
roughly equal academic merit, the individual who showed a better knowledge of Russian
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and American history should be chosen.237 Robert Richardson, who went on the exchange
in 1968 to study Russian language and literature, agreed, contending that the IUCTG
selection committee placed too much emphasis on scholarly qualifications and not
enough consideration on “more personal factors,” such as maturity and knowledge of
current conditions in the Soviet Union.238 Others had a more direct agenda, such as the
two 1959 participants who urged the Committee to include an African American on the
exchange in order to confront Soviet propaganda on American racism.239 These
statements and others like them illustrate that to government policy-makers and exchange
participants alike, the program was not just a tool for academic enrichment but, more
importantly, a method to spread American values directly to the Soviet people.
Beyond just using conversation to spread American values, about thirty grantees
discussed in their reports the merit of bringing American goods and publications to the
Soviet Union to distribute as gifts. Marguerite Barerat, a 1961 graduate student in
literature asserted that “anything related to American culture” would be well appreciated
by Soviet acquaintances.240 Besides books, the most suggested type of gift was music
records, and especially those of the jazz genre. Language student Willis Konick urged
future participants to “leave Beethoven, Brahms, and Bach at home” because “the
Russian students have an insatiable thirst for American popular music,” meaning jazz
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music.241 Illustrating yet another parallel between American exchangees’ actions and US
government propaganda tactics, this was the same decade when the State Department
began using jazz as a weapon in the Cold War ideological struggle. Worldwide tours of
performers such as Louis Armstrong and Duke Ellington, organized by the State
Department, were intended to counter the criticism of American racism and project the
image of a racially inclusive American society.242 While numerous exchangees gladly
distributed American music, the most frequent items Americans gifted to Soviet friends
were American publications. Many gave out periodicals such as Time, Life, The New
York Times, and Vogue, which they most often obtained from the US Embassy in
Moscow. Many of these academics mentioned the possibility of Soviet officials’
disapproval of this practice, and while some recommended distributing copies discreetly
and only to friends, others handed out the literature freely and made no effort to hide its
dissemination.243 There were also differing opinions of the types of books appropriate to
give Soviet friends. Language student Willis Konick suggested exchangees bring popular
twentieth-century novels and leave 1984, Animal Farm, and Doctor Zhivago at home.244
Others argued that participants should bring whatever they wanted and merely use
discretion when allowing Soviet friends to borrow sensitive books.245 Regardless of their
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specific views, most of these individuals agreed that the Soviets had a “large thirst for
foreign literature,” and distributing American publications was greatly appreciated by the
Soviets.246 As with the use of jazz music as a Cold War weapon, exchangees’ enthusiasm
for disseminating American literature also aligned with broader governmental objectives.
By this time, the United States Information Agency was already attempting to use
publications to spread American values, through reading rooms and libraries abroad and
campaigns such as “Books from America,” which encouraged American citizens to
donate unwanted books to the USIA to distribute overseas.247 The fact that so many
exchange participants took it upon themselves to give out American literature illustrates
their belief that the Soviet people not only desired but needed this exposure to American
ideas. Implicit in this view was the idea that if Soviet citizens were merely exposed to
American values, the universal appeal inherent in these values would foster a desire
among the Soviet people to emulate American society. Reflecting the American
government’s shift to the utilization of soft power to puncture the Iron Curtain and
promote dissent in Eastern Europe, American academic exchange participants did not
rely on aggressive anti-communist rhetoric to appeal to the Soviet people, but instead
sought to use themselves as positive representatives of American freedom and consumer
culture.
American exchangees’ efforts to represent the United States during their time in
the Soviet Union would have been futile, however, if they had not perceived the Soviet
people as receptive to these overtures. Thus their characterizations of the Soviet people
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did not describe them as hardline communists who resisted all contact with the West.
Instead, in over one hundred instances, American exchangees described the Soviets they
met as very friendly, desirous of associations with Westerners, or curious about the
outside world. In other words, the Soviet people were receptive to converting to
democracy and capitalism. This distinction is vital to illustrating the beliefs held by
exchange participants and proving these individuals’ strong confidence in American
exceptionalism and Western superiority, despite their reluctance to assert these ideas
explicitly. In his 2007 monograph The Global Cold War, Odd Arne Westad argued that
the key to understanding the Cold War was to comprehend Soviet and American
incursions into the Third World, because these forays clearly illustrated the national
ideologies of the two superpowers. Central to both American and Soviet ideologies,
Westad asserted, was the idea that their system was universally applicable and could be
successfully transplanted and adopted by any nation in the world. Therefore, the reason
for intervention in developing countries was that “Washington and Moscow needed to
change the world in order to prove the universal applicability of their ideologies.”248 This
same argument and model can be applied to American academic exchangees. If they
perceived the Soviet people as being incapable of reform and absolutely resistant to
Western ideas and values, this proved that the American system was not, in fact,
universal. If Soviet citizens remained largely unswayed by American products, literature,
and ideas, the exchangees’ entire American identity would be shaken. Just as American
policy-makers sought to show that their system of government and way of life could be
applied all over the world, so these American citizens believed that they had to show that
248
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the Soviet people were indeed capable of supporting democracy and capitalism. Since the
way to win the Cold War was the ultimate triumph of American ideology, this assurance
that American values had a strong appeal to Soviet citizens reaffirmed that the United
States would eventually prevail in this struggle. So despite the 1960s being a time when
many Americans, especially academics, began to question their own government and
ideas of American exceptionalism, these reports show that most of the basic assumptions
of American ideology remained intact.
The most frequent assertion made by the academic exchange participants when
discussing the Soviet people was their friendliness towards Americans and that they
readily formed relationships with Westerners. While a few exchangees did report that
Soviet citizens tended to treat foreigners with hostility, these comments occurred in less
than twenty instances and almost all of them were recorded in the first three years of the
exchange. Conversely, throughout the entire decade and in over seventy instances,
Americans in the Soviet Union noted the people’s cordiality, helpfulness, and generosity.
Multiple exchangees recalled, sometimes with surprise, the ease with which they formed
friendships with Soviet people and how “naturally” these relationships developed.249 For
instance, historian Edward Keenan argued that Soviet-American relationships developed
like any other: “if one is honest, open, considerate, and intelligent…he can expect to have
[Soviet] friends with the same qualities.”250 Many remembered that the Soviets,
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especially their fellow students, showed “no hesitation” in visiting the dorms of their
American colleagues and if an exchangee desired these relationships, he or she would
never be lacking Russian friends.251 Bryon Lindsey, a graduate student in literature,
recorded an especially poignant illustration of Soviet kindness. After the assassination of
Senator Robert Kennedy in 1968, Lindsey and other Americans received permission to
place a memorial stand of pictures, inscriptions, and flowers at the entrance of Moscow
State University. Lindsey recalled receiving nothing but “help, sympathy, and
appreciation” from Soviet students after the erection of the memorial. He recalled that:
It was undoubtedly the first time an American statesman has been publicly
honored in the Soviet Union, and the privilege of placing the stand and the very
human response it received from the Russians were an outlet for the anguish and
sorrow we felt.252
These recollections and others portrayed the Soviet people not as anti-Western or brutal
ideologues but as ordinary people who were capable of sympathy, openness, and
congenial relations with Americans. This sentiment was key to underscoring the
universality of American ideals and values, which could be more easily accepted by an
amenable Soviet population.
In addition to discussing the personal temperament of the Soviet people, many
exchangees specifically underscored their intellectual curiosity and openness. These
exchange reports noted the capability of many Soviet people to be free-thinking, which
participants often equated with their willingness to question the regime and communism.
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Academic Frederick Barghoorn recalled in 1958 that one of the most “delightful
surprises” he encountered during his time in the Soviet Union was when Soviet citizens
expressed “personal unorthodox opinions” in conversations with him.253 Numerous others
repeated this sentiment, such as one 1959 Summer Exchange of Language Teachers
participant, who was also surprised at the “frankness and openness” expressed by Soviet
friends, even in their conversations on difficult topics such as Stalinism and anti-semitism
in the Soviet Union.254 Many exchangees were especially impressed with young Soviets,
whom they characterized as being part of a “flexible and sophisticated new breed” with
“broad cultural interests.”255 In his memoir, graduate student William Taubman recounted
the many occasions he attended Communist Party meetings at Moscow State University.
At these lectures, he witnessed Soviet students speak freely and ask party representatives
many controversial questions. For instance, one student asked why high Party officials
received special privileges not given to ordinary citizens. At another meeting, a Soviet
student contended to a Communist Party official, “Perhaps there should be more than one
political party in the Soviet Union, not just the Communist Party…It’s been said all these
years that the Soviet state was a dictatorship of the proletariat. But didn’t it really amount
to a dictatorship of the Communist Party?” Recording his thoughts on these shocking
observations, Taubman summarized concisely the sentiment of many of his colleagues.
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“We delude ourselves,” he argued, “when we persist in the notion that this is a nation of
sheep.”256
While Americans often equated the Soviet ability to be free-thinking with their
readiness to question their system of government, numerous others were surprised and
hopeful at the amount of curiosity about the United States exhibited by the Soviet people.
Many exchangees remembered how eagerly their Soviet acquaintances wanted to learn
about the United States. These Americans were constantly confronted with questions
about life in the United States, concerning everything from professors’ salaries to jazz
music to prices of basic goods.257 Leslie Brady, who served as the Embassy’s Counselor
for Cultural Affairs in Moscow and worked closely with many exchange students,
characterized this Soviet curiosity as “encouraging, and at times very touching.”258
These descriptions by American academics illustrated their faith that the Soviet
people were capable of eventually throwing off their communist system and supporting
American-style democracy and capitalism. Illustrated by their efforts to associate with
Westerners, their ability to think freely, and their curiosity about America, the Soviet
people, in the mind of many American exchangees, were poised and ready to emulate
American values. In summary, these reports and recollections by American academics on
exchange to the Soviet Union between 1958 and 1968 show a persistence of the Cold

Taubman, The View From Lenin Hills, 5-10, 168, 248.
Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants, July 1961, “Study and Research in the Soviet Union,
1960-1961: Report of American Participants in the Exchange of Graduate Students, Young Faculty
Members, and Post-Doctoral Researchers,” Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Collection,
University of Arkansas Library, Fayetteville, Arkansas; Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants,
1959, “Summer Language Program Composite Student Report,” International Research and Exchanges
Board Collection, Indiana University Library, Bloomington, Indiana; Taubman, The View From Lenin
Hills, 156; Bernice Madison-Schapire, March 5, 1965, “Brief Report of Trip by Bernice Madison-Schaprio
to the Soviet Union,” Robert Byrnes Collection, Indiana University Library, Bloomington, Indiana.
258
Brady, “The Role of Cultural and Educational Exchanges in Soviet-American Relations,” 203.
256
257

111

War consensus and continued belief in American exceptionalism. While these Americans
sought to gain a more thorough understanding of the Soviet Union, they simultaneously
worked to reform its people and convert them to the American way.

112

“REPRESENTATIVES OF AMERICAN SCHOLARSHIP,” 1969-1979
As the US-Soviet exchange program entered into its second decade, it
experienced significant changes in terms of the scope of the program and its purported
aims, according to both exchange officials and the participants. First, although it would
be undermined by the end of the decade, the era of detente brought about an
unprecedented expansion of the exchange, allowing more Americans than ever the
opportunity to live and study in Eastern Europe. Secondly, the tumultuous nature of the
period, especially the growing domestic and international opposition movement to the
Vietnam War, affected attitudes toward the exchange and placed the goals of the program
in stark contrast to those of the previous decade. Most exchange organizers and
participants alike no longer characterized the program as a way to spread American
values. As the Vietnam War convinced many Americans that their country’s role as the
global protector of freedom and democracy was no longer feasible or desirable, exchange
leaders and participants began treating the US-Soviet program as a “normal” exchange
and focused more on its scholarly benefits than its propaganda value.
Though it is often assumed that the dramatic events of the late 1960s and 1970s
had an impact on American citizens and their perception of America’s role in the world,
an examination of American exchangees’ reports in this period provides a specific case
study that shows the direct effects of this era on a particular group of Americans. The
113

exchange program entered its second decade at a pivotal point in a shifting American
public opinion. Whereas just a few years earlier an overwhelming majority of Americans
supported American intervention in Vietnam as a legitimate effort to contain communism
and promote freedom globally, from 1968 onward a growing majority believed that the
war had been a mistake. College campuses proved to be the heart of the anti-war
movement, affecting even those students who never signed petitions or marched in
demonstrations.259 While the media tended to draw attention to the more radical
protestors, the attitude shifts among American exchangees to the Soviet Union show the
dramatic implications of this period on more “ordinary” students and academics.
The post-exchange reports of this period demonstrate that the missionary zeal of
the previous decade had almost entirely disappeared. Although exchangees still largely
believed in the superiority of the United States, as shown by their frequent criticisms of
the Soviet economy, its frustrating bureaucracy, and the presence of state surveillance,
most no longer asserted that the exchange be used to spread American values to the
Soviet people. Corresponding with such an important shift in public perception of the war
in Vietnam, this points to a significant shift in their notions of American identity.
Historians such as Michael Hunt and Walter Hixson have described American national
ideology as including the notion that “national greatness depended on making the world
safe for liberty” and the idea that America “possess a special right to exert power in the
world.”260 The dramatic shift in the reports by exchange participants to the Soviet Union
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show that by the 1970s, these Americans were contesting that long-held facet of
American ideology.
Other themes and commonalities among this decade’s exchange reports reinforce
the idea that while these Americans still believed in the virtues of their nation, they had
begun to doubt the universal applicability of their national values. Unlike during the
previous decade, exchangees of this period no longer characterized the Soviet people as
intensely curious about the West, and they were much more apt to criticize American
institutions and organizations than they had been before. Furthermore, exchangees of the
1970s tended to focus much more on the academic aspects of their sojourn instead of
using the bulk of their reports to describe the Soviet people and their way of life,
essentially treating the program as more of an “ordinary” exchange. Still, the ongoing
Cold War necessitated some level of “othering” the Soviet Union, and therefore
exchangees chose to concentrate more on the inefficiencies of Soviet society and
bureaucracy and its weak economy. This reinforced their belief that the American way
remained superior, even if they spent less time trying to impress that idea upon the Soviet
people.
The second decade of the official US-Soviet academic exchange program
witnessed substantial shifts in both the approach of exchange organizers and the scope of
the program. Yale Richmond, an American diplomat to Eastern Europe with decades of
involvement in directing cultural exchange, characterized the early years of the program
as a period of “exchange tourism,” during which both the United States and the Soviet
Union had first to become acquainted with one another and determine the procedures for
exchange, all while harboring intense suspicion and mistrust. However, he argued, by the
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late 1960s and through the 1970s, the program matured and the exchange grew into a
more regularized and cooperative endeavor. The range and size of the exchanges
expanded dramatically, coming to include bilateral cooperative agreements in various
fields of research, direct university-to-university agreements, new exchanges between the
American National Academy of Sciences and the Soviet Academy of Sciences, and the
expansion of the Fulbright Program to include exchanges to Eastern Europe.261
The start of this period, the year 1968, also brought some significant
organizational changes to the exchange program. The Inter-University Committee on
Travel Grants (IUCTG), which had administered American academic exchanges with the
region since the late 1950s, was replaced by a new agency headquartered in New York
City called the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX). Connected with
several nonprofit educational organizations, including the American Council of Learned
Societies, the Social Science Research Council, and the National Academy of Sciences,
IREX also drew sponsorship from philanthropic organizations, such as the Ford
Foundation and the Carnegie Foundation, and from government sources, namely the
Department of State through the National Endowment for the Humanities. Though
chartered by the United States Congress and partially funded by the State Department,
IREX remained a legally independent organization.262 At its inception, Allan Kassof, a
sociologist who specialized in the Soviet Union and a former exchange student to the
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USSR, became the organization’s executive director, a position that he retained until
1992.263 IREX continued and worked to expand the IUCTG’s flagship programs,
including the Graduate Student/Young Faculty Exchange, the Senior Research Scholars
Exchange, and the Summer Exchange of Language Teachers. The organization also
sustained a newer program that the IUCTG developed in its last years in tandem with the
American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS). The ACLS exchange focused on
sending senior scholars in the social sciences and humanities to work in Soviet research
institutes for periods between three and ten months.264
The IREX annual reports from the late 1960s and 1970s chronicle the expansion
of the US-Soviet exchange in this decade. The year 1968, characterized by heightened
tensions over the Vietnam War and America’s denunciation of the Soviet intervention in
Czechoslovakia, saw an unprecedented reduction in the size of the program. However,
this trajectory changed almost as soon as Richard Nixon entered the presidential office in
1969. Calling for a new “era of negotiation” with the Soviet Union in his inaugural
address, the incoming administration participated in the first round of Strategic Arms
Limitations Talks with the Soviets just a few months later in the fall of 1969. Although it
would take almost two years for those negotiations to produce a final agreement,
culminating at the Moscow summit in May 1972 between Nixon and Soviet leader
Leonid Brezhnev, these early overtures toward a more conciliatory US-Soviet
relationship seemed to have an immediate effect on the exchange program. The biannual
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US-USSR cultural agreement signed in early 1970 took only a week to negotiate. Most
significantly, considering that the exchange had been diminishing in size since 1964, the
1970 agreement finally reversed this downward trend.265 Furthermore, besides increasing
the number of exchange participants, IREX officials noted that Soviet exchange
administrators became more flexible as well, as they were willing to accept American
academics researching more sensitive or contemporary topics that had been regarded as
taboo in previous years. They even noted that American participants in the Soviet Union
were beginning to gain better access to necessary archives and were experiencing less
provocations and harassment by Soviet police, describing the exchange as occurring in a
“more business-like atmosphere.”266 Finally, another factor that contributed to the
expansion of the program was the inclusion in the subsequent 1972 exchange agreement
of a provision to allow Americans on the Graduate Student/Young Faculty Exchange to
bring their children with them to the Soviet Union, which IREX organizers hoped would
enlarge the applicant pool.267 Even before the momentous meeting between Nixon and
Brezhnev in 1972 cemented the policy of detente, the new more conciliatory attitude of
the Nixon administration and its promise to scale back American involvement in Vietnam
had almost immediate positive consequences for the exchange program.268
President Nixon’s 1972 visit to Moscow and the ensuing atmosphere of detente
served to further expand on this progress. Discussing the importance of collaborative
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research projects between America and the Soviet Union in particular, President Nixon
stated in an address to Congress in June 1972 that such programs would form “habits of
cooperation” in “areas of peaceful enterprise,” and in addition they would “create on both
sides a steadily growing vested interest in the maintenance of good relations between our
two countries.”269 With this sentiment in mind, the State Department conducted the next
set of negotiations for the 1974 US-Soviet cultural agreement in the spring of 1973.
These talks would normally have been held later in the year, but the administration
wished for them to be concluded in time to be signed during Brezhnev’s visit to the
United States in June.270 The renewed cultural exchange agreement included an exchange
of professors, allowing American and Soviet scholars to design classes and teach at each
other's universities for the first time.271 Another momentous addition to the exchange
program that year was an agreement to involve American and Soviet scholars in those
collaborative research projects that Nixon had encouraged. Instead of just focusing on
basic exchanges, American and Soviet scholars could now participate in cooperative
endeavors, including joint research in the fields of science, technology, environmental
protection, medicine, and space exploration.272 The IREX officials sensed some tangible
improvements to their existing programs also, which they attributed to the improving
international climate. The 1973 academic year, for instance, was the first time in the
entire existence of the exchange that Soviet officials accepted all forty American
nominees for the Graduate Student/Young Faculty exchange. This was even more
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stunning to exchange organizers, considering that fifteen of these Americans were
working on contemporary Soviet topics.273 The admissions process also became easier in
this era, as the long delays experienced in years past when waiting on Soviet officials to
accept American applicants began to diminish. The IREX officials further noted that
exchangees were also seeing positive results, such as the 1973 Summer Language
Exchange participants who reported that they received so many personal invitations and
requests for interviews from Soviet colleagues that they could not keep up with them
all.274
Even as Gerald Ford took office amidst a presidential scandal in the fall of 1974,
the US-Soviet exchange program continued to expand in size and scope. Just as Ford
assumed the presidency, in an attempt to expand the program further, State Department
negotiators convinced Soviet officials to allow American lecturers in US and Russian
history into Soviet universities under the auspices of the Fulbright Program for the first
time.275 In their annual reports, the IREX officials continued to express the significant
effects of detente on the exchange and articulated their optimism for the future of the
program. They noted in 1975 that unlike in the first years of the exchange, the
interchange of scholars had now come to be “accepted as legitimate and necessary by the
governments of the socialist countries.” This was not only true because of the educational
benefits it provided, but they believed Soviet officials also knew that the exchange
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showed the world that their government was “a participant in ‘normal’ international
communications.”276
Beginning in 1975, however, IREX exchanges began to suffer both from a decline
in American-Soviet relations and budgetary difficulties. Exchange officials noted that
despite the signing of the 1975 Helsinki Accords, which sought to improve relations
between the West and the Soviet bloc, the “honeymoon atmosphere” of detente was
dwindling as a result of new Soviet incursions into the Middle East and Africa and
renewed American skepticism about the feasibility of cooperating with the Soviet
Union.277 By 1978, the optimism IREX officials had exhibited in the early 1970s had
diminished because of emerging problems with the exchange. Officials noted in their
annual report their belief that “America and Russia [were] separated by social and
cultural differences so far-reaching as to be all but unbridgeable.” Holding a much more
pessimistic outlook than the exchange organizers of the 1960s, the experience of IREX
officials up to the late 1970s convinced them that international understanding could not
be obtained simply on the basis of Americans and Soviets getting to know each other.
The best that could be hoped for the program, besides educational benefits, was not to
“dispel what [were] probably irreducible differences, but to learn how to handle [those
differences] in minimally destructive ways.”278 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
1979 brought a conclusive end to the era of detente, and though IREX exchanges were
one of the few programs not scaled back in its aftermath, the sharp decline in US-Soviet
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relations did have several negative effects on the program. Negotiations for renewal of
the US-Soviet cultural exchange agreement were set to occur in late 1979, but the events
in Afghanistan eliminated the possibility of holding these talks, so the IREX exchanges
continued into the 1980s without a formal agreement in place. Additionally, many
American universities in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan refused to accept Soviet
applicants. Many of these universities did not specify the reasoning for these rejections,
but indications by a few led IREX officials to believe that a concern over deteriorating
international relations played a major role.279
Despite these difficulties, the IREX officials cited budgetary concerns as the most
pressing problem facing their program, and they urged the federal government to take a
larger role in assisting in their efforts. In their 1979 report, they noted that when the
exchange began in 1958, the program was so small that it could function with support
from private foundations and “limited assistance from Washington.” However, after the
dramatic expansion of the program beginning in 1970, support from philanthropic
organizations was no longer enough to sustain the exchange considering that the budget
now totaled $3.9 million. The IREX organizers noted that the United States spent the
least out of all the major nations on public diplomacy and cultural exchange, and they
called on President Jimmy Carter’s administration to increase their funding. To
underscore why this additional funding was important, the IREX officials contended that
the exchanges were “instruments essential to the maintenance of our inventory of expert
knowledge of the USSR and Eastern Europe” and they “never qualify as pleasure trips.”
They argued that as the administration had recently spent $35 billion on improving just
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one component of the nation’s missile defense system, “prudence suggests that we ought
to be willing to spend one one-hundredth of one percent of that sum annually to fund the
exchanges that enable us to keep an eye on, and keep talking with, the people whose
missiles so worry us.”280
The organizers of post-1968 US-Soviet exchanges also had much different
objectives for their program than their earlier counterparts. The IREX officials did not
express a desire to use the exchange to spread a positive image of the United States or to
make American-style democracy more appealing to the Soviet people. In their internal
documents, whenever they referred to the exchange as creating “understanding,” IREX
officials almost always connected it with maintaining scholarly communication and
cooperation, not with the improvement of international relations.281 Also, in the
aforementioned petition to the Carter administration for more government funding,
exchange organizers framed the program as essential not because it provided a way to
spread democratic ideals to the Soviet people but because it allowed American experts to
gain more knowledge and insight into the Soviet Union.282 Furthermore, unlike the
previous IUCTG selection committees, which placed a lot of importance on an
applicant’s emotional maturity and ability to represent the United States favorably, IREX
selection procedures did not even mention considering an applicant’s demeanor or
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personality. Instead, they insisted “professional qualifications [were] the paramount
considerations in the selection of candidates” and that IREX officials sought to “avoid
involvement in judgments concerning nonprofessional criteria.”283
Still, IREX did seek to respond to the criticism that had plagued the exchange
since its inception, namely the imbalance between participants in the sciences versus
those in the humanities. IREX officials noted in their reports that they often heard from
politicians or the public that this was an enormous cause for concern. In the 1970s,
roughly 70% of American participants in IREX exchanges were specialists in the
humanities while only 5% were in fields of science or technology. Conversely, 90% of
Soviet grantees in the same exchange were scientists. However, exchange officials
argued, this imbalance was “not nearly so sinister as it appears,” as it did not result from
Soviet reluctance to allow American scientists to study in their universities. The problem,
IREX organizers insisted, was that many American scientists were simply not interested
in working in Soviet institutions. Furthermore, those scientists who did want to work with
their Soviet counterparts were much more likely to apply for more short-term visits
through the National Academy of Sciences, allowing them to work in Soviet research
institutes which tended to be much better equipped than Soviet university laboratories.284
Nevertheless, IREX officials did attempt to offset this imbalance with a new Preparatory
Fellowship Program, initiated in 1972. This year-long language intensive program sought
to “attract Ph.D. candidates from underrepresented disciplines” to the exchange. With the
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majority of fellowship participants able to meet the program’s language requirement after
participating, IREX officials considered the program a success and established it as a
permanent segment of the program.
While the 1970s brought changes to the size, scope, and objectives of the official
US-Soviet exchange program, an examination of participants’ remarks shows an even
more dramatic ideological shift that reflects the tumultuous nature of this period in
American history. From 1969 to 1980, almost one thousand Americans traveled to the
Soviet Union through IREX programs, including the Graduate Student/Young Faculty
Exchange, the Senior Research Scholars Exchange, the Summer Exchange of Language
Teachers, and the American Council of Learned Societies Exchange. The roughly 220
exchangee reports I was able to obtain and examine here serve as a case study for the
broader shifts in American society in this period. Specifically, they plainly show the
effects of growing doubts in the universal applicability of American values, coinciding
with increasing doubts about and opposition to the Vietnam War.
The starkest difference between the pre-1968 reports and the accounts of this era
was the almost complete absence of an intent to serve as cultural ambassadors for the
United States while in the Soviet Union. While some participants between 1968 and 1979
did assert that exchangees should serve as positive representatives of America, that their
presence could help create international understanding, or that participants should
actively distribute American goods and publications to the Soviet people, the occurrence
of these sentiments declined dramatically in the second decade of the program. Among
the few concerned with Soviet perceptions of American exchangees, only two directly
mentioned the notion that participants should act as cultural representatives. Chemist
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Donald Malament, in 1970, remarked on the constant excitement he felt being “a
representative of the United States.” Edwina Blumberg, a 1977 graduate student in
literature, asserted that not only did her exchange experience achieve an important
academic purpose, but it was also significant because she was able to serve as an
“Ambassador of Good Will.”285 Only a few more noted that the exchange could serve as
a “window on the world” for Soviets who came into contact with American participants
or as a way to get information about the United States and its people into the USSR.286 A
small number of other participants asserted that the program could help create
international understanding and only one contended that direct American-Soviet
interactions could help advance the larger policy of detente.287 In a significant departure
from the previous decade, only about ten exchangees suggested future participants bring
American goods and publications to distribute to Soviet acquaintances, and even fewer
urged IREX officials to carefully select future grantees based on their emotional maturity,
knowledge of American and Soviet society, or their ability to represent the United States
favorably.
This enormous decrease in American exchangees’ willingness to serve as
missionaries of the American way and the decline in participants’ perception of the
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exchange program as a tool for spreading freedom and democracy illuminate their
realization of the difficulty, and sometimes impossibility, of exporting American values
abroad. From 1958 to 1968, more than half of reports by exchangees mentioned, either
directly or indirectly, their belief that academic exchange with the Soviet Union was an
important method for exposing the Soviet people to American values and culture.
However, in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, only about one-sixth of the 220
reports examined here even tangentially relayed such sentiment. Concurrent with the
height of the anti-Vietnam War movement, more and more Americans, if only for a brief
period, began questioning one of the main tenets of their national identity- making the
world safe for democracy. While this shift has been well established by historians, this
dramatic change in attitude by American academics on exchange to the Soviet Union
serves as a precise example of this phenomenon and as a case study for the specific
effects these events had on the American people.288
The disappearing of exchangees’ missionary zeal, a sentiment that was so
pervasive in the 1960s, coincided directly with the growing opposition to the Vietnam
War, indicating that these Americans had likely begun to question if American-style
democracy was truly universal. Throughout this entire decade, with few exceptions,
American exchange participants no longer cited spreading American values abroad as an
objective for their time behind the Iron Curtain. This silence indicates that such a purpose
was either no longer important to them or that they no longer felt that serving as
champions of the American way was desirable or feasible. A few from the late 1970s
even noted in their reports their disdain for being considered cultural ambassadors or
288
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representatives of the United States. Two 1976 graduate students resented the fact that, as
Americans in the USSR, they were “forced to live in a goldfish bowl” and were
“constantly…under scrutiny,” and they found this attention to be “annoying.”289 Unlike
some exchangees in previous years who encouraged future participants to wear
fashionable clothing to illustrate the West’s high living standards, a graduate student in
linguistics, Christopher Daly, warned that “unless such a person enjoys being stared at
and pointed to, such clothes should be kept to a minimum.”290 Thomas Remington, a
1977 exchangee in political science, spoke to this sentiment more directly, stating that the
exchange should be justified by its benefits to both the United States and the Soviet
Union “rather than on the diffuse hope for the spread of some ‘word’ about American life
among Soviet citizens.”291
Further illustrating this new reluctance to use the exchange as a way to spread
American values, there was also a precipitous drop in reports that characterized the
Soviet people as intensely curious about the West and the United States. Unlike in the
first decade of the exchange, when a significant number of participants recalled the
Soviets’ desire to learn about American society, only four exchangees mentioned Soviet
curiosity about the United States in this later period. Furthermore, even these four
remarks differed from the sentiment expressed in the previous decade. From 1958 to
1968, many exchangees reported that Soviets asked numerous questions about ordinary
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American life, such as income, the price of basic goods, and American music.292
Exchangees in the 1970s, though, mostly framed Soviet curiosity in terms of academic
interest. Literature graduate student Lauren Leighton noted in 1970 that “there was
intense interest in anything I had to say, even when it was clear I knew less than persons
asking the questions.” She concluded that this was because “there was unanimous interest
in anything an American member of the humanities had to offer.”293 Two others,
anthropologist Marjorie Balzer and mathematician Stanely Grossman, recalled that Soviet
scholars were “hungry” for Western literature and viewed American exchangees as a
“gateway” to obtain Western information and academic publications.294 Only one, a
Senior Research Scholar in physics named James Anderson, remembered the Soviets as
being very interested in American culture generally. When he and his wife invited Soviet
friends to their apartment, they often showed American movies, such as films on the
lunar space program and travel documentaries about the United States, which he asserted
were “very well received.”295 In the scope of these records, it is impossible to discern
definitively if the Soviets just stopped asking questions about American life or if the
exchangees simply ceased to note such instances, especially since the reports were openInter-University Committee on Travel Grants, July 1961, “Study and Research in the Soviet Union,
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ended letters, allowing the participants to include simply what they perceived as
significant aspects of their time abroad. Regardless, the almost complete absence of this
sentiment further shows that touting the benefits of American life was no longer
important to the exchangees in this era.
Illustrating another shift from the previous decade of the exchange, there was a
seven-fold increase in exchangees who criticized American institutions, such as IREX,
the American Embassy, the US Consulate, or the government in general. While many
exchangees from the previous decade were concerned with articulating to the Soviet
people the superiority of American institutions, participants from 1970 to 1979 not only
resisted describing themselves as America’s cultural ambassadors but were also much
more likely to complain about actions by American officials and organizations. Though
over half of exchange participants criticized Soviet bureaucracy for making their stay in
the USSR very difficult, a significant number placed the final blame on IREX for not
putting enough pressure on the Soviets to reform their policies. Though exchangees of the
previous decade faced these same bureaucratic hurdles, almost none of them held
American exchange organizers responsible for these problems. Slavic linguist Charles
Gribble, reporting in 1972 after his time in Moscow, asserted that IREX and its director
Allen Kassof should not gauge the program’s success by simply getting more Americans
accepted by the Soviets annually. Instead, he contended, “IREX should put more
emphasis on making sure that our visits are as fruitful as possible once we’re there” by
forcing the Soviets to guarantee such things as essential archival access and adequate
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lodging.296 Historian David Macey echoed this sentiment in 1973, stating that “IREX is
not sufficiently interested in the academic side of our problems and…not enough pressure
is brought to bear on the Soviets.”297 As these bureaucratic obstacles persisted throughout
the 1970s, some exchangees even began to urge IREX officials to implement sanctions
against the Soviets in order to improve their experience. Historian Jonathan Zorn
remembered in 1976 that he and many of his fellow exchangees resented the restrictions
placed on their travel by Soviet authorities. Some even wished that IREX would
“physically nail to the floor the feet of all Soviet exchangees until the Soviets loosened
up on travel arrangements.”298 Some, such as 1977 participants Bill Fierman and Malvin
Helgesen, even suggested that in return for the Soviets violating the “spirit of the
exchange” by hampering American students and researchers, IREX should threaten to
suspend the program if conditions did not improve.299
Conversely, while many reports criticized IREX for being too lax with the
Soviets, others condemned the organization for being too critical of Soviet society,
another sentiment not present in earlier accounts. Historian Patricia Polansky, placed in
Leningrad in 1977, believed that the IREX orientation manual distributed to participants
ahead of departure was a bit of an “overkill” because many items it suggested Americans
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bring were readily and adequately available in the Soviet Union.300 Jo Ann Bailey, a
graduate student in literature, articulated this sentiment even more plainly, asserting that
in IREX’s orientation material there was:
a vague anti-Russian bias. ‘The Russians are dirty people and their dorms are
dirty and their toilets are dirty, etc.’ It wasn’t stated this plainly, but you felt it.
Well, in my experience it wasn’t the Russians who were the problem at all; the
problem was the other foreign students…
Bailey went further, accusing IREX officials of sexism. In the orientation literature, she
pointed out, “spouses are always ‘she,’ [and] my project is always ‘his’ project. Very
offensive.”301
Another element, almost totally absent from earlier reports, were the numerous
denunciations of the American Embassy in Moscow. Much of the exchangees’ criticisms
stemmed from new restrictions placed on exchangees’ use of Embassy facilities such the
commissary, the snack bar, Xerox machines, and mailing privileges. A graduate student
in literature, Edythe Haber, urged in 1978 that these cuts should not continue. “Shopping
for soap flakes, toilet paper, etc. in Soviet stores is a time consuming and often futile
exercise and, especially for those without spouses to share the dirty work, would sharply
curtail research time.”302 Still, the significant aspects of these remarks reside in the
language exchangees used to describe the Embassy officials and their attitude toward
exchange participants. These Americans did not perceive these restrictions as resulting
from budgetary or logistical shortfalls. Instead, many believed it originated from a

Patricia Polansky, Exchange report, 1977, International Research and Exchanges Board Collection, The
Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
301
Jo Ann Bailey, Exchange report, August 1975, International Research and Exchanges Board Collection,
The Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
302
Edythe Haber, Exchange report, April 26, 1978, International Research and Exchanges Board
Collection, The Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
300

132

distrust and lack of respect for academics by the Embassy and, by extension, the US
government. Linguist Janet Hoffman in 1973 reported that relations with the Embassy
were a “matter of concern” because officials there felt exchangees were abusing Embassy
privileges. “‘Students’ were often used as a scapegoat for a number of inconveniences
experienced by Embassy personnel and [their] families,” she contended. “Much of this,
however, was based on false information and general prejudice.”303 That same year,
historian David Macey agreed, noting that Embassy personnel regarded exchangees as
“frivolous, non-scholarly, radicals, communist party members, or fellow travelers,”
which he blamed on the officials’ “anti-intellectualism.”304 Others, such as Edward
Brown, remarked in 1979 that the Embassy treated him and his colleagues as an
“embarrassment,” a “nuisance,” and “second-class citizens.”305 Even more starkly,
historian James Hart remembered in 1978 that at the Cellar Club, a bar in the basement of
the Embassy, personnel often asked the IREX exchangees if they were “really
Americans,” and the staff at the Marine Bar routinely reminded exchangees that it was
“American only” night. “The Indonesians and Africans were there without having to take
a loyalty oath,” he remembered resentfully. “We were given the distinct impression that
Americans serving in the Embassy and their families considered the exchange scholars
un-American.” He assumed they believed that “we were in Russia to learn how the
Russians lived and then we would bring the revolution to America!”306 Historian Howard
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Spendelow lamented this situation as well in 1975. He argued that given the particularly
difficult circumstances researchers faced in the Soviet Union, and given the fact that the
Embassy “stands as a surrogate for the government which signed the official exchange
agreement…one would hope that the Embassy would be much more active on the
exchangees’ behalf.”307
Despite the exchange participants’ frustrations with the actions of the American
Embassy personnel, they reflected the attitude of the Nixon administration itself and the
political climate it fostered. Known for his paranoia and preoccupation with rooting out
all possible political enemies, President Nixon had a particular distrust of “liberal
academics.” For instance, Henry Kissinger, the president’s National Security Advisor,
remembered that Nixon sought to “exclude the CIA from the formulation of policy
[because] it was staffed by Ivy League liberals.”308 With exchangees feeling more
victimized by US government officials than ever before or since, perhaps this points to a
dissemination of Nixon’s suspicions of academics in this period.
While many participants only indirectly criticized the American government by
pointing out problems with the Embassy or IREX, one exchangee had a particularly
unfortunate experience for which he blamed the US government directly. During the
1969-1970 academic year, Princeton University graduate student James West participated
in the Graduate Student/Young Faculty exchange to Moscow to do historical research for
his dissertation. When he prepared to depart Moscow, he packed all his research notes
from the previous year into two wooden crates and shipped them back to the United
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States via diplomatic pouch, a mailing service offered through the US Embassy that
prohibited search and seizure by Soviet officials. While one box arrived in the United
States within ten days, the second and more valuable box never materialized. In the
following months and years, West desperately attempted to trace his lost research
materials, but after two years he reluctantly halted his search and finished a “crippled
dissertation.” In that period, West believed this incident to be merely an unfortunate
accident. However, in 1975 he addressed a letter about this matter to Senator Frank
Church, chair of the Senate Select Committee on Domestic Intelligence, which was
investigating past illegal intelligence gathering methods used by US government agencies
such as the FBI and the CIA. In the correspondence, West expressed his belief that the
CIA had seized his crate of research materials, acting under the auspices of President
Nixon’s Huston Plan. This intelligence-gathering program called for intensified
surveillance of alleged radicals in the United States, and as West contended, “possibly
including Americans with Soviet connections.” West had traced the shipment of the one
box that was delivered and discovered that it had passed through the Brooklyn Army
Terminal and had been stamped by an unauthorized person who was unknown by the
New York Customs Service. Having already written to the CIA to request information
through the Freedom of Information Act, West wrote Senator Church to ask for advice on
getting his materials back.309 Though this was a single incident, West’s experience,
coupled with the many other exchangees who criticized American officials and
organizations in this period, illustrate an important shift. In contrast to the first decade of
the exchange, when large numbers of participants felt confident enough in their national
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values to attempt to spread them to Eastern Europe, these later groups clearly felt that
their nation’s institutions were no longer totally above reproach.
Reports from this period not only illuminate a change in exchangees’ perception
of the United States, but recollections of participants from the 1970s also show a shift in
how they understood the Soviet Union. This was the era of detente, arms limitation
treaties, the end of the Vietnam War, and the signing of the Helsinki Accords, and these
reports indicate that those high policy developments did have a personal impact on
Americans and how they viewed the Cold War. As US-Soviet relations became more
“normalized” than ever before, even if for a brief period, these Americans began to see
the Soviet Union as less of an enigma and more as an “ordinary” nation state. Whereas
exchangees in the 1960s devoted just as much of their reports to discussing the Soviet
people and society as they did their actual academic experience, this changed
considerably in the 1970s. After categorizing statements made by these participants, it is
evident that participants’ remarks about their academic experience doubled compared to
the previous decade and the amount of comments describing the Soviet people dropped
by half. This seems to indicate that participants were beginning to view the US-Soviet
exchange as more of a “normal” experience and less as a trip to an exotic land where they
felt compelled to document the lifestyle of these strange peoples.
Exchangees of the 1970s devoted far more of their reports to recording their
academic experience than their predecessors, and this trend along with their
overwhelmingly positive remarks show a significant shift in the perception of the Soviet
Union by these Americans. Whereas participants in the first decade of the exchange
included a more equal ratio of positive to negative opinions of Soviet academia in their
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reports, post-1968 exchangees reported overwhelmingly favorable impressions of their
academic experience. The vast majority of exchangees used their accounts to extol the
intelligence, helpfulness, and generosity of their advisor, colleagues, or academic
department. For instance, linguist Charles Gribble recalled in 1972 that being attached to
his assigned advisor was “the best thing that happened to [him] during the entire trip”
because of his insightful advice and the fact that he was a “decent human being.”310 Even
when their academic advisors knew little about the exchangee’s research, as was the case
with historian Thomas Pearson and linguist Robert F. Allen, participants recalled their
mentors’ “eagerness” to help in arranging research permissions and their “unfailingly
cheerful and helpful” nature.311 Furthermore, many of these Americans even described
advisors who were devout communists in positive terms. Soil scientist Gary Halvorson
remarked in 1978 that though his advisor was a “stalwart member of the establishment,”
he was an intelligent scholar and “one of the finest persons I have ever met.”312 Another
graduate student in history, Stuart Grover, asserted that despite the fact that his advisor
clearly did not agree with his historical interpretations, he remained professional and
“confided his comments to matters of fact, and clearly was not interested in whether or
not my ideas were acceptable to orthodox Marxism.” In fact, Grover believed that his
advisor enjoyed their disagreements because they resulted in stimulating and enlightening
debates. Grover further encouraged other graduate students to approach Soviet scholars in
a similarly honest fashion because, he contended, “we are in the Soviet Union as
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representatives of American scholarship [emphasis added].”313 This characterization is
particularly noteworthy considering that past exchangees framed themselves as purveyors
of the American way of life. By this time, as the dramatic events of the late 1960s and
early 1970s had cast doubt on feasibly of spreading American values, exchangees now
more frequently presented themselves as simply academic ambassadors.
Further illustrating these individuals’ increased focus on the scholarly aspects of
the exchange, more than half of the participants examined here praised their respective
departments and Soviet peers for their insight and generosity. When describing
relationships with Soviet colleagues, American exchangees in this period used language
such as “stimulating,” “cooperative,” “welcoming,” “high quality,” “rewarding,” and
“invaluable.”314 Several even sought to challenge the negative stereotypes associated with
Soviet scholars. Historian Herman Edgar Melton argued in 1977 that although many
Soviet academics in his field tended to produce “dry” publications, in reality Soviet
historians had a “lively and imaginative approach” to the field, which they articulated in
private conversations.315 Though these encouraging sentiments regarding Soviet
scholarship certainly existed in the previous decade, instances of it grew tremendously
throughout the 1970s. Unlike their predecessors, these exchangees no longer equated
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Soviet intelligence with curiosity about the West or an ability to criticize communism,
but instead focused more on their scholarly abilities.
Additionally, the overwhelming majority of American exchangees noted that,
despite some difficulties, they had a good and productive academic experience. For
example, Carl Ray Proffer, a specialist in Slavic languages, reported in 1969 that “there is
no question that the five months I spent in Moscow was the most important five months
of my entire education and career as a Slavist.”316 Similarly, Russian literature student
Alma Law said that despite the occasional frustrations and inconveniences involved with
living in the Soviet Union, the exchange was “one of the most fascinating and rewarding
experiences I have ever had.”317 Many noted that their time in the USSR was
“productive” and that completing their research projects would have been impossible
without the wealth of knowledge they gained from Soviet archives and scholars.318 Even
exchangees in underrepresented fields, such as contemporary economics and
anthropology, reported that they were able to gain access to needed records and that they
benefited from contacts with Soviets scholars in their field.319 These and similar remarks
illustrate that in this period exchange participants perceived the Soviet Union in a much
more positive way. The exchange was no longer just a means to “get a feel” for Russia
but instead provided tangible and high quality academic benefits for American scholars.
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Unlike the previous American exchangees, when these individuals did note the
value of getting to see Soviet life firsthand, they almost always connected it with the
academic and pedagogical enrichment it would provide. Multiple exchangees, such as
historian David Brower, noted that getting to observe Soviet society directly enhanced
their ability as teachers because it allowed them to relay the nature of the Soviet Union to
their students better.320 Many others contended that living in Soviet society greatly
strengthened their abilities as Russian specialists. Historian Daniel Morrison asserted in
1975 that “to the aspiring Russian expert, the total immersion in Russian society and
culture which the exchange experience provides is of incalculable value,” while fellow
historian Kent Hill agreed that living in the Soviet Union had enhanced his ability to
understand some of the “enigmas” of Russian history.321 James Wertsch, a graduate
student in psychology, noted that “many of the problems in understanding how Soviet
psychology, linguistics, and psycholinguistics work became much clearer after one has
gained some insight into the nature of Soviet life in general.”322 In essence, many of the
exchangees agreed with the sentiment of exchangee R. D. Rucker who claimed that it was
impossible to truly comprehend the Soviet Union without living and studying there.323
This represented a clear break from the first decade of the exchange, when many
participants simply wanted to observe the Soviet Union because of its alien nature. By the
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1970s, exchangees were treating the US-Soviet exchange more like an “ordinary”
program and chose to focus more on the academic merits of living and working in the
Soviet Union. This further underscores the shift away from using the exchange as a
method to spread American values.
One aspect of the exchange that remained constant from its first decade into its
second was the significant number of exchange participants who recorded the friendly
and cordial nature of the Soviet people they encountered. Throughout the second decade
of the exchange, nearly half of the exchangees recalled their positive impressions of
Soviet citizens they came to know through their time in the USSR. Some such as Borivoj
M. Plavsic, a 1973 graduate student, noted that his Soviet roommate was “noninterfering, quiet, and friendly” and “one could not ask for a better one.”324 Others
recalled similar impressions, such as Anne Frydman Weinfied who asserted that despite
the challenges involved in living in a Leningrad dormitory, sharing that experience with
“an intelligent, curious, complex Russian and living in close contact with many others is
one of the most edifying experiences one can have if one is interested in what the USSR
is all about.”325 In 1976, Virginia Bennett recalled that she made “several lasting
friendships” that were incredibly rewarding, while William Mills Todd remembered the
“generosity of Soviet friends” who often invited him and his family to their homes for
dinner.326 Graduate student R.D. Rucker even stated in 1979 that the Soviet people were
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no different from his fellow New Yorkers.”327 Almost none of these individuals
mentioned that they sought to use their friendships with Soviet people as a way to spread
American values. Most simply noted the cordial and helpful nature of their colleagues
and the positive cultural enrichment they themselves gained by getting to know Soviet
citizens.
While exchange participants of this decade became more positive when
describing the academic benefits of going to the Soviet Union and the impressive
scholarly achievements of its people, the biggest criticisms in their reports were very
similar to those of their predecessors in the 1960s. Namely, many detailed the
inefficiencies of Soviet society, its bureaucracy, its weak economy as indicated by a
lower standard of living, and the presence of state surveillance. These critiques indicate
that despite their doubts about the necessity to export American values abroad and their
sudden resistance to recognizing themselves as America’s cultural ambassadors, their
sense of American superiority remained. Even though exchangees saw their Soviet
colleagues and Soviet academia in a more positive light by this period, they still decried
the constant inefficiencies and problems that characterized life in the Soviet Union.
While they were no longer comfortable with overtly spreading American democracy to
the Soviet people, these comments implied that they still believed that capitalism, and the
American system more generally, provided a higher standard of living for its people than
Soviet communism.
One of the most frequent remarks in exchangee reports, cited in about 120
instances, was the inefficiencies of the Soviet system and the difficulties of
R.D. Rucker, Exchange report, November 6, 1978, International Research and Exchanges Board
Collection, The Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
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accomplishing anything in the face of Soviet bureaucracy. In several cases exchangees
recalled that Soviet officials had delayed issuing their entrance visa, making them lose as
much as a month of time in the Soviet Union.328 Like the first set of American exchange
participants, their most frequent bureaucratic hurdle involved Inotdel, the office charged
with handling exchange students at Soviet universities. In most cases, when an exchangee
had to make any type of academic arrangements, such as gaining admittance to archives,
arranging interviews for research, or obtaining travel permissions, they were expected to
go through Inotdel. As many exchangees attested, getting anything useful out of Inotdel
was “painfully slow” and a researcher could waste numerous days in the Inotdel office
trying to get the necessary permissions.329 Linguist Janet Hoffman even contended that
the Moscow State University Inotdel had “a way of making one feel that it is doing favors
by performing its assigned tasks.”330 Historian Constantin Galskoy, writing about his
experience in Leningrad, concurred, stating that Inotdel’s main purpose “seems to be in
providing as many nuisances as possible in the path of each individual exchangee.”331
Rose Glickman went even further, stating that not only was the Leningrad Inotdel
“incompetent and malevolent,” but its director, Vadim Anatolich, was “an evil wretch
whose goal in life seems to be dispensing misery.”332 Many exchangees simply advised
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future participants to avoid Inotdel if possible, but others such as historian Borivoj
Plavsic found that incentives, such as “a few strategically timed little gifts,” encouraged
Inotdel officials to do their job.333
A recurring obstacle exchangees faced with Inotdel was the difficulty of obtaining
travel permissions. Graduate student in history Gloria Gibbs described this process in
1978:
No foreigner travels to another Soviet city without a visa and a guarantee of
housing. Obtaining both the visa and the housing sometimes takes months; and, it
has happened that, after the ‘Great Wait,’ the dates of the visa and housing do not
coincide and the process must be started again.334
Many of these American recalled the multiple times Inotdel delayed their travel plans or
even cancelled research trips mere days before their scheduled departure.335 One
particularly interesting encounter with Inotdel happened to linguist Dee Ann Holisky who
was on exchange in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi. When Holisky and another female
exchangee requested travel permission to Kutaisi in eastern Georgia, she reported that
Inotdel officials responded, “You can’t go there alone. You’re women.”336 Because of the
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extremely difficult and time-consuming nature of procuring permission to travel in the
Soviet Union, many exchangees simply gave up trying to complete the process.337
Though few drew an explicit comparison between the difficulties of Soviet
bureaucracy and the more efficient nature of American society, the implicit distinction
was clear. The very large number of exchangees who spent part of their reports
describing Soviet bureaucracy shows that they perceived it as a highly abnormal situation
that they were unaccustomed to facing as Americans. One 1976 exchange student to
Leningrad, Serge Gregory, noted his frustration that Inotdel made it difficult for
American exchangees to travel around the Soviet Union while “Soviet grantees [got] to
travel around the United States with comparative east.”338 Another in Kiev, Myroslava
Ciszkweycz, recalled that the only way to overcome the Soviet establishment was to play
“their game…according to their rules while using their tactics,” which included lying,
faking ignorance, and belligerency in some circumstances.339 Even when Soviet
bureaucracy did not cause any problems for some participants, such as with graduate
student Andrea Southard, this was met with surprise. When Southard went to the Lenin
Library to apply for permission to do research, the process took “little more than 15
minutes (a remarkably short time for the Soviet system).”340 These and the numerous
other comments lamenting Soviet bureaucracy implied that Americans still felt that the
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Soviet system was restrictive and cumbersome, and despite some issues with American
institutions, the efficiency of the United States still surpassed that of the USSR.
The second largest criticism by American exchangees regarded the Soviet
economy, especially the quality of housing, availability of foods and basic goods, and
overall living standards. Almost sixty participants recalled the poor nature of the housing
provided for them in the Soviet Union. Soviet officials housed more advanced-career
academics, such as those on the Senior Scholar Exchange or the American Council of
Learned Societies program, in hotels. Many described what they considered to be
deplorable conditions in these facilities, such as brown tap water, dirty rooms, bug
infestations, and overcrowding for exchangees with families who were confined to one
small room.341 For those graduate students and young faculty members who were
assigned to Soviet dormitories, the descriptions were even bleaker. One graduate student
in history, George Bournoutian, remarked explicitly that Soviet living conditions “were
not up to the standard of any US facility and were difficult to get used to.”342 Terms used
by these individuals to describe Soviet student housing included “dismal,” “primitive,”
“uncomfortable,” “dirty,” and “unhygienic.”343 Exchangee Marc Rubin described the
experience of many of his colleagues when he recalled that he and his wife shared a
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“small, drafty 9x12 room with mice and roaches.” The dorm floor had a communal
kitchen, but it only had one oven and seven stove burners to service sixty people.
Additionally, he remembered, the kitchen remained perpetually dirty as “rotting garbage
was always strewn all over the kitchen area, and often remained there several days before
being collected.” The communal bathrooms, as Rubin recalled them, were even worse.
It was so foul that the cleaning women were forced to use shovels and hoses to
render the stalls useable…My wife assures me that the back wards of mental
hospitals in which she has worked were cleaner…And finally there were eight
showers for 250 people… [Everything was covered in mold and bacteria, and] the
Soviet concept of hygiene consisted of two Sanitary Days during which they
painted over the fungus rather than clean and disinfect.344
Even the many exchangees who did not recount such horrific experiences or
claimed that Soviet housing was adequate rarely characterized it as good or up to
American quality. For instance, Robert Miller, a senior scholar in political science,
recalled in 1972 that the hotel he lived in was “not a bad place to stay at all by Soviet
standards,” implying that Americans should have lowered expectations for adequate
housing in the Soviet Union.345 Another exchange, Daniel Brower, noted that while
Soviet housing was “barely adequate,” exchangees “should not expect to preserve in the
Soviet Union the same style of life as in the United States.”346 Multiple participants
commented that while they could handle the spartan living conditions, they missed
having privacy. Even though Dean Worth liked his housing assignment, he remarked, “I
do wish I could have had my own bathroom and toilet, spoiled degenerate Westerner that
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I am.”347 Graduate student Stephen Baehr reiterated this, recalling that even though the
Leningrad dorms were “tolerable,” he found the lack of privacy “rather depressing.”348 In
almost every instance when an exchangee described their housing experience in the
Soviet Union, even when it was veiled in seemingly positive terms, the implicit contrast
to superior American housing was certainly present.
A significant number of participants underscored the problems of the Soviet
economy by describing the scarcity of various food items and basic goods and the
arduous task of obtaining them. Multiple exchangees noted that procuring food “took up
an inordinate amount of time.” Supermarkets were almost nonexistent so grocery
shopping involved “various bus trips, waiting in lengthy lines, and finally struggling
homewards with weighty bundles.”349 Furthermore, according to participants, the food
that was available was often monotonous, limited in variety, and of poor quality, and
some exchangees even recalled losing a substantial amount of weight due to the poor
diet.350 Similar to those who detailed the housing conditions in the Soviet Union, even
exchangees who described the food situation in positive ways still often pointed out the
shortcomings of the Soviet system through their remarks. Several Americans recalled that
they had good access to food in the Soviet Union but only because they were attached to
Dean Worth, Exchange report, November 1, 1972, International Research and Exchanges Board
Collection, The Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
348
Stephen Baehr, Exchange report, 1976, International Research and Exchanges Board Collection, The
Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
349
Jerry Floyd, Exchange report, August 28, 1973, International Research and Exchanges Board Collection,
The Library of Congress, Washington, DC; Alice Harris, Exchange report, 1975, International Research
and Exchanges Board Collection, The Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
350
Reginald Zelnik, Exchange report, December 1972, International Research and Exchanges Board
Collection, The Library of Congress, Washington, DC; Joan Afferica, Exchange report, January 30, 1978,
International Research and Exchanges Board Collection, The Library of Congress, Washington, DC;
Myroslava Ciszkweycz, Exchange poret, February 5, 1979, International Research and Exchanges Board
Collection, The Library of Congress, Washington, DC; James Mandel, Exchange report, May 24, 1976,
International Research and Exchanges Board Collection, The Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
347

148

a university and could thus take their meals in the university dining hall.351 Many more
remarked that grocery shopping was “not as troublesome” as they anticipated because
goods that could not be obtained in regular Soviet stores could often be purchased from
the US Embassy commissary or foreign currency stores, which remained unavailable the
average Soviet citizen. Some recognized the privilege Americans had in this situation,
such as graduate student Peter Krug who often shopped in the dollar stores and had
“pangs of conscience shopping at such a place while the rest of Moscow stood in lines to
purchase lower-quality food at higher prices.”352
Furthermore, several exchange participants chronicled the difficulty of procuring
basic goods, such as quality clothing and footwear, toys for children, medicine, and toilet
paper.353 Law student Logan Robinson observed during his difficult mission to find
toothpaste that such an item could not be purchased at just any store. Because there were
relatively few of them, Soviet stores were always crowded, but the profit motive that
would have normally caused an entrepreneur to open another store across the street did
not exist in the Soviet Union. Thus, he contended, “you must know of a store that would
carry it, and there is always the possibility that toothpaste, or any other item you might
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seek, would be entirely sold out citywide and remain so for months.”354 Soil science
graduate student Gary Halvorson recalled another interesting story about the
unavailability of goods. Before arriving in the USSR, he had spoken to a soil scientist
who had graduated from a Soviet university. He told him that conducting scientific
research in the Soviet Union was a “waste of time” because “you will spend three days
looking for a screwdriver.” Halverson recounted:
I naturally assumed he was exaggerating somewhat. The first thing I witnessed at
the Timeryazev Academy- I mean the very first thing- was a man who walked
into my advisor’s office, handed him a screwdriver, said thank you, bowed very
graciously, and left. My advisor immediately locked the screwdriver up tightly in
a drawer of his desk.355
Additionally, a significant number of exchange participants described the general
low standard of living in the Soviet Union. Even those who had visited the USSR
multiple times before, such as historians Samuel Baron and Alfred Levin, experienced
intense culture shock and depression due to the “general crudity” of life in the USSR.356
Others, like linguist Carl Ray Proffer, reiterated the difficulties of the “painful physical
and psychological effects which go with any prolonged stay in the USSR.”357 Some
asserted that exchangees should not be allowed to bring their spouses or children because
the difficult living conditions made providing for a family so burdensome that it would
“impair exchangees’ productivity.”358 There was even an instance when one individual in
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Leningrad contracted tuberculosis, which he said was reflective the poor living conditions
and the result of “overcrowding, poor hygiene, and lack of sterilization of eating
utensils.”359
These remarks are just a few examples of the over 130 observations of the Soviet
economy and living standards recorded by exchangees, and the prevalence of these
details points to a larger reality concerning how exchange participants conceptualized
both the Soviet Union and the United States. Though their missionary fervor and desire to
spread American values to the Soviet people had largely disappeared in the wake of the
Vietnam War, this did not mean that most Americans had come to doubt American
superiority or the merits of capitalism. Though the difficulties of obtaining quality
housing, food, and goods in the Soviet Union was certainly a reality in this period, the
fact that so many exchangees spent part of their reports describing it shows that they
perceived the Soviet economic situation as abnormal by American standards. Even for
those who remembered Soviet daily life in somewhat positive ways, the fact that they felt
the need to counter common conceptions of the Soviet Union as a place of intense
scarcity shows that this was a central part of their perception of the USSR. This allowed
these Americans to continue their othering of the “primitive” Soviet society in order to
reaffirm the superiority of their own way of life, despite their doubts that such American
values were universally applicable.
Lastly, almost one-fourth of exchange participants from this period spent a
portion of their post-trip reports discussing their encounters with Soviet police, state
surveillance, and the restrictive nature of Soviet society. Donald Malament, the first
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American to work in the Chemistry Department at Leningrad State University, recalled
the “one unhappy note” of his visit was a newspaper article published in Pravda that
claimed he was “an ideological subversive spreading Zionist propaganda who admitted to
being offered $1,000 for getting a Soviet specialist to defect.” Malament insisted that he
had merely answered questions put to him by Soviet acquaintances concerning capitalism
and Israel, and the closest he had gotten to urging a Soviet citizen to defect was
encouraging colleagues in his laboratory to apply to the exchange program to the United
States.360 Another student from that year wrote to IREX and insisted the organization
strongly condemn the Pravda article, which was written by an Inotdel official who, he
argued, was supposed to be protecting and assisting foreign students.361 A more common
accusation by exchangees was that the KGB bugged their dorm rooms and phone lines.
One graduate student in Leningrad in 1974, Constantin Galskoy, asserted “it is the
general opinion among students and Soviet students living in the dorm that the rooms are
at least selectively bugged.” Therefore, he suggested, all political discussions should be
carried out outside of the dorm for the protection of Soviet friends.362 Another in
Moscow, Kathleen Parthe, remembered in 1976 that though most Americans wanted
Soviet roommates in order to get more exposure to Russian culture and language, Soviet
exchange officials had confined the Americans to one floor, which she called an
“uninteresting…capitalist ghetto.” Because of this tight concentration of Americans, she
lamented, most Soviet students were very hesitant about approaching them because of
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suspected surveillance in the dorms.363 Mark Adams, a 1977 ACLS exchangee to the
Soviet Academy of Sciences in Moscow, went into even more detail about his belief that
Americans’ rooms were monitored.
There is no doubt that these hotel rooms are “bugged.” These bugs are located in
the fire alarms in the ceilings. Upon returning to his room early one day, an
English exchangee saw various repairmen who were ostensibly there to fix the
fire alarm. He observed one on a ladder speaking into the fire alarm saying the
Russian words for “one, two, three, four, five six,” after which a phone was
attached to the fire alarm and the repairman asked through the telephone whether
he could be heard. Apparently receiving an affirmative reply, he came down from
the stepladder and very unselfconsciously told the guest that his fire alarm
worked.
Adams then noted his feeling that the Soviet government viewed these types of practices
as only “natural” because “since most Soviets sent abroad have a secret agenda…the
assumption is made that American exchangees may have the same kind of agenda."364
The other most common observation concerning Soviet surveillance was many
participants’ concerns that their dorm mates and colleagues were serving as informants
for the Soviet police. In 1973, Woodfood McClellan contended in a letter to IREX
officials that Soviet informants, whom he dubbed “little men,” surrounded every
American exchangee and for participants to think otherwise was terribly naïve.365
Graduate student Catherine Cosman agreed, claiming that “systematic spying and
informing” was “a prevalent part of Soviet life.”366 James Long noted in 1976 that his
Soviet roommate, while “courteous and unobtrusive,” was “undoubtedly a stukach
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[police informer],” which caused his other Soviet friends to avoid coming to their room
altogether.367 Logan Robinson, a 1977 exchangee to Leningrad, had the same doubts
about his roommate Zhenya, who never studied, happened to possess excellent English
language skills, and had always been paired with American and British roommates.
Robinson observed that such surveillance by the state police was something that Russians
were long accustomed to since medieval times; he therefore argued that they considered
it a:
‘natural’ phenomenon, and therefore no more a subject for moral comment than
would be a hurricane or an earthquake…People would talk about a relative who
ran afoul of the secret police as if he had been hit by a falling tree. It was an
accident, no one was really to blame, and these things just happen.368
Although there were a small number of participants, less than ten, who argued that
Americans were simply being paranoid and no such surveillance existed, the majority of
exchangees who discussed the subject believed that the KGB was very active around
them and their Soviet friends.369
Similar to their discussions of Soviet bureaucracy and the struggling consumer
economy, exchangees’ decisions to discuss state surveillance was another attempt to
place the Soviet Union in contrast with American society. Though few framed that
contrast in direct terms, their choice to include their impressions of Soviet state
surveillance implies they perceived it as both abnormal and a significant part of Soviet
life. Furthermore, several participants admitted they had no real evidence that they had
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been targeted by the KGB but simply assumed that such activities occurred. This means
that the existence of state surveillance was such a central part of their perception of the
USSR that they believed that it went on even though they witnessed no indications of
such activities. From these records, it is impossible to determine the validity of these
claims by American exchange participants. Regardless of whether these Americans were
actually monitored by the KGB, though, a significant number of them believed that such
activities constituted a central part of Soviet life. This further indicates that even in the
era of detente, when US-Soviet relations temporarily normalized and exchangees
subsequently began treating the program more like a “normal” exchange, these
Americans still needed to articulate the most strange and abnormal aspects of Soviet
society. At a time when many Americans, including most of these exchangees, no longer
felt confident in attempting to impose American values abroad, the Soviet Union and its
problems remained the contrast needed to maintain confidence in the rectitude of
American democracy and capitalism at home.
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“A LIVING DOCUMENT OF AMERICAN CULTURE,” 1980-1991
The 1980s brought many changes to the US-Soviet academic exchange program,
both at the organizational and participant level. On one hand, the health of the exchange
program fluctuated with the dramatic political shifts that occurred during this period. In
President Ronald Reagan’s first term, when his administration assumed a confrontational
and aggressive posture toward the Soviets, the exchange dwindled to some of its lowest
levels yet. Conversely, when Reagan shifted to a more conciliatory approach in his
second term, the exchange grew to an unprecedented size. Similarly, these political
changes also had an impact on the ideas and objectives of individual exchangees. In the
first three years of his presidency, Reagan reasserted that the essence of the Cold War
was a battle over ideals and morality. Through a combination of his rhetoric and policies,
he framed the “evil empire” as an illegitimate and morally bankrupt state that could not
be reformed merely by “soft power” measures. Similarly, American exchangees to the
Soviet Union in this period were not interested in serving as America’s cultural
ambassadors or using the exchange to promote understanding between the two
superpowers. With the international situation in such a dire state, it seems that these
individual Americans did not believe their small efforts and personal contacts with the
Soviets could do anything to alleviate the poor state of US-Soviet relations. In part due to
his growing apprehension about nuclear warfare, however, President Reagan exhibited a
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huge policy reversal starting in 1984. Even before Mikhail Gorbachev began
implementing his sweeping reforms of Soviet society, Reagan began publicly calling for
more dialogue with the Soviets and renewed negotiations, especially concerning nuclear
arms limitations.370 Almost simultaneously, American exchange participants in the
second half of the 1980s began to reassert that their program could help increase
international understanding through their roles as positive representatives of America
abroad, an idea that had almost disappeared from exchangees’ post-trip reports since the
late 1970s. Therefore, the difference in these Americans’ perceptions of the Soviet Union
and their own sense of national identity and purpose, as contrasted to previous
exchangees, serve as a case study to illustrate the direct and deep effects of Reagan’s
ideas and policies on the mindset of Americans. Though certainly not all of these
Americans agreed wholly with Reagan’s policies at any point during his presidency, his
approach set the parameters of what seemed feasible in regards to US-Soviet relations,
and these individual Americans shifted their sense of purpose accordingly.
Furthermore, exchangees’ reports from this decade and previous ones can provide
additional insight into how many Americans perceived the Cold War in general and the
Soviet Union. In every year of the exchange, the Soviet people themselves were hardly
ever described as an enemy to the United States, but instead were almost always
remembered as inherently friendly, intelligent, and good-natured. The enemy other,
essential to forging American national identity throughout the Cold War, was instead the
Soviet system more generally. In other words, these Americans saw the Cold War as a
more abstract conflict, waged against a faceless Soviet system that had merely entrapped
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the innocent Soviet people. This chapter will first outline the history of the exchange
program in this period, and then examine the recollections of its participants in the 1980s.
As the Cold War entered into the 1980s and President Ronald Reagan took office,
the escalating tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union continued to have
detrimental effects on the academic exchange program. The International Research and
Exchanges Board (IREX), still reeling from the collapse of detente and the American
pushback against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the late 1970s, saw a continued
decline in both the number of agreed-upon exchange participants and the number of
applicants. Financial difficulties continued to plague the organization in the early 1980s,
along with fallout resulting from international crises such as the Soviet downing of a
Korean Airlines passenger aircraft in 1983. It was not until the transition to Reagan’s
second term, when the president began to publicly articulate a newfound willingness to
hold dialogue with the Soviets and work toward improved international relations that
prospects for the exchange began to improve.
In the early 1980s, IREX officials were increasingly concerned with the small
number of available slots for exchangees and the dwindling applicant pool from which to
fill those positions. This problem was so pronounced that they believed it would
eventually have damaging effects on the entire field of Soviet and Eastern European
studies. For instance, regarding the number of academics who participated in the
exchange, only fifty went to the Soviet Union during the 1980-1981 academic year
through IREX’s three main programs combined. Concerning the shrinking number of
applicants, IREX officials lamented that this was due, in part, to the fact that Soviet and
Eastern European studies as a discipline was diminishing in American universities,
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especially because of decreasing graduate school enrollment. The consequences for this,
they urged, were already becoming apparent within the exchange program, which
experienced a declining number of doctoral student applicants and some decrease in the
quality of applicants as well. In this period, only a total of about 130 Americans applied
for all of IREX’s exchange programs to the Soviet Union. This declining number of
applicants, they argued, especially for the Graduate Student/Young Faculty Exchange,
represented the “drying up of the training pipeline” for Sovietologists. The IREX officials
believed this was also due in part to the shrinking academic job market and contended
that in the next decade the United States would experience a dramatic shortfall in
qualified Soviet specialists. This shortage, they argued, would come at a particularly
unfortunate time when international crises made such expertise more necessary than ever.
Shrewdly, IREX organizers framed this decline as not only an academic crisis but also a
significant problem for American foreign policy, which would eventually lack the input
of skilled specialists in East European affairs.371 Reflecting the purpose of the exchange
program since its inception in 1958, officials still considered it as a service both to
scholarship and to national interests.
The start of the decade also brought more financial challenges. The Reagan
administration made substantial cutbacks to the budgets of the National Endowment for
the Humanities and the US Information Agency, and these agencies had been major
contributors to the IREX budget, funding 25% and 40% of the program, respectively.
Therefore exchange officials feared that within two years they would be forced to
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suspend or cancel many of their programs, further discouraging prospective
Sovietologists from entering the field.372 However, by 1982, IREX officials were able to
garner the support of the academic community and government agencies to renegotiate
these shortfalls and keep the exchanges functioning at their current, albeit relatively low,
levels. For instance, the US Information Agency approved a $1.7 million grant for the
1982-1983 academic year that contained no reductions from the previous year. The
National Endowment for the Humanities and the Ford Foundation also contributed more
than previously expected, donating $930,000 and $400,000 respectively.373
In addition to dealing with exchange participant shortages and budgetary
challenges, IREX officials had increasing difficulty insulating the program from the
broader international US-Soviet tensions of the early 1980s. One of the first indications
of this problem came in the fall of 1979. Because Moscow was to be the site of the
summer Olympic Games in 1980, Soviet exchange officials informed IREX that the
capital city would be closed to exchange activities that summer, necessitating the
cancellation of the Summer Exchange of Language Teachers. Soviet administrators
claimed this was because the Olympics had simply caused a shortage of housing, but
IREX officials noted in their report that the move was certainly “exacerbated by the
deteriorating political relationship between Moscow and Washington.”374 In the
following months, as President Reagan came into office in 1981, his initial stance on USSoviet relations also prevented any improvement in the program. As one of his first
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strategies to restrain communism and eventually force Soviet capitulation, the president
introduced the policy of “linkage,” which outlined that an improvement in US-Soviet
relations had to be predicated on a positive change in Soviet behavior. This overarching
“linkage” policy applied to the academic exchange program as well, making government
support of the program contingent upon the current health of US-Soviet relations.
Reflecting one of the long-standing criticisms of the program, the Reagan administration
initially believed that the Soviet Union benefited from the exchange program much more
than the United States, particularly because of Soviet exchangees’ access to American
scientific and technological training. Therefore, as long as the relationship between the
two nations remained unimproved, it was extremely difficult for American exchange
officials to overcome all their financial difficulties or convince officials in Washington to
expand the program back to its previous levels.375
Additionally, this “linkage” policy created more challenges for the exchange
program in the wake of the tragic Korean Air Lines Flight 007 disaster. On September 1,
1983, a Soviet pilot mistook a commercial Korean Air Lines plane for an American
military aircraft and shot it down, killing all passengers onboard including some
Americans. This incident served to increase the already heightened tensions between the
United States and the Soviet Union, and IREX officials had to confront the ensuing
backlash against their programs by both American and Soviet officials. American and
Soviet diplomats, who were set to finally renew the US-Soviet cultural agreement that
had not been renegotiated since the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, cancelled their
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plan for the resumption of intergovernmental negotiations. Officials with the American
Council of Learned Societies cancelled their upcoming biennial meeting with the Soviet
Academy of Sciences due to the perceived inappropriateness of hosting high-level Soviet
guests in such an atmosphere. Perhaps most dramatically, Soviet exchange officials
decided to withdraw their participants in the Graduate Student/Young Faculty Exchange
mere weeks before they were set to leave for America. In addition, the Soviet government
recalled home twenty Soviet scholars already in the United States on a year-long stay.
Though neither side had ever before taken such an action in the twenty-five year history
of the program, the status of US-Soviet relations was so poor that Soviet officials were
concerned with how their citizens would be received in the United States due to the
intensifying anti-Soviet sentiment among the American people.
In the aftermath of these setbacks, IREX leaders noted in their annual report that
it was becoming increasingly difficult to keep their program shielded from broader
political and foreign policy fluctuations. Though officials had strived since the program’s
1958 inception to keep the exchange insulated from Cold War tensions, by 1983 IREX
leaders feared that insulation was “wearing thin” and further deterioration of the
international environment could even end the program completely.376 As the willingness
of the American government and people to cooperate in any capacity with the Soviets
continued its steady decline that had begun in the late 1970s, it remained a real possibility
that the academic exchange program would finally become a casualty of the renewed
Cold War.
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After reaching such a low point, prospects for the exchange program quickly and
substantially improved beginning in 1984 due to President Reagan’s evolving and more
conciliatory stance toward America’s Cold War rival. Historians continue to debate the
exact reasons for and extent of this sudden “reversal” in Reagan’s rhetoric and actions
towards the Soviet Union. Scholars especially deliberate on the president’s degree of
involvement in crafting his administration’s policies and the extent of his role in bringing
about the end of the Cold War. The so-called “triumphal school,” advocated by Reagan’s
conservative admirers, argue that Reagan took an active role in his administration and
used an aggressive stance and military build-up to put enormous pressure on the Soviet
Union. That pressure, they assert, had the intended effect of convincing Soviet leaders,
and especially Mikhail Gorbachev, that their country had to capitulate and make drastic
reforms, which eventually led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself and the end of
the Cold War. Reagan’s more conciliatory rhetoric during his second term, advocates of
his interpretation argue, came only after it was clear to the president that the Soviets had
begun backing down. Conversely, Reagan’s more liberal critics argue that he was a
passive president who was little more than a spokesperson for his administration. Reagan
simply got lucky, they contend, because he happened to be in office when Mikhail
Gorbachev began reforming the Soviet Union. His reversal and more friendly approach to
the Soviets was merely a response to Gorbachev’s actions and charms, making Reagan
more reactive than active, and furthermore shows that he played no role in bringing an
end to the Cold War.377 This study holds the view of subsequent and more nuanced
approaches to Reagan’s legacy, drawing from scholars such as Beth A. Fischer and
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journalist James Mann. They argue that while Reagan did not single-handedly bring an
end to the Cold War, he was not a passive president and instead played an active role in
shaping his administration’s policies. They contend that unlike many of his recent
predecessors, such as Richard Nixon, President Reagan viewed the Cold War less as a
geopolitical struggle and more as a competition over ideas and values. Thus he refused to
accept the permanence of the Soviet Union and instead held a firm belief that it could be
reformed in positive ways. His initial aggressive tone reflected his view of the
superpower rival through that lens of morality. While in office, however, Reagan
developed a genuine and extremely powerful fear of the horrors of nuclear war. Therefore
beginning in 1984, even before Gorbachev emerged as leader of the Soviet Union and
began his reforms, Reagan began publicly endorsing renewed dialogue with the Soviets,
especially in an effort to stem the nuclear arms race.378
The very first public sign of Reagan’s changing and more amicable approach to
the Soviet Union, which would have dramatic effects on the US-Soviet academic
exchange program, came with a televised presidential address on January 16, 1984. To
underscore the importance of this address to the American public, the Reagan
administration took a number of measures to show that this speech represented an
important change in direction for the president. In the week before the speech, White
House officials held a series of press briefings to tout the importance of the upcoming
address. They even chose to release excerpts of the speech to the press in advance, which
was highly unusual. In the speech, illustrating a stark departure from his past
denunciations of the Soviet Union as the “evil empire,” Reagan deemphasized the
378
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superpower rivalry and instead focused on the two countries’ common interests.
Specifically, he proclaimed, the most important commonality was “to avoid war and
reduce the level of arms.” He then called for constructive dialogue with the Soviet
leadership in order to address this concern, even stating that his dream was to “see the
day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the earth.” Reagan’s
national security aides drafted most of the text of the speech. However, Reagan himself
crafted the end of the address, illustrating not only his penchant for storytelling but also
his belief that the American and Soviet people shared common values and concerns that
transcended the geopolitical competition. He described a fictional meeting between two
couples, “an Ivan and an Anya” and “a Jim and a Sally.” If no language barrier separated
them, he asserted, the Soviet and American couples would not debate the differences
between their governments or societies, but instead would have a pleasant conversation
about their careers, families, and hobbies. This would prove, he asserted finally, “that
people don’t make wars.” Throughout the rest of 1984, Reagan repeatedly asserted, both
in public and in private correspondence with Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko, that
the United States and the Soviet Union should work together to gain better understanding
and promote international peace.379
As part of these early efforts to improve US-Soviet relations, Reagan directly
addressed the importance of resuming and expanding America’s cultural contacts with
the Soviet Union as early as June 1984. At a conference sponsored by the Kennan
Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Reagan addressed a crowd of US government
and private agency officials on US-Soviet cultural exchange. While White House
379
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officials told the press that Reagan’s primary interest was organizing nuclear arms
negotiations with the Soviets, the president hoped to use renewed cultural contacts to
show American flexibility and encourage Soviet receptiveness to his new push to
implement arms control. By the time of that speech, some improvements were already
underway in US-Soviet cultural contacts. For instance, just days before, American and
Soviet officials renewed the exchange agreement between the American Council of
Learned Societies and the Soviet Academy of Sciences. A few months later, in August
1984, American and Soviet representatives finally met to negotiate a new cultural
exchange agreement, although it took them an unprecedented fifteen months to finalize
it.380
The prospects for cultural exchange became increasingly positive the following
year, as 1985 ushered in a new reform-minded Soviet leader and the beginning of direct
summit meetings between the American and Soviet leadership. After Chernenko’s death
in the spring of 1985, a young Mikhail Gorbachev became head of the Soviet Union.
However, even before Gorbachev unveiled glasnost and perestroika and showed just how
revolutionary his new regime would be, Reagan extended an invitation for a summit
meeting with the new Soviet leader. Due to Reagan’s insistence on the need for renewed
dialogue between the two superpowers, in November 1985 Reagan and Gorbachev met
for the first time in Geneva.381 Along with agreeing to an extremely symbolic joint
statement concluding that “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,”
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Reagan and Gorbachev signed a new cultural agreement that reestablished many of the
exchanges that had been suspended since 1979. The accord also expanded the academic
exchange program in several ways, including increasing the number of annual Fulbright
lecturers, promoting more exchanges of undergraduate language students, and allowing
six Soviet and American language instructors to teach at schools in each other’s country
for three months each year.382 Returning from the Geneva Summit, President Reagan
addressed Congress on the purpose of reinvigorating cultural exchange. “Americans
should know the people of the Soviet Union- their hopes and fears and the facts of their
lives,” he asserted. “And citizens of the Soviet Union need to know of America’s deep
desire for peace and our unwavering attachment to freedom.”383 As the US-Soviet
exchange entered into its final years, Reagan revitalized the nation’s commitment to
using cultural exchange as a means to spread American values, and this would cause a
dramatic shift in the mindset of exchange participants of this period.
Following these significant political developments, IREX officials gained a
newfound optimism that their exchange program would be able to reemerge from its
dismal condition, although financial obstacles still afflicted the exchange in this period of
expansion. The improvement in US-Soviet relations, coupled with the fact that the new
cultural agreement formed a centerpiece of the Geneva Summit, made exchange
organizers hopeful for a renewed and “unprecedented role for cultural diplomacy.”
Knowing that cultural exchange had always played a very minor role in America’s larger
national strategy, IREX officials were surprised and enthused that Reagan and Gorbachev
had placed cultural contacts at “the cutting edge in a deliberate effort to redefine the very
382
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essence of superpower relations.”384 This new high-level appreciation and support for
cultural diplomacy had tangible effects on the US-Soviet exchange. After almost a
decade of decline, by 1986 the number of applicants for the research exchanges in the
Soviet Union had risen by twenty-five percent compared to the previous year and the
applicants for the Summer Exchange of Language Teachers had more than doubled.385
By 1987, about 275 Americans had applied for IREX programs to the Soviet Union,
which was double the number of applicants compared to the early 1980s. This trend
continued for the next year, and by 1988 IREX received a record number of applicants,
including more in the fields of international relations, than ever before.386
The programs experienced so much growth in this period that IREX yet again had
to confront serious financial constraints. Already the agency consistently had trouble
reaching is needed annual budget of $5 million to cover the cost of all its programs in the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. By 1987, with the number of participants growing
rapidly, IREX officials estimated that they would need at least a $1 million increase in
funding. Due to federal budget cuts and constant fluctuations in other funding, IREX
struggled to meet the growing demands of their programs. For instance, funding from the
US Information Agency had remained frozen for several years at $2.4 million, while
grants from the National Endowment for the Humanities fell from a high of $1 million in
1981 to $800,000 for 1987. Additionally, IREX officials noted that the improved nature
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of international relations surprisingly did not encourage the private sector to make up for
those shortfalls. “In one of those utterly American mood swings, yesterday’s denizens of
the Evil Empire have suddenly graduated in the popularity polls,” they recorded, but this
had not made funding easier to obtain. Instead, private sector funding tended “to be
diverted to highly visible activities- concerts, for example, or television bridges, or
activities with strong populist appeal, such as sister-city or youth exchanges.” Scholarly
exchanges were simply not as exciting for the general public because their benefits only
became apparent after years or even decades. Therefore, “in an era dominated by
electronic mass media, where the attention to world issues is measured in seconds, it is
increasingly difficult to make the case for such programs.”387 These financial concerns
continued into the following year. By 1988, when American and Soviet representatives
were discussing the prospect of doubling the number of exchangees allowed annually,
IREX officials questioned whether either the Soviet Union or the United States was
prepared to take on that financial burden.388
Despite these budgetary hurdles, IREX organizers believed that the era of
glasnost and perestroika signified the fruition of their decades-long effort to promote
American ideas and values in Eastern Europe. Just months after Gorbachev began
instituting reforms, IREX officials noted in their annual report that “years of contacts
[through scholarly exchanges] are finally leaving their mark.” While they admitted that
some of the impetus for change came through internal factors within the Soviet Union,
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they believed that these shifts represented, at their core, a revolution of ideas in part
stimulated by the presence of American intellectuals in Eastern Europe. Specifically, they
argued, the Soviets’ recognition of the necessity for fundamental reforms was “driven in
part by self-conscious comparisons to the West, and in particular the United States.” USSoviet academic exchanges, which put Soviet citizens in contact with the West either
directly through a period of study in the United States or indirectly through personal
contact with American scholars, provided the means to make this comparison.389 The
IREX leaders reported that by 1987, “virtually every prominent academically-based
economic reformer in the Soviet Union has participated in IREX exchanges, as have
numerous sociologists who are now among the top advisers to party and government
leaders.” IREX officials linked their willingness and ability to implement reforms in the
Soviet Union directly to their experience through the exchange. Lastly, these IREX
reports concluded that American exchangees to the USSR still had a vital role to play if
Gorbachev’s reforms were to continue and succeed. American scholars in Soviet studies,
through their decades of “objective scholarship,” had served as “custodians of forbidden
or repressed interpretations.” Now that the Soviet Union was opening up, these
Americans could “reopen the pages of history for native intellectuals who have been cut
off from large parts of their own past,” and therefore help spur social change in Eastern
Europe. Although exchange organizers had maintained throughout the entire history of
the program their separation from US government objectives and foreign policy concerns,
by the late 1980s they openly endorsed what they perceived as “American-style reforms”
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in the Soviet Union and asserted their belief that exchange programs had played an
instrumental role in fostering this transition.390 As had been the case since the 1950s,
exchange organizers continued to consider the promotion of American values as an
integral goal of the program.
The American exchange participants were also greatly affected by the dramatic
political shifts and changing international climate, and the remainder of this chapter will
examine their experiences and their conceptions of national identity throughout the 1980s
and into the early 1990s. In this period, over 800 Americans went to the Soviet Union
under the auspices of IREX exchange programs. Owing to the relatively recent nature of
these records, however, many exchangee reports from this decade remain restricted. Thus
this chapter’s analysis is drawn from only sixty-eight of these participants and only
analyzes reports from scholars on the Senior Research Scholars Exchange and the
American Council of Learned Societies Exchange, along with many reports from
Fulbright grantees. Nevertheless, the relatively small sample examined here can provide
at least partial insight into the mindset of these Americans living in the last decade of the
Cold War.
The most pronounced shift in exchangees’ reports from the late 1970s to the
1980s was their renewed willingness to identify themselves as cultural ambassadors for
the United States, though this shift did not begin until 1984. Prior to that year, only four
of the exchange participants examined here mentioned that they desired to use the
exchange to improve international understanding or spread American values. This shows
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that the continued deterioration of US-Soviet relations in the early 1980s, along with
Reagan’s rhetoric, had a direct effect on the attitudes and ideas of exchangees. Days after
entering office in 1981, President Reagan asserted to the press that renewing détente was
impossible because the Soviets willingly lie, cheat, and “operate on a different set of
standards” in their efforts to promote a world communist revolution.391 During a 1982
address to the British parliament, Reagan continued this aggressive rhetoric, predicting
that “the march of freedom and democracy…will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash
heap of history.”392 Furthermore, in one of the most famous public statements of his first
term, Reagan called the Soviet Union “an evil empire” in his March 1983 speech to the
National Association of Evangelicals. As foreign policy scholar James Mann contends,
Reagan attempted to alter the language, the ideas, and the very thought processes
used in American discussions about the Soviet Union. The purposes were to strip
the Soviet Union of its legitimacy, to express a sense of moral condemnation
toward the regime, and to characterize the Cold War as a battle of ideas and
ideals. 393
Reagan not only tried to use rhetoric to reshape American perceptions of the Soviet
Union and the Cold War in his first term, though; he also implemented policies that
reflected this aggressive stance. Starting in the spring of 1981, his administration
proposed the largest peacetime military budget in American history and later began
development of the Strategic Defense Initiative research program to build a defense
system against possible Soviet missile attacks.394 Compounding Reagan’s rhetoric and
policies were the various crises of the early 1980s that encouraged increased anti-Soviet
sentiment among Americans, such as the Korean Air Lines disaster.
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While earlier exchangees from the 1960s had repeatedly touted direct people-topeople contacts as a legitimate way to help improve US-Soviet relations, by the early
1980s an overwhelming majority of participants seem to have felt that this international
climate was so dire that even their direct contacts with the Soviet people could not make
any real progress in improving it. Considering how dramatically this changed in Reagan’s
second term when a majority of exchangees sought to again serve as cultural
ambassadors, this shows how these Americans conceptualized the Cold War struggle at
this pivotal point. Spreading American values, especially through positive cultural
interactions, seemed no longer viable under an administration that placed no hope in
these efforts nor gave them any support. Unlike past exchange participants who believed
they actually held the power to help alleviate Cold War tensions, these individuals shared
none of that confidence, illustrating the powerful effects of Reagan’s policies and actions
and the current international climate on their sense of American identity and purpose.
Exchangees from the 1960s felt that spreading American values behind the Iron Curtain
was as simple as talking about life in the United States and allowing the Soviets to judge
for themselves the obvious superiority of the American way. Though their confidence in
the American system remained, disseminating those values abroad through positive
cultural methods was no longer central to their national mission.
However, the tone of American exchangees’ reports changed considerably
beginning in 1984 as they increasingly aspired to be America’s cultural representatives
and use the exchange to promote international understanding, and this shift coincided
precisely with Reagan’s reversal to a more conciliatory approach to the Soviet Union.
Starting in 1984, over fifty of the sixty-eight participants examined here remarked that
173

either they actively sought to serve as cultural ambassadors, that they made a point to talk
to Soviet acquaintances about American life and values, or that they believed academic
exchanges could help improve international relations between the US and the Soviet
Union. That same year brought the first public articulation of Reagan’s belief that the
United States should work with the Soviet Union to ease tensions and the related idea that
the Soviet Union was capable of positive reforms. Subsequent summit meetings between
American and Soviet leadership, such as the initial Geneva Summit with Reagan and
Gorbachev, convinced these Americans that an improvement in superpower relations was
possible and that they could play an active role in advancing it. They were even further
heartened by the Washington Summit in December 1987. As the first Reagan-Gorbachev
summit not on neutral ground, and more significantly in the United States, the
Washington Summit convinced many Americans that the Cold War was actually
subsiding. An ABC poll taken the night of Gorbachev’s departure from Washington
showed that an astonishing seventy-six percent of Americans now believed that their
country and the Soviet Union were entering a new era. Additionally, Reagan’s approval
rating rose to fifty percent following the summit, which was unusually high for a
president in his final year.395 These changes in public opinion, coupled with the similarly
clear shift among American academics in the Soviet Union, suggests the great extent to
which national policy affected individual consciousness in this period and illustrates that
Reagan was very effective in shaping the public mood about the Cold War.
Starting in the mid-1980s, American exchangees began to explicitly articulate
their desire to serve as cultural representatives of the United States. Fulbrighters from this
395
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period remarked that they aspired to be “a living document of American culture,” provide
a “window” into the United States for curious Soviets, and “represent American values
clearly and fairly.”396 One 1984 Fulbright grantee in history reasserted a common
sentiment of 1960s exchangees, arguing that IREX should take great care to send
participants who possess “integrating personal qualities” and who can live “in a fish
bowl” and still maintain a good attitude and pleasant relationships with Soviet
acquaintances.397 Another Fulbright exchangee in 1985, placed in the Ukrainian city of
Kharkov, advised that all participants should bring some basic reference books on
American history and society. These, she argued, would help provide answers for
inevitable Soviet questions on subjects such as American home ownership, crime,
unemployment, race relations, and gender equality.398 Many of these individuals also
believed that they had been successful in their endeavor to be positive national
representatives. A Fulbright lecturer in literature recalled feeling satisfied about his
efforts to “represent the United States…and convey something of our national character
and thought.”399 Another grantee, a geologist placed in Siberia, believed that through
establishing friendships with Soviet citizens he had “changed many opinions about
America for the better.”400 Thus it is clear that by this period an increasing numbers of
Richard D. McKinzie, Exchange report, 1984, Council for International Exchange of Scholars
Collection, University of Arkansas Library, Fayetteville, Arkansas; Jerome J. Oetgen, Exchange report,
1984, Council for International Exchange of Scholars Collection, University of Arkansas Library,
Fayetteville, Arkansas; Richard Jensen, Exchange report, 1986, Council for International Exchange of
Scholars Collection, University of Arkansas Library, Fayetteville, Arkansas.
397
Richard D. McKinzie, Exchange report, 1984, Council for International Exchange of Scholars
Collection, University of Arkansas Library, Fayetteville, Arkansas.
398
Judith C. Shapiro, Exchange report, 1985, Council for International Exchange of Scholars Collection,
University of Arkansas Library, Fayetteville, Arkansas.
399
Bryon T. Lindsey, Exchange report, 1989, Council for International Exchange of Scholars Collection,
University of Arkansas Library, Fayetteville, Arkansas.
400
Frank R. Ettensohn, Exchange report, 1989, Council for International Exchange of Scholars Collection,
University of Arkansas Library, Fayetteville, Arkansas.
396

175

exchangees were again becoming comfortable, and indeed confident, in serving as
America’s cultural representatives. Though only about ten of the sixty-eight individuals
examined here directly referred to themselves as cultural ambassadors for the United
States, many others still served in this capacity by recalling their conversations about
America to Soviet friends or by asserting that these cross-cultural relationships could
promote international understanding.
In addition to those participants who directly referred to themselves as America’s
goodwill ambassadors or cultural representatives, over twenty others simply recalled their
efforts to tell the Soviet people about American society and its national values. Several
exchangees, such as 1981 Senior Research Scholar in literature Mark Pomar, fondly
recalled conversations with Soviet colleagues about life in the United States. “I felt
comfortable discussing the complexities of our society and giving these ordinary
Russians a different picture of the US from the one they were accustomed to.”401 By the
mid-1980s, many participants sought to use Gorbachev’s new policy of glasnost to their
advantage in their attempts to spread “truths” about American life. One 1989 Fulbrighter
to Lithuania noted that the recent reforms had caused many Soviet citizens to have a
heightened suspicion of their own government, consequently making them more open
than ever to outside information and influence. So much so, he cautioned, “that a visitoracademician must exercise special care to be calm, objective, and dispassionate in
relating the ‘Western way’ of doing things.”402 Mirroring sentiment from those in the
early years of the exchange, many of these Americans asserted that spreading that
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“Western way” was not difficult and simply required an exchangee to rely on his own
experiences as an American. For instance, one 1987 Fulbright grantee’s host institution in
Kiev allowed him to give a series of lectures on American culture. While he depended on
US Information Agency pamphlets for some of his background material, he mostly relied
on his “own experience as an American,” discussing basic aspects of American life such
as average salary, how credit cards work, and the mechanics of shopping.403 Another
Fulbrighter to Moscow in 1988 reiterated this same sentiment. An exchangee did not
have to be an expert on all aspects of American society in order to relay its positive
characteristics, he argued. “All you have to be is yourself.”404 Harkening back to the
missionary zeal of the exchangees of the late 1950s and 1960s, many of these individuals
again believed that the American system was superior enough to speak for itself.
Several exchangees not only discussed American society with their Soviet
acquaintances but many used supplementary methods, such as photos and publications, to
further illustrate the United States. Walter Hixson, a 1991 American history Fulbrighter
to Kazan, recalled that he would bring photographs of his family and home life to Soviet
gatherings he attended. “My Soviet friends poured over the photographs with unbridled
fascination, often flipping through the same pictures over and over,” he remembered.405
Another Fulbright grantee in 1988 further suggested that future participants be well
prepared for this inevitable Soviet intrigue regarding the United States. He suggested that
before their departure to the USSR, they get a photographer to follow them for a day to
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document everyday life in America. This should include pictures of the participant’s
home and workplace, along with photos of him going to the grocery store, the gas station,
or any other location he would normally frequent. These photos could then be produced
into slides and taken to the Soviet Union to “allow the Soviet hosts to see inside the life
of the American professional household.”406 Many exchangees also noted the importance
of taking Western publications to the USSR. “Above all, take all the American journals
and books you can afford to carry,” a 1989 psychology Fulbrighter to Estonia asserted.
She believed her “small lending library” was her most valuable contribution to her Soviet
colleagues and assisted in her mission to give the Soviets “a greater understanding of
American values, history, and politics.”407 This compares starkly to the exchangees of the
previous decade, who were almost without exception merely interested in disseminating
Western scholarship for its academic value. Another Fulbright lecturer in urban
geography recalled the same enthusiasm for American literature by Soviets in his field.
Upon arrival in Moscow, he made fifty copies of the standard textbook that he regularly
used for courses back in the United States, with the intention of distributing it to his
Soviet students. He recorded:
I brought the xerox copies to the first lecture, and as I handed them out after class
I felt a bit like a Red Cross volunteer handing out rice in Ethiopia. I expected a
rush to get the handouts, but not a scene that resembled people boarding a Tokyo
subway at rush hour.408
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This Fulbrighter’s image of himself as a humanitarian serving the underprivileged is a
significant representation of the sentiment many exchangees held in this period. The
scene he recalls is one of a Soviet populace hungry for Western information and
American intellectuals as the harbingers of true mental sustenance. Just as the Reagan
administration was urging the American public to overcome the “Vietnam syndrome”
and realize the positive effects of spreading American values abroad, these American
exchangees had renewed confidence in the universal appeal of American society and
ideals.
Another way this shift manifested itself among participants’ remarks was the
large increase in those touting the great cultural enrichment made possible by the
exchange program. Whereas exchangees from the late 1970s to the early 1980s focused
mostly on the academic merits of the program and deemphasized its cultural value, about
twenty-five participants after the year 1985 recalled the cultural value of their experience
through getting a first-hand look at Soviet society and its people. A Fulbright participant
in Leningrad in 1985 remarked that it enlarged his understanding of Soviet culture,
including its music, dance, and literature.409 Echoing other exchangees, one 1986
Fulbright grantee wrote that he greatly valued getting to experience Soviet life first hand.
“Earlier short trips to the Soviet Union helped my understanding of Russian culture,” he
recalled, “but nothing compares with living in the midst of it for a few months.”410
Another, placed in Armenia in 1988, found that while Armenians knew a relatively large
amount about life in the United States, she was much less knowledgeable about Soviet
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society before her visit. “Hence, I benefited a great deal by learning about the Soviet
political and economic systems as well as about the general way of life in the Soviet
Union.”411 Finally, an additional Fulbright exchangee in law, placed in Lithuania in 1989,
asserted, “No amount of reading could substitute for the understanding I gained of Soviet
communism, of Soviet society, its people, and particularly its government.” He also
shared his special excitement to have personally witnessed “these historic times,”
specifically the political reforms in the Baltic States as a result of perestroika and
glasnost.412 Coinciding with Reagan’s assertion of the importance of cross-cultural
dialogue, these individuals no longer saw the program as a “normal” exchange as they
had characterized it in the late 1970s. Instead, they also viewed it as a uniquely enriching
and valuable cultural experience that helped contribute to improving international
relations.
Similarly, American exchange participants once again began to characterize the
Soviet people as intensely curious about the United States, something they had almost
entirely ceased to include in their reports since the 1960s, and some even noted that the
Soviet people recognized the problems in their society and wanted Western-style reform.
Beginning around 1984, and in more than fifteen instances, Americans recorded that
Soviet acquaintances yearned to hear about Western society and culture. A 1986
Fulbright history grantee to Moscow recalled that Fulbrighters played an important role
not only in an academic sense but also in that they provide information for Soviet
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students who are “intensely curious about the USA and Americans.”413 Another
participant, placed in Armenia in 1985, recalled similarly that his curiosity about Soviet
Armenian society “was at least equaled by the Armenians’ curiosity about life in the
United States,” and he attempted to answer their many questions as best he could.414
During his time in Kiev, another Fulbrighter noted that he would get many questions
about America, some of them about its negative aspects such as homelessness, racism,
and AIDs. He recalled that he spent many such conversations trying to correct the Soviet
people’s “distorted picture” of life in the United States.415 Finally, in one 1989 report, an
exchangee remarked that he found the Soviet people “intensely friendly and intensely
curious about our country.”416 In essence, not only had these Americans resumed their
formerly abandoned goal of preaching the values of America abroad, but they also had
begun to articulate again the highly receptive nature of the Soviet people to their
message. Additionally, about five stated directly that the Soviet people recognized
problems in their own society and wanted reform. One Fulbright grantee in linguistics,
placed in Lithuania in 1984, claimed that the experience showed him that while Soviet
citizens did not have freedom of speech and expression, “I learned how resilient they are
[and] how much they value the freedom we take for granted in America.”417 Another in
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Armenia in 1988 claimed that many Soviets he met recognized the “shortcomings of the
Soviet system” and hoped that Gorbachev’s new reforms would improve their society.418
By the 1980s, many American exchangees had a more honed and specific idea of
exactly which American values and ideals they sought to impart to the Soviet people,
namely free intellectual expression and critical thinking. While the cultural ambassadors
of the 1960s had used American products such as jazz records, American fashion
magazines, and Western newspapers to help spread American beliefs and consumer
culture to the Soviet Union, many of these later participants had a much more nuanced
approach to winning over their Soviet colleagues. As several exchangees noted in their
reports, many Western fashions, styles, and products had already permeated the Soviet
bloc by the 1980s but communism still remained intact.419 Thus the academics in the last
decade of the exchange began to believe that the best way to convert the Soviets to the
American way was not just to encourage them to emulate American society but also to
instruct them on how to be critical and analytical thinkers and to question all traditionally
accepted ideas. Simultaneously, this provided a means for these Americans to bolster
their own national identity. They framed American society as a completely open society
where citizens were free to express any opinion they wished, which they contrasted to the
restrictive and oppressive Soviet society that failed to teach its people that dissent was
even possible. By the end of this period, at least one American exchange participant
agreed with IREX officials that these encounters had made a positive impact on the
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Soviet people. In 1991, James H. Billington travelled to the Soviet Union for a librarians’
conference as a representative for the Library of Congress and witnessed the collapse of
the Soviet state. He concluded that academic exchanges had given the Soviet people vital
exposure to the West, which helped “transform the consciousness of a new Russian
generation” and helped lead to the collapse of communism.420
Several exchangees in this period attempted to portray American society to the
Soviet people as a culture that encouraged diversity of opinion and the challenging of
accepted beliefs. After criticizing US leaders in his lectures, one American historian
recalled telling his audiences that “the great thing about America is precisely an
intellectual atmosphere in which nothing is sacred and all ideals are subject to devastating
iconoclasm.”421 Another Fulbrighter in linguistics lamented that the Soviet people were
restricted in what they could say and do, but that they valued “the freedom we take for
granted in America.” Therefore, he argued, lines of communication must remain open
between the United States and the Soviet Union in order to encourage this unorthodox
thinking.422 An additional Fulbright exchangee in journalism used half of his class time to
show American and British broadcasting programs to his Moscow students. He asserted
that from his lectures and these videos, “the students must have realized we are an open
country, we encourage diversity, [and] we not only permit but encourage the publication
of a wide range of opinions.”423 Others complained of the “narrow” nature of Soviet
James H. Billington, Russia Transformed: Breakthrough to Hope: Moscow, August 1991 (New York:
Free Press, 1992), 99-100.
421
Edward Pessen, Exchange report, 1985, Council for International Exchange of Scholars Collection,
University of Arkansas Library, Fayetteville, Arkansas.
422
Jerome J. Oetgen, Exchange report, 1984, Council for International Exchange of Scholars Collection,
University of Arkansas Library, Fayetteville, Arkansas.
423
Burton Paulu, Exchange report, 1986, Council for International Exchange of Scholars Collection,
University of Arkansas Library, Fayetteville, Arkansas.
420

183

education, but remained hopeful because many of their students and colleagues were very
interested in American scholarship and methods. A historian placed in Moscow in 1985
noticed that many students seemed “quietly pleased” when he argued that the worth of a
historical argument did not depend on its “correctness” but instead on its intellectual
quality and originality.424 Many other exchangees noted the same phenomenon as
students in their fields showed an intense interest in Western scholarly techniques, which
relied on new and innovative ideas and intellectual freedom.425
Going further than simply espousing the merits of analytical thinking, many
American exchangees attempted to introduce Soviet instructors and students to new
teaching methods that would encourage such an approach. Several Fulbright instructors
recalled that they frequently implemented discussion periods into their courses, and the
Soviet students usually struggled with the format at first. One literature professor
remembered:
I devoted most of the class period to discussing assigned readings. For the first
two weeks the students had difficulty with this approach. One of them told me
after class one day that their teachers only asked factual questions: ‘What
happened to so-and-so on page twenty-five?’…They hesitated giving their own
interpretations. However, I took glasnost at face value, asked them to do the
same, and we had a great semester.
Soon Soviet instructors began to hear about his unorthodox approach to instruction, and
actually asked him to speak about it at a department meeting. The Soviet professors, he
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recalled, “had not been taught to analyze literature critically, so they didn’t know how to
ask questions or what questions to ask.”426 Others reported similar experiences, including
an economics professor assigned to Kharkov. As she attempted to lead a discussion-based
seminar course, she “had the impression that participants in the seminar were supposed to
normally ask only short questions.” However, as the students became more comfortable
with her methods, she prodded them into discussing their own opinions and ideas at
length.427 Another lecturer in urban geography also noted that the students were “not
accustomed to question-answer activity in the classroom,” but that they eventually caught
on to this “interesting and unusual” teaching style.428 One Fulbrighter in American
literature asserted that by 1987 the Soviets were realizing that in order to compete with
the West “they must teach their students to thinking independently rather than to parrot
back political clichés,” and some Soviet students were even organizing debate groups in
order to learn how to discuss sensitive political issues freely.429
These were just a few of the many instances of American exchangees
underscoring the importance of instructing Soviet academics on how to think critically,
and the frequency of this sentiment is significant in illustrating these Americans’
perception of their country and national identity. To help further regain the confidence to
serve as cultural ambassadors for the United States, these Americans repeatedly
contrasted their own intellectual abilities to the inferior Soviet other. They cast
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themselves as promoters of intellectual freedom and critical thinking, ready to guide the
Soviets out of their own ignorance. In essence, this was the return of the same American
exceptionalism propounded in the 1960s, merely in another form. While the American
exceptionalism of the 1960s mostly focused on winning over the Soviet people with
American affluence and consumerism, this brand focused on actually changing the
thought processes of the Soviet people. This sentiment fit precisely with the attitude
exhibited by President Reagan in his second term. Viewing the Cold War as primarily a
war of ideas, he believed it was desirable and indeed possible to reform the Soviet Union
from within. His initial negotiations with Gorbachev, which preceded the massive reform
program soon put forth by the Soviet leader, instilled in these Americans the possibility
that people-to-people contacts could actually lead to deep and meaningful reforms in the
Soviet Union.
The other biggest contrast to previous exchangee reports of the late 1970s was
these Americans’ renewed concern with promoting international understanding between
the United States and the Soviet Union. While fewer than ten percent of exchangees
examined in the previous era were interested in using the program for the furtherance of
American foreign policy goals, almost half of participants in the 1980s noted that the
program should promote improvement of US-Soviet relations. Exchange participants of
this era increasingly believed that not only should they be cultural ambassadors for the
United States but that their combined efforts could contribute to a renewal of detente
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Still, this trend was not consistent
throughout the decade but instead grew in parallel with President Reagan’s new
commitment to improving relations with America’s Cold War rival. Before 1984, almost
186

no exchangees recorded “international understanding” as being an important motivation
or result of their time in the Soviet Union. As Reagan transitioned into his second term in
1984 and 1985 and abandoned his “evil empire” rhetoric, American exchange
participants became increasingly optimistic about the exchange serving as a means of
international cooperation and peace. This dramatic shift shows not only the revival of
these Americans’ national self-confidence but also serves as a further illustration of the
profound effect of Cold War national policy on individual Americans.
Before 1984, when Reagan still publicly maintained a hardline and aggressive
approach toward the Soviet Union, exchangees who did mention international
understanding in their reports were generally skeptical that it could be achieved. Senior
Research Scholar Tyrus Cobb recorded in 1981 that while academic exchange would be a
good first step in easing Cold War tensions, he was “under no illusion that this kind of
visit in itself [would] place Soviet-American relations on a more stable, solid footing.”430
Other exchangees agreed with this sentiment, arguing that educational exchange only
played a “small” or “modest” role in creating international peace.431 One Fulbrighter to
Lithuania even noted that although the exchange created understanding because he
learned about a different culture, seeing Soviet society and its lack of freedoms firsthand
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made him feel very glad to be an American. “I think I have a deeper understanding of the
virtues and strengths of American society,” he contended after returning in 1984.432
Starting in 1984, though, as Reagan began publicly advocating a new and more
amicable approach to the Soviet Union, over twenty individuals recorded that the
exchange program could be used to improve US-Soviet relations. One sociologist on a
Fulbright grant to Armenia recalled that his experience was “very useful” in contributing
to international understanding, and another Fulbrighter in literature also recorded in 1987
that the exchange program was “extremely important” in encouraging direct contact
between American and Soviet intellectuals in the spirit of international understanding.433
An additional Fulbrighter to Armenia in 1988 argued that the exchange contributed
“tremendously towards international cooperation, communication, and world peace.”434
A participant the following year even went as far as to state that “the Fulbright program
contributes more to international understanding than any other single program.”435 These,
along with numerous other reports that touted the international benefits of the exchange,
illustrated a marked change in the perceptions of this set of Americans in the 1980s. The
fact that this shift coincided almost directly in parallel with Reagan’s new initiatives to
increase cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union illustrates the
powerful implications of national rhetoric and actions on the individual psyche of
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Americans. In the entire decade previous, American exchange participants had almost
entirely abandoned the idea that their program was anything more than a scholarly
exchange. However, by the second half of the 1980s, a large number of exchangees
suddenly reasserted the idea that cultural contacts could indeed contribute to larger
foreign policy concerns of international peace and understanding. As Reagan and
Gorbachev engaged in multiple summit meetings and forged international agreements,
these Americans now felt that a renewal of detente was indeed possible and that direct
American-to-Soviet interaction would help make it a reality.
Finally, these Americans’ reactions to the starkly disparate political fluctuations
that took place during the 1980s help illustrate the overarching abstract nature of the Cold
War to individual Americans. Specifically, despite the Reagan administration’s shift from
confrontation to negotiation and individual Americans’ similar ideological reversals,
conceptions of the Soviet people remained unchanged throughout the life of the USSoviet exchange. In fact, for the entirety of the exchange program, even during periods of
heightened Cold War tensions, the majority of exchangees recalled the generosity,
kindness, and helpfulness of their Soviet friends and colleagues. It is especially
significant that even during Reagan’s “evil empire” period, when exchange participants
lacked the will and confidence to actively spread American values abroad, exchangees
overwhelmingly continued to note the friendly and intelligent nature of the Soviet people.
This shows that even by its last decade, the Cold War really remained an abstract conflict
for these Americans. The enemy-other was not the Soviet people themselves, but the
faceless Soviet system.
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Despite the political shifts of the 1980s, American exchangees of this period,
similar to those who came before them, consistently asserted that the Soviet people were
extremely hospitable and friendly. Andrejs Plakans, an ACLS exchangee to Latvia,
recalled in 1981 that his stay in Riga was “greatly enhanced” by numerous invitations to
visit Soviet friends in their homes.436 Senior Research Scholar in literature Michael Heim
also remembered the generosity of Soviet friends, recalling in 1983 that whenever Soviet
bureaucracy got in his way, his associates were more than willing to “stick their necks
out” to help him.437 In 1981, exchangee Mark Pomar sought to further counter the
stereotype that Russians were inherently mean and instead insisted that they were merely
tired and overworked. If Americans would exhibit just a small amount of “kindness and
understanding,” he argued, this would melt away their seemingly standoffish nature.438
During the mid- to late-1980s, American exchange participants continued to commend
the goodness of the Soviet people. One Fulbright Lecturer in American literature, placed
in Georgia in 1987, recalled that she made numerous friends and “fell in love” with
Georgians. She even recalled her ironic “problem” of getting too many invitations to
friends’ homes. “Some ‘problem.’ Too many nice people all wanting to make a fuss over
you. You won’t be fit for America afterwards. You’ll expect people to throw big feasts
and wait on you and propose elaborate toasts, etc.”439 Another Fulbrighter to Armenia
added to these sentiments, contending that many Armenians were more “friendly” and
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“warm” than some Americans. “Their lifestyle is much more human than ours,” he
recalled. “They place a great deal of importance on friendship and family ties…They will
do anything to help you.”440 An additional exchangee in Kiev noted that Soviet
acquaintances would give him and his family numerous gifts, such as homemade jams,
packaged foods unavailable in Soviet shops, records, and books. “This generosity was all
the more moving,” he recorded, “given the relatively low salaries and the pervasive lack
of decent consumer goods available in the Soviet Union.”441 These favorable
recollections were not just limited to the Soviet republics, though. A 1985 Fulbright
exchangee to Moscow remembered that he often dined with Soviet friends and had
exhilarating conversations covering every subject imaginable.442 Another lecturer in
Moscow recorded in 1989 that he had “never met warmer hospitality anywhere” and that
the Soviet people “appear prepared to offer courtesies to virtual strangers that we would
normally reserve for old friends.”443 These types of remarks were present in over half the
reports examined here, and they show that while the Cold War raged on, these Americans
did not view it as a conflict with the Soviet people themselves.
Even more exchangees in the 1980s recorded a favorable personal impression of
their colleagues and students. For instance, linguist Roy Jones remarked in 1983 that his
Soviet colleagues in Leningrad could not have been more “helpful and cooperative.”444 A
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1989 Fulbright exchangee to Estonia echoed the same sentiment, asserting that his
“professional relationships were excellent” and “our hosts were helpful in every way.”445
Others noted the academic benefits of their relationships with Soviet scholars, such as
Alton Donnelly who asserted that his consultations with Soviet colleagues while on the
Senior Research Scholars exchange was “an especially useful part of my stay in the
Soviet Union.” He was even able to create a collaborative research project with Soviet
historians.446 Another research exchangee in literature, Julia Alissandratos, developed
such a good relationship with her Soviet peers that they invited her to publish her
research in a Soviet journal.447 Others had fond memories of the personal friendships they
developed with their fellow Soviet academics. One 1984 Fulbrighter in Lithuania
remembered his faculty colleagues as “warm.” He came to “regard many of them as
friends” and asserted that establishing those friendships was one of the highlights of his
experience.448 Another exchangee in 1985, who was a World War II veteran, remembered
a particularly heartfelt experience on the fortieth anniversary of the end of the Second
World War. His department hosted a celebration and “I was asked to attend and was
pleasantly surprised when they called me up as a veteran of the war for recognition and a
bouquet of tulips.”449
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Further illustrating these Americans’ positive attitudes toward the Soviet people,
many Fulbright lecturers tasked with conducting classes in Soviet universities
complemented the quality of students at their institutions. One Fulbright exchangee in
Kazakhstan found all of his students to be “widely read and with excellent academic
backgrounds judging by the questions they asked.”450 Another exchange lecturer asserted
that his fifth-year students were of such a quality that they were “comparable to graduate
students in better American universities.”451 While others recalled that a few students
relied too much on Marxist ideology in formulating their ideas, “such doctrinaire
pronouncements were rare. Faculty and students alike seemed more concerned with
understanding and profiting from my non-Marxist observations than with judging them
against a Marxist-Leninist standard.”452 These exchange participants, along with a
majority of others, held their Soviet peers and students in high esteem and clearly
respected the Soviet academics for their work.
From the beginning of the US-Soviet exchange in 1958 to its last years in the
1980s and early 1990s, one of the most frequent observations by the program’s alumni
was the generosity and kindness of the Soviet people, whether friends, colleagues, or
students. This points to the conclusion that, to this significant group of Americans, the
Cold War enemy-other was not the Soviet people themselves, but the colossal faceless
Soviet system. Consistently throughout this thirty-three year period, American
exchangees repeatedly criticized the Soviet bureaucracy, economy, and academic
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structure, and denounced the presence of state surveillance and censorship. However,
only a small minority placed blame for these inadequacies on the Soviet people or spoke
negatively about most of the Soviet citizens with whom they came into contact. This
provides an interesting lens through which to examine the perceptions of these Americans
during the Cold War. Their image of the Soviet people was not the caricature of the
sabotaging communist lurking around the corner or the mindless pawn of the communist
regime. Instead, their perception of the Cold War was driven by the idea that the Soviets
were decent people who needed to be set free from an oppressive system they merely
inherited. While these Americans’ sense of national purpose transformed in this period to
one that focused once again on spreading American values abroad, the only constant
remained their overwhelming positive impression of the Soviet people.
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CONCLUSION
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, several scholars of American
foreign relations have explored the extent to which cultural exchange played a role in the
final demise of the Cold War. Robert English, a political scientist and a former IREX
exchange student to the Soviet Union from 1989 to 1991, argued that the stage for
Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms and the subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union was set as
early as the 1950s when the Soviet Union began to be more open to foreign influence,
especially from the West. What made the end of the Cold War possible, he contended,
was “the emergence, over the preceding two decades, of a Soviet intellectual elite” whose
new, reformist thinking was “rooted in the cultural thaw, domestic liberalization, and
burgeoning foreign ties of the early post-Stalin era.” These academics, some of whom
formed these foreign ties through the exchange program, became senior colleagues in
Gorbachev’s government. They desired to belong to the West and to adopt a new
Western-oriented national identity, and their support encouraged the Soviet leader to
progress with his reforms.453 Historian of US public diplomacy, Nicholas J. Cull, agreed
with English, as evident through his own examination of the United States Information
Agency. He contended that since 1991, Eastern European leaders have repeatedly
asserted that Western cultural diffusion through mediums such as radio, exhibitions, and
Robert English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 2-5.
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people-to-people contact allowed the Soviet people to learn of the freedoms and material
abundance in the West. Eventually, their desires for these advancements “drew the
Kremlin into a race it could never win.”454 Other historians of American cultural
diplomacy, such as Laura A. Belmonte, saw the fruits of these efforts in the post-1991
developments in Eastern Europe. She concluded her monograph on Cold War propaganda
by arguing that although it is difficult to draw a direct link between American cultural
efforts and the collapse of communism, the subsequent evolution of the former Soviet
bloc showed the obvious influence of American ideals, especially democratic capitalism.
These governments, to various degrees, allowed freedom of speech, the press, and
religion, and American consumer goods became even more popular. Therefore, she
contended, “American officials correctly believed that democratic capitalism would
appeal to peoples oppressed by communist political oppression, economic regimentation,
and police surveillance.”455
Since the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, former academic exchange
participants have also presented their ideas on the direct connection between their efforts
at cultural diplomacy and the collapse of the Soviet state. Alfred Rieber, an exchangee to
Moscow in the first year of the program in 1958, recalled in 1999 that the exchanges
were important in keeping an “open avenue of contact when others were closed.” This
meant, he contended, that “perestroika did not have to begin at ground zero” because
when the official barriers to the West came down, all those personal and professional
relationships that exchangees had created over the previous decades were allowed to
Nicholas J. Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and
Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 482.
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flourish. Terence Emmons, who participated in the graduate student exchange to the
Soviet Union from 1962 to 1964, more directly asserted that the development of Westernoriented values and ideas among Soviet intellectuals, which was encouraged by the
exchange, was “a fundamental aspect in the collapse of the Soviet Union.” He contended,
“Stalin and his epigones were right; intercourse with the West was a dangerous thing.”
George Demo, a former exchangee to Moscow in 1962, also agreed. In 1999, he
characterized the exchanges as a “very significant pipeline of ‘truth’ or Western values
and information” to the Soviet elite, whose influence culminated in the Gorbachev era
reforms. Former 1967 participant James Muller added to these sentiments, speaking
directly on the debate as to why the Cold War concluded when it did. He argued years
later that while many believed President Reagan’s military build-up forced the Soviets to
capitulate, “I believe it likely that cultural and scientific exchanges, and the resulting
cooperative contacts between the Soviet Union and the United States, played a more
important role than increasing nuclear over-kill.”456
Additional former exchangees have published works on their experience of being
in the Soviet Union as the communist regime was disintegrating and also have explained
their belief that academic contacts were an important contributor to these dramatic
events. The very first exchange participant introduced in this work was James Billington,
who initially went to the Soviet Union on a 1961 exchange to the University of
Leningrad. By 1991, Billington was again in the Soviet Union as a representative of the
Library of Congress for the annual gathering of the International Federation of Library
Associates. He was present in the Soviet capital during the attempted August coup
Yale Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain (University Park:
Pennsylvania State University, 2003), 49-58.
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against Gorbachev’s government and witnessed the subsequent resistance staged by many
Soviet people against these opponents to reform. When the putsch threatened to restore
dictatorial control and the old “politics of fear,” he watched the Soviet people assert
themselves and their support of reform through protests, thus “reaffirming a new politics
of hope” and paving a new path for their nation. Billington stated plainly that this
transformation of the Russian consciousness was directly linked to the influence of the
West, especially the cultural interchange promoted by the academic exchange program.
He recalled several Soviet academics he had encountered as proof of this connection.
Rem Khokhlov, a prominent Soviet laser scientist, went to the United States through an
academic exchange to Stanford University. The experience exposed “this remarkable
man…to more than just physics.” Upon his return to the Soviet Union, he helped create
the first American Studies courses at Moscow State University and subsequently worked
to expand those classes to other Soviet institutions. Alexander Yakovlev participated in
an exchange to Columbia University and later became one of Gorbachev’s closest
political advisors. Billington asserted that Yakovlev’s experience exposed him to a “free
society” which allowed him to more effectively “explain the West to the more sheltered
Gorbachev.” Finally, Soviet political scientist Vladimir Shtinov, after spending time at an
American university through the exchange, introduced to his home institution Sverdlovsk
University “some of the first series studies of comparative politics and democratic
political philosophy anywhere in Russia.”457
Finally, Walter Hixson, who taught at Kazan State University as a Fulbright
scholar from September 1990 to July 1991, also later connected the disintegration of
James H. Billington, Russia Transformed: Breakthrough to Hope: Moscow, August 1991 (New York:
Free Press, 1992), 3-4, 99-101.
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Soviet communism to American influence. His book, which described his experience as
an exchangee, contained numerous anecdotes that showed the great influence of Western
culture in the Soviet Union, especially the Soviet peoples’ “uncritical fascination…with
Western consumerism.” Although before his visit he admitted his skepticism of the idea
that Western values were significant in creating change within the Soviet Union, he
recorded that he became more receptive to the notion as a result of his time among the
Soviet people. “After spending ten months observing Soviet society ‘from the bottom
up,’” he recalled, “it did become clear to me that, in certain fundamental respects, the
West had indeed conquered the East” because “as their own system disintegrated,
millions of former Soviets looked to Western-style capitalism for salvation.” This
development could not have been possible without the influence of Western culture.458
My research has been premised on the idea that Americans’ descriptions of the
Soviet Union provide a more accurate picture of exchangees’ own ideas and values rather
than giving any substantial insight into the Soviet society and culture they observed.
Therefore it is outside of the scope of this work to analyze whether US-Soviet cultural
exchange did indeed play a pivotal role in bringing about the end of Soviet communism.
Still, it is significant that even years after the Cold War had come to an end, several
exchangees still believed that their combined individual efforts made such a deep impact
on the Soviet consciousness, and thus the Soviet political system. Not one of the over 500
exchange reports examined here ever included a concern that the presence of Soviet
exchange participants in the United States posed a danger of convincing Americans of the
merits of communism. If an exchangee discussed cultural transmission, it was always in
Walter L. Hixson, Witness to Disintegration: Provincial Life in the last year of the USSR (Hanover:
University Press of New England, 1993), ix-x, 170-171.
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the context of spreading American values to the Soviet Union, not vice versa. This fact,
along with countless remarks made by these individuals throughout the life of the
exchange program, show that they had internalized the concept of American
exceptionalism and that it was through this lens that they viewed the Soviet Union.
Consistently until the end of the Cold War, American exchangees used the image of the
inferior Soviet other to reinforce that sense of superiority. Even in the late 1960s and
1970s when many Americans questioned the viability of spreading American values
abroad, the image of the inferior Soviet system helped this specific group of Americans,
and most likely many others, to maintain a more unified national identify formed around
the idea of American exceptionalism.
In every type of travel writing, the traveler does not narrate the experience in its
entirety but chooses to record what he or she believes is significant or abnormal about the
society being observed. Thus, exactly what author-travelers choose to include in their
accounts illuminate their own cultural assumptions and values, and this principle can be
applied to reports by American exchangees to the Soviet Union. The American culture
they lived in had inundated them with notions of American superiority, even after the
ultra-patriotic fervor of the early Cold War period had receded.459 They were therefore
forced to compare their preconceived notions of Soviet society to the reality they saw on
the ground. Consistently, in every period, the majority of exchangees chose to focus
mostly on the inefficiencies and problems of the Soviet system, especially the stifling
bureaucracy, the low standard of living, and the presence of state surveillance (whether
witnessed first-hand or not). While they consistently noted their favorable impressions of
459
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the hospitable Soviet people, whom they often framed as innocents trapped within a
broken system waiting to be reformed, they used their critiques of the overarching Soviet
society to confirm these preconceived notions of American exceptionalism.
Though this repeated reaffirming of American superiority remained a constant
throughout this period, these exchange reports also provide a look into the ways that
public perception of the Cold War and America’s goals in the conflict constantly shifted.
Namely, while these Americans’ commitment to their own national uniqueness remained,
their willingness to serve as cultural ambassadors waxed and waned at various points.
Throughout the late 1950s and most of the 1960s, an overwhelming majority of
exchangees described their efforts to tell the Soviet people about the virtues of American
democracy and capitalism. Many suggested that a central purpose of the program was to
use exchange participants as representatives of the United States, and they repeatedly
recalled their attempts to relay the merits of American life to the Soviet people through
stories about themselves and through disseminating Western products and publications.
Though US-Soviet relations were far from consistently positive in this period, this
showed that there was not yet a widespread questioning of the Cold War consensus and
the strategy of containment among this segment of ordinary Americans. Likely
emblematic of larger trends in American public opinion, these individuals still maintained
that American values could and should be transplanted abroad, especially behind the Iron
Curtain. These trends changed so dramatically after 1968, though, that they were
certainly indicative of a widespread shift in public perception of the Cold War. Almost
none of the exchangees from the late 1960s to the early 1980s relayed any concern with
actively promoting a positive image of the United States or working to transplant
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American values abroad. At a time when the quagmire of the Vietnam War made many
Americans question the feasibility of such efforts, the vast majority framed the exchange
as simply an academic endeavor and eschewed the prospect of serving as America’s
cultural diplomats. This indicated a temporary shift away from a central facet of
American identity, specifically the idea that national greatness depended on exerting
power and influence globally. It was not until the mid-1980s, when President Ronald
Reagan began to show that cooperation with the Soviets at the high policy level was
indeed possible, that American exchangees began overwhelmingly to reassert their desire
to promote American values among the Soviet people. Though examinations of public
opinion polls, the media, and public figures show that shifting perceptions of the Vietnam
War created a sea change in Americans’ opinions on US foreign policy and America’s
role in the world, these exchange reports provide a specific and detailed case study of just
how important these changes were in shaping the beliefs and actions of individual
Americans.
Lastly, this research reinforces the important connections between diplomatic,
cultural, and social history. Throughout the exchange, American policymakers in various
agencies and levels throughout the US government sought to use the exchange as a
foreign policy tool to improve America’s image abroad. While it is significant to
understand these top individuals’ goals and desires for the program, especially to fully
comprehend America’s Cold War strategy, it is also extremely important to know
whether the participants themselves shared these overarching aims and actually carried
them out. Throughout the Cold War, there appears to be a constant interplay between
high foreign policy and American public opinion, with each influencing and reshaping
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the other. Because these two threads were never fully independent of one another, each
would be difficult to fully comprehend individually. Therefore, as has been the case with
the historiography of American foreign relations in recent years, diplomatic historians
should continue to incorporate non-government perspectives and public opinion into their
works in order to provide a more complete image of the formulation of American foreign
policy. These two fields of study, diplomatic and cultural history, are not at odds with one
another but can be effectively utilized together.
Sources such as these post-trip exchange reports provide a fascinating look into
the beliefs and perspectives of ordinary Americans living under the shadow of the Cold
War. While each individual was different, overarching trends observed in their narratives
show that the conflict did alter their worldview and that it framed how they
conceptualized their own country and its place in the world. Although most of them
treasured the cultural enrichment gained from a firsthand look into Soviet society, most
indicated their readiness to return to “normal” life back in the United States. Judith C.
Shapiro, an economist who spent a semester in the Soviet Union, described this situation
aptly in 1985. “In short,” she said, “it is very much like going to the moon.”460

Judith C. Shapiro, Exchange report, 1985, Council for International Exchange of Scholars Collection,
University of Arkansas Library, Fayetteville, Arkansas.
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